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Abstract 
One major issue in studying payout policy concerns the information implicit in payout 
announcements. It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore why the firms make 
substantial cash distributions by dividends or share repurchases under the scenario of 
information asymmetry. Of particular interest, this thesis aims to clarify 1) whether 
the wealth effect of dividend announcements exists while earnings and dividends are 
announced simultaneously, 2) whether current or future earnings are the information 
conveyed by dividend announcements, and 3) whether share repurchase 
announcements signal, and if they do, whether they signal the same information as 
dividend announcements. 
The evidence of this thesis suggests that dividend effect exists even when dividend 
and earnings are announced simultaneously. Dividend changes appear to play a 
confirmative role for the earnings increase announcements which alone are not 
reliable enough to earn investors' trust. By comparison, earnings decline 
announcements per se are informative for investors and possess prominent effect on 
the market reactions. Moreover, the evidence, after controlling mean reversion and 
autocorrelation in earnings process, shows that current but not future earnings changes 
are the information which dividend changes convey. When making dividend decisions, 
managers are also found to take account of current rather than future earnings 
performance. With respect to share repurchase announcements, the evidence indicates 
that share repurchase announcements signal good news to the market and are likely 
made after a long-term drop in share prices. More specifically, comparing the 
managerial motives for different payout decisions reveals that share repurchase 
announcements mainly signal for the undervaluation of the firm value while dividends 
are announced to signal for the firms' superior operating performance. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. First view of payout policy 
Payout policy, one of the most controversial issues in corporate finance, is becoming 
increasingly crucial in that the policy per se is involved with substantial cash 
distribution and, furthermore, the policy closely pertains to firms' financing and 
investment decisions. To date a variety of options, including regular dividends, 
extraordinary dividends, special dividends, and share repurchases, have been available 
for managers' preference on payout methods'. However, the issue as to why firms pay 
out is as yet an enigma. This thesis, specifically, focuses on 1) regular dividends 
(hereafter, dividends or cash dividends) which are traditionally a primary payout 
mechanism, and 2) share repurchases which surge as a popular payout device in 
recent years. Recently, a great amount of researchers have provided insights, 
theoretically as well as empirically, into the payout policy puzzle. With regard to 
dividends and share repurchases, in general, agency problem2, clientele effect3 and 
information signalling4 have been most frequently mentioned by previous studies as 
the three major managerial motivations. For share repurchases alone, some other 
studies additionally suggest that share repurchases are utilised with a view to 
1 Managers may account stock dividends as another payout option, but stock dividends do not directly 
affect' the-firms' ·cash flow;· Instead;" firms distribute new·shares tcrtheir sliarelioiOers:'·suc!l'(fjstributions 
were popularly imposed by British companies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but are 
not prevalent recently (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987). 
2 See Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986). 
3 See Elton and Gruber (1970) and Pettit (1977). 
4 See Bhattacharya ( 1979) and Miller and Rock (1985). 
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substituting dividends (Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Grullon and Michaely, :2002), 
signalling undervaluation (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 2000; Oswald and 
Young, 2004), or preventing dilution of earnings (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 
2003). 
Among the various predictions regarding the managerial motivations, the signalling 
theory can be accounted one of the most prominent theories in that its prediction 
directly links dividends and share repurchases with the important source of funds in 
payout policies, that is, firms' earnings. In light of the signalling theory, a number of 
empirical evidence to emerge from previous studies shows that shareholders 
experience increases in profits around the announcements of dividend increases and 
share repurchases, but suffer losses or earnings declines around dividend cuts (see 
Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Comment and Jarrell, 1991 
etc). Moreover, a number of literature about the evidence on signalling of dividends or 
share repurchases for firms' current or future earnings performance has been 
documented (Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Lie, 2005). 
In addition to the signalling theory, the undervaluation hypothesis of share 
repurchases has also drawn increasing attention in that not only signalling for firms' 
performance but also signalling for firms' undervaluation may be the motivation for 
announcing share repurchases. The underlying reason for this speculation is that share 
repurchases are implemented by share transactions (while dividends are not) and 
repurchasing firms very likely take advantage of their private information to buy back 
own shares with bargain prices. The existing studies have reported that share 
repurchase announcements signal for the firm's undervaluation (see Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Oswald and Young, 2004). 
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Theories and prior evidence discussed above demonstrate different explanations for 
the determinants of firms' payout policy. The aim of this thesis, of particular interest, 
is exploring the following questions: 1) whether dividends possess signalling power 
when they are simultaneously announced with earnings, 2) whether current or future 
earnings changes are the information signalled by dividend changes, and 3) whether 
share repurchases signal, and if they do, whether share repurchases announcements 
signal identical information with dividends. This thesis, on one hand, aims to helps 
managers make use of signalling devices more efficiently. On the other hand, 
investors could better understand the information implicit in dividend announcements 
and share repurchase announcements. 
1.2. Market reactions to simultaneous dividend 
and earnings announcements 
The signalling model of Miller and Rock (1985) suggests that dividends convey the 
missing piece of information about current earnings to investors who then accordingly 
update their expectations of future earnings. As a result, the shareholders' wealth 
effect should be induced by the information about firms' earnings performance 
implicit in dividend announcements rather than the announcements per se. Among the 
enormous previous studies focusing on the market reactions to dividend 
announcements, the evidence that markets react positively to dividend increases and 
negatively to dividend cuts5 has been well documented. Nonetheless, far too little 
atten~ionJlas beyn paid to co11trol the earnings information which h~s been,hdd by 
investors on the time of dividend announcements. Lack of considering the earnings 
5 See the empirical evidence provided by Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983) and 
many others or the discussion in Alien and Michaely (2003). 
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information already held by investors may result in spurious findings of dividend 
effect. This underlying reason motivates this thesis to jointly examine the market 
reactions to the information of dividend and earnings announcements. 
According to the suggestion of the dividend signalling model, dividend effect should 
diminish or disappear after the earnings information is adequately controlled. 
Relatively, once the earnings effect has been controlled, any shareholders' wealth 
effect detected around dividend announcements can be attributed to "real" dividend 
effect. Conroy, Eades, and Harris (2000) suggest that simultaneous dividend and 
earnings announcements provide a good opportunity for empirical studies to test the 
relative effects of dividends and earnings on share prices based on the same 
information set. In the UK, dividends and earnings are announced simultaneously, of 
which can be taken advantage by this thesis to adequately control for earnings effect 
and detect "real" dividend effect (if any). 
Moreover, the information about large firms is more focused by analysts who in turn 
bring more information about the large firms to the market. Previous studies indicates 
that the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors is greater in 
small firms than that in large firms, leading to the bigger market reactions to the 
announcements made by small firms than by large firms. Freeman (1987) and Ball 
and Kothari ( 1991) provide the evidence for the association between the market 
reactions and the differential information for earnings announcements while Bajaj and 
Vijh (1990; 1995) and Bali (2003) find the similar evidence for dividend 
announcements. However, the tests on the differential information to date have not 
been carried out for simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements whose 
dividends and earnings are released on the same information set. As a consequence, 
5 
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another motivation of this thesis is to understand whether the market reactions to the 
simultaneous announcements are dependent on the level of information asymmetry. 
The market reactions to the simultaneous announcements are firstly examined to 
understand whether the market reactions are dependent on the information in dividend 
announcements or earnings announcements. More explicitly, the market reactions are 
further tested by the regression analysis for the purpose of finding out whether it is the 
dividend, earnings, or interaction effect the main factor affecting shareholders' wealth. 
The signalling theory of dividends predicts that, if dividend effect exists, the market 
reaction around the announcement day should be dependent on the news signalled by 
dividend announcements. If earnings announcements have captured most information 
about earnings performance, the market is expected to depend on the information in 
earnings announcements and no dividend effect is expected. In addition, if the market 
jointly evaluates the information implicit in the simultaneous announcements, the 
positive relation between the market reaction and the interaction effect is expected. 
On the other hand, to examine whether the market reactions are dependent on the 
level of information asymmetry, firm size is used as the proxy for the level of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. The market reactions to the 
simultaneous announcements are tested by the differential information hypothesis 
stating that the information released by small firms elicits greater market reactions 
than that by large firms. 
The evidence of comparing the market reactions to the simultaneous announcements 
of dividends and earnings confirms the existence of both dividend effect and earnings 
effect. Nevertheless, dividend effect seems to be more prominent than earnings effect. 
6 
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When dividend and earnmgs signal for contradictory information, the market 
reactions are found to be more dependent on the information in dividend 
announcements. 
More explicit implication to emerge from the evidence shows that, dividends play a 
confirmative role for earnings increases, but not for earnings declines. This, however, 
may stem from that managers are reluctant to cut dividends when the firms' earnings 
are in depression (Lintner, 1956), making the information signalled by dividends 
become unreliable and that by the earnings declines relatively creditable. Furthermore, 
the market reactions are likewise detected to pertain to the subsequent earnings 
changes, indicating that the market may correctly anticipate the future earnings based 
on the information content ofthe simultaneous announcements. 
Moreover, the simultaneous announcements made by small firms are found to elicit 
greater market reactions than those made by large firms. This phenomenon is found to 
be particularly prominent for the firms which announce simultaneous increases in 
dividends and earnings. Consistent with the differential information hypothesis, the 
level of information asymmetry are greater in small firms than that in large firms, 
leading to the findings that the simultaneous announcements made by small firms are 
more informative to investors. 
1.3. Dividend signalling and earnings information 
Based on the signalling model of Miller and Rock (1985), beyond the information of 
current earnings, dividends may indirectly convey the information about future 
earnings. Debates have been raised about whether dividends only represent current 
7 
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earnings or further signal for future earnings. The findings, combined with the 
evidence on the significant relation between dividends and current earnings, indicate 
that dividend changes are associated with current rather than future earnings changes 
(e.g. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997; Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler, 
2005). However, Nissim and Ziv (200 1 ), by contrast, report that dividends are capable 
of signalling for future earnings for up to two subsequent years. Interestingly, Healy 
and Palepu (1988) and some others demonstrate that the earnings changes reverse in 
the subsequent years of dividend changes. This, however, is contradictory to the 
notion that dividends signal for future earnings. Taken together, the findings on the 
relations between dividend signalling and earnings performance are still controversial, 
motivating this thesis to find out the real information signalled by dividends and 
provide incremental evidence on this issue. Given the miscellany of prior evidence, 
understanding the potential reasons leading to these results is important before 
carrying out examinations. 
Among the prevwus studies, a major controversy among the prevtous studies is 
whether the methods applied are appropriate for controlling the mean reversion and 
(or) autocorrelation in earnings process as the results obtained could possibly differ in 
light of various methods. To this end, this thesis engages in various models and 
methods to control the nonlinear patterns in earnings process and meanwhile critically 
examine the association of dividend changes with current and future earnings changes. 
The first method, the categorical analysis, compares the current and future earnings 
performance of the firms with different dividend decisions. Considering the dividend 
signalling hypothesis, it is predicted that the firms with dividend increases (cuts) 
should have better (worse) current and future earnings performance than the firms 
with dividend continuations. Further taking account of the mean reversion and 
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autocorrelation in earnings process, the second method, the multivariate regression 
models, critically examines the relation between dividend changes and the changes in 
current or future earnings. Since large earnings changes are indicated to reverse faster 
than small earnings changes (Fama and French, 2000), taking the mean reversion and 
the autocorrelation in earnings process into consideration is of vital importance when 
forecasting earnings changes. Based on the signalling theory of dividends, this thesis 
hypothesises that the relations between dividend changes and current earnings 
changes and between dividend changes and future earnings changes should be 
positive. The third method applies the logit model in an attempt to investigate the 
influence of current and future earnings changes on managers' propensity for dividend 
increases and cuts. If the dividend signalling hypothesis is supported, current and (or) 
future earnings increases (declines) should raise the likeliness of dividend increases 
(cuts). 
In this thesis, directly testing the relation between dividend and earnings changes 
proposes that dividend changes mainly represent current earnings performance. While 
the signalling models predict that dividend changes also signal for the information 
about firms' future performance, this thesis does not find explicit evidence supporting 
this notion. Furthermore, managers' decisions on dividends are found to be influenced 
by current earnings changes but not future earnings changes. The findings on the 
information of dividend signalling in this thesis are consistent with the findings of 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler 
(2005) but inconsistent with the findings ofNissim and Ziv (2001). 
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1.4. Managerial motives and shareholders' wealth 
effect of share repurchase announcements 
Considering that share repurchases appear to be an alternative method of cash 
distribution emerging last decade, researchers have shown an increasing interest in 
understanding whether share repurchase announcements signal for new information 
and whether the announcements signal for the same information as dividend 
announcements do. To date, previous studies extensively focus on the US share 
repurchases while the UK share repurchases have drawn little attention. Due to the 
potential effect of different regulations and taxation6, the share repurchases in the UK 
merits more comprehensive investigations. 
Recently, the studies of Rau and Vermaelen (2002), and Oswald and Young (2004) are 
the two recent studies which focus on investigating the UK share repurchases. 
Nonetheless, the database (SDC) used by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) has been 
criticised for exclusing comprehensive observations of the UK share repurchases. 
Moreover, the main focus of Rau and Vermaelen (2002) is on the effect of the changes 
in tax regimes on shareholders' wealth around share repurchase announcements. 
Oswald and Young (2004), on the other hand, only concentrate on testing open market 
share repurchases. With an increasing attention paid on this alternative payout 
mechanism, relative insufficiency in prior evidence for the UK share repurchases 
inspires this thesis to test and to understand the information implicit in the UK share 
6 Prior to 71h October 1996 in the UK, off-market repurchases (tender offer and privately-negotiated 
share repurchases) are likely the favourite payout method of taxpayers while dividends should be the 
favourite methodof tax-exempt investors. From 8th October 1996, a tax reform. no .longer allows 
tax:exempf" investors · reclaifuirl!(tne' 'tax. credits ·for'' off--Market''"I'epurchases: 'Thisc' reform ·makes 
tax-exempt investors become indifferent between off-market repurchases and open market repurchases. 
The tax credit for dividends is further eliminated for tax-exempt institutional investors on 2"d July 1997 
and for all other tax-exempt investors on 151 April 1999, making dividends less attractive to tax-exempt 
investors. More details about the tax reforms in the UK can be found in Section 5.2.1. of this thesis, 
Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005). 
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repurchase announcements. Furthermore, neither of Rau and Vermaelen (2002) nor 
Oswald and Young (2004) examine the shareholders' wealth effect of the UK tender 
offer repurchases. Since the US findings suggest that share repurchases with different 
methods 7 are different in their shareholders' wealth effect, this thesis is prompted to 
investigate whether the similar phenomenon exists in the UK share repurchases. 
On the other hand, due to the nature of share repurchases8, managers may announce 
share repurchases for not only signalling firms' performance but also signalling the 
undervaluation of firm value. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995; 2000) 
respectively suggest that the US and Canadian share repurchases are made for 
signalling undervaluation while Oswald and Young (2004) confirms that the 
undervaluation is also the determinant for firm to buy back own shares in the UK. 
Nonetheless, most of prior studies focus on only one of the potential motivations for 
announcing share repurchases, which neglects a possibility that managers may, by 
utilising share repurchase announcements, communicate two or more sorts of 
information to markets simultaneously. With taking this possibility into account, this 
thesis jointly examines whether share repurchases are announced for signalling 
undervaluation, signalling firms' performance and substituting dividends. 
Another reason makes this chapter important is that this study compares the 
managerial motivations for announcing share repurchases with those for announcing 
dividends. For the UK market, this comparison has not been carried out in prior 
7 tile eviOence from th{US repurchase shows th'at market reacts riiofepositiVely to~tlie aimcniilce'inents 
of tender offer repurchase than the announcements of open market repurchase (Comment and Jarrell, 
1991 ). In addition, prior evidence shows that the market responds positively to the privately negotiated 
repurchases announcements with repurchase premiums but negatively to those for greenmail (Peyer 
and Vermaelen, 2005; Bradley and Wakeman, 1983). 
8 Share repurchases are implemented by share transactions but dividends are not. 
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studies9. Nonetheless, the comparison of the managerial motivations is crucial in that 
the evidence could help to figure out the role share repurchases play in payout policy 
and the reasons why managers choose between dividends or share repurchases as the 
payout mechanism. 
This thesis, therefore, examines the shareholders' wealth effect in term of various 
repurchasing methods as well as compares the managerial motives for different 
payout decisions. The examinations on the UK share repurchases are mainly threefold. 
First and foremost, in order to figure out whether share repurchases with different 
buyback methods are indifferent to the market, the short-term abnormal returns are 
tested for the period around the announcements. This thesis hypothesises that 1) the 
market reactions to share repurchases announcements should be positive and 2) the 
market reactions to tender offer repurchase announcements should be greater due to 
the repurchase premiums offered by tender offer repurchases. Secondly, to test the 
undervaluation hypothesis, the long-term abnormal returns are examined for a 
four-year period centred on the announcements. If the undervaluation of the share 
prices is a reason for announcing share repurchases, the announcements are 
hypothesised to follow a downtrend of long-term return performance and precede an 
upward return performance. The third examination applies the multinomial logit 
model to compare the managerial motives for different payout decisions on share 
repurchases and dividends. The comparison of the managerial motives helps to 
understand whether dividend and share repurchase announcements signal for the same 
information and whether share repurchases can be used as a means of distributing 
cash to substitute for cash dividends. 
9 See Rees (1996), Lasfer (2002), Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Oswald and Young (2004). 
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The evidence to emerge from the short-term shareholders' wealth effect corroborates 
that the announcements of share repurchases are generally good news for the 
shareholders. Particularly, consistent with the US findings of Comment and Jarrell 
(1991), the tender offer repurchase announcements induce larger positive market 
reactions than the open market repurchase and the privately-negotiated repurchase 
announcements. On the other hand, the evidence on the long-term return performance 
is in favour of the undervaluation hypothesis by showing that the firms announcing 
share repurchases have experienced a long-term drop in share prices before the 
announcements. Furthermore, the shareholders seem to have received the information 
about the undervaluation and the share price reverses around the month of the 
announcements. Taken together, the evidence on the long-term returns performance is 
consistent with the findings of Oswald and Young (2004) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen (1995; 2000). Finally, comparing the managerial motives for share 
repurchases and for dividends generates the evidence suggesting that dividends and 
share repurchases are announced with different motivations. In this respect, it is 
indicated that the primary motive for announcing share repurchases should be 
signalling for the undervaluation while signalling for firms' operating performance is 
the main motive for announcing dividends. Furthermore, since these two payout 
mechanisms are used for different purposes, they are unlikely the substitute for each 
other. 
1.5. Plan of the study 
The remainder thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews extensive literature 
on dividends and share repurchases. Both theoretical and empirical studies are 
thoroughly discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, it identifies the gaps of prior 
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literature and provides insightful understanding on the mam issues about payout 
policy. 
When dividends are believed to signal for the information about earnings, markets 
should have positive reaction to good news and negative reaction to bad news. The 
UK firms which announce dividends and earnings simultaneously provide an ideal 
circumstance for testing "real" dividend effect by controlling earnings effect. The tests 
are presented in Chapter 3. 
Directly exammmg the association of dividend changes with current and future 
earnings changes, this thesis is particularly interested in finding out whether dividends 
signal reliable information for future earnings beyond the information about current 
earnings. The empirical examinations are presented in Chapter 4. 
With the emergence of share repurchases in recent years, this thesis examines the 
wealth effect of share repurchase announcements. Moreover, the potential factors 
(motivations) which induce managers to make different payout decisions are 
examined by the multinomial logit model. The examinations are carried out in 
Chapter 5. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes and summarises the findings of this thesis. This chapter 
also discusses the implications of this thesis for managers and investors. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Issues in Dividends and Share 
Repurchases 
2.1. Introduction 
Regular cash dividends, among numerous strategies of cash distribution, have long 
been a major form of payout for managerial decisions. The dividends are paid 
quarterly in the US and semi-annually in the UK. Relative to the regular cash 
dividends, firms may distribute special dividends (or specially designated dividends) 
to indicate these dividends are not recurrent. Normally, firms, possessing temporary 
excess funds, distribute special dividends instead of committing to pay them regularly. 
Alternatively, share repurchases may be used by firms for the purpose of distributing 
cash and buying back their own shares. Similar to special dividends, share 
repurchases are not a recurrent policy. However, comparing to dividends, it is 
suggested that different characteristics are inherent in share repurchases. For example, 
managers are allowed to receive dividends whereas they are not allowed to participate 
in share repurchases. Previous study into share repurchases shows that the strict 
regulations have been set on in many countries to prevent managers' deliberate 
manipulation on share prices (Sabri, 2003). Another type of dividends which does not 
directly affect the firms' cash flow is stock dividends. Instead of distributing cash, 
stock dividends distribute a proportionate of new shares to shareholders in the light of 
their share holdings. It is analogous to that shareholders first receiving cash dividends 
from firms reinvest in the firms' stocks afterwards. Normally, the growth firms with 
more investment opportunities and eagerness for more cash flow tend to distribute 
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stock dividends. 
It is important to note that dividend irrelevance proposition, introduced by Miller and 
Modigliani ( 1961 ), has provided a revolutionary influence on the traditional view 
about dividend policy to date. Before the proposition is presented, the corporate 
officials and investors broadly believe that higher dividend leads to higher firm value. 
For example, given a constant on investors' required rate of return, the dividend 
discount model indicates that the present firm value is determined by current and 
future dividends. By contrast, the dividend irrelevance proposition proposes that the 
real increase in firm value should result from increase in firm's investments rather 
than sole increase in dividends. 
The proposition starts from presuming that the sources and the uses of firm's funds 
have to be balanced over any given period. Suppose that a firm has two sources of 
funds which are retained earnings and the funds financed externally. During the same 
period, the firm expends its funds on either investments or dividends. The balance can 
be expressed as Eq. (2 .1): 
E(t) + M(t) = D(t) + /(t), (2.1) 
where E(t) denotes retained earnings at the start of period t, iJS(t) denotes external 
funds financed during period t with ex-dividend price10, D(t) and I(t) respectively 
denote dividend and investments during time t. 
On the other hand, given the rate of return on each share of the firm equals r(t), the 
10 Note that negative LIS(t) indicates share repurchases. 
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share price of the period t (denoted as p(t)) in perfect capital markets can be expressed 
as Eq. (2.2): 
1 
p(t) = (d(t) + p(t + 1)), 
1 + r(t) (2.2) 
where d(t) denotes dividend per share during time t and p(t+ I) denotes the 
ex-dividend share price. If the firm does not raise external funds during the period t, 
the total value of the firm at the start of period t (denoted as V (t)) can be expressed as 
Eq. (2.3): 
1 
V(t) = (D(t) + V(t + 1)). 
1 + r(t) (2.3) 
Nevertheless, ifthe firms raise external funds (L1S(t)), Eq. (2.3) has to be amended as 
Eq. (2.4): 
1 
V(t) = (D(t) + V(t + 1)- M(t)). 
1 + r(t) (2.4) 
Recalling Eq. (2.1 ), the divergence between total dividends and the raised funds 
equals the residuals of retained earnings after investments. The equilibrium can be 
express as Eq. (2.5): 
E(t)- I(t) = D(t)- flS(t). (2.5) 
Thus, Eq. (2.4) can be rearranged as Eq. (2.6): 
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1 V(t) = (E(t) + V(t + 1)- l(t)). 
1 + r(t) (2.6) 
Eq. (2.6) clearly indicates that, given the firm's retained earnings, the decision of 
investments is the only element which determines the firm value of the period t. Since 
the firm value of the period t+ 1 is also predicted by the subsequent retained earnings 
and investments, it becomes that the firm value is determined by the sequential 
investment policy. With respect to the dividend decision during each period, after the 
decision of investments is made, the divergence between total dividends and the 
externally raised funds should be equal to the residual of retained earnings. 
Consequently, for each level of dividend decided, the firm could correspondingly 
finance externally to make balance between the uses and the sources of the funds. It 
follows that dividend policy does not possess any influence on firm value in perfect 
capital markets. 
In the real world, however, it is hard to find perfect capital markets. The major 
imperfect elements discussed in previous studies are 1) information asymmetry, 2) 
agency problems and 3) the tax differentials between dividend and capital gains. 
While information asymmetry exists between insiders (managers) and outsiders 
(investors), the information about stocks is no longer freely available for all traders. 
The underlying idea is that insiders know the real value of their firms in that they 
possess more information about investments and expected profits (Jaffe, 1974). By 
contrast, outsiders can only get information from financial reports or speculate about 
real firm value via firm's announcement, such as dividend or repurchases 
imposed by managers in order to change the outsiders' evaluation on their firms. 
According to the signalling theory of payout policies, managers use dividend or 
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repurchases to signal for their expected earnings and profits. Relatively, investors 
respond positively to dividend increases or share repurchases and negatively to 
dividend cuts. 
The second imperfect element is the agency problem exiting between managers and 
shareholders. Without complete contracts, managers may operate the firms in the light 
of their own interests. An implication of this is the possibility that expenses are 
lavished on unproductive projects or are consumed as perquisites by managers. 
However, dividend or share repurchases could serve as a tool to reduce free cash flow 
available for managers and therefore abbreviate the agency problem. Moreover, it 
follows that increases in payouts may likewise force the firms to enter the capital 
markets more frequently and thus get monitored. 
The tax differentials are the third imperfection which makes the investors no longer 
neutral between dividends and capital gains. A dollar of dividend becomes less 
valuable than a dollar of capital gains when the tax on dividend is higher, and vice 
versa. Similarly, with the same value of cash payout, the investors may also prefer 
share repurchases to dividend when capital gains are taxed on a lower rate. It follows 
that investors may bias evaluate the firm value due to their discrimination between 
dividend and capital gains. The dividend clientele hypothesis predicts that investors 
would invest in the stocks whose payout policy is consistent with their best interests. 
Relatively, managers would make the payout policy accordingly in an attempt to 
reduce the potential transaction costs for their clienteles. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the 
theoretical and empirical studies with respect to dividend and asymmetric information, 
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followed by Section 2.3 which reviews the studies on the agency theory and the 
clientele hypothesis of dividends. Section 2.4 reviews the studies on share repurchases 
and the conclusion is presented in Section 2.5. 
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2.2. Dividends and asymmetric information 
2.2.1. Signalling models 
What is proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961) on dividend irrelevant theory is 
founded on the assumption of perfect capital markets. An underlying implication of 
the theory is that dividend policy may affect firm value if this assumption is not held. 
Asymmetric information between investors and managers is a kind of market 
imperfection. Managers possess more insiders' information about firms' policies 
whereas investors can only revise the expected firm performance by evaluating the 
firms' signals. Given firms' investment policy set, dividend policy is a residual of the 
investment policy, and dividend changes should be driven by the changes in earnings. 
Consequently, dividend is thought to convey information about earnings even if 
managers have no intention to signal. 
Although dividend effect has been detected earlier in the 1970s 11 , it is until 1979 that 
the first signalling model is originated. One very initiative paper in this topic is that by 
Bhattacharya (1979) who develops the signalling model in which consists of two 
periods. In the first period, managers decide the investment policy which they are 
going to carry out and thereby make a commitment of dividends to their shareholders. 
In the second period, managers distribute dividends which they committed in the 
previous period by using the proceeds of the investment projects. 
A crucial assumption implicit in Bhattacharya's (1979) model is that access to capital 
markets for external financing is costly. In light of this assumption, it is supposed that 
if firms are incapable of meeting the dividend commitments, the firms will be forced 
11 See Pettit (1972) and Brown, Finn, and Hancock (1977). 
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to finance externally and therefore incur transaction costs. The increasing frequencies 
of external financing are likewise considered to raise the transaction costs, and in turn 
increase the costs of signalling. As a consequence, if the committed dividend is high 
enough, a firm with inferior investment projects is unable to mimic the dividend 
decisions of a firm investing in productive projects. Otherwise, the transaction costs 
incurred by the inferior firms may exceed the signalling benefits generated by 
mimicking the better firms' dividend decisions. 
Nevertheless, Bhattacharya's (1979) model fails to shed light on why dividend are 
made to signal when they are costly (Allen and Michaely, 2003). Since the real value 
of the firms will be disclosed when the firms realise the proceeds of the previous 
period's investment projects in the second period, it is questionable whether it is 
worth to pay a lot of cash merely to signal for the next period. Furthermore, 
Bhattacharya ( 1979) assumes that the incentive of signalling dividend is the rise in 
liquidation value. But then a question mentioned by Allen and Michaely (2003) is that 
why the rise in liquidation value becomes the main concerns of managers in the first 
period and prompts them to distribute cash. 
Unlike Bhattacharya's (1979) model, Miller and Rock (1985) develop a signalling 
model from the aspect of dividend, investment and financing policies. They assume 
that there are two groups of shareholders who behave differently after dividends are 
announced. A group of shareholders sell their shares after dividend announcements 
but before dividend realisations while the other hold the shares. The objective of the 
firms is to make a compatible dividend policy and maximum their wealth for these 
two groups. Additionally, as indicated by Miller and Rock (1985), the earnings are 
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only used for investments and dividends12• Based on these two assumptions, they 
derive the optimal dividend given a specific level of earnings. 
Nonetheless, with the information asymmetry between managers and investors, 
managers pay higher than the optimal dividend to eliminate the information 
asymmetry and the signalling costs are the foregone use of the funds in productive 
investments. Bearing the signalling costs may be worth for good-news firms since 
they could "avoid giving the market the false impression that earnings were not good 
enough to justify a dividend" (Miller and Rock, 1985; p. 1 045). Yet, the signalling 
costs may lower the future earnings at the same time since the firms give up a part of 
productive investment. 
The model, developed by Miller and Rock (1985), clearly explains that dividend is 
made to signal for earnings and to eliminate the information asymmetry. Unlike the 
signalling costs in Bhattacharya's (1979) model (i.e. the transaction costs of external 
financing), the signalling costs in Miller and Rock's (1985) model are the cuts in 
funds for productive investment. The model could also be applied to share 
repurchases in that the "dividend" discussed in Miller and Rock (1985) is net dividend. 
However, the assumption that earnings are only used for investment and dividend are 
rarely the case in reality. When the retained earnings are allowed in the model, the 
managers would have more flexible financial policies and signalling by dividend may 
not necessarily force managers to give up investment opportunities. 
In their model, John and Williams (1985) shed light on dividend signalling from the 
aspect of taxes and liquidity needs. With liquidity needs, both shareholders and firms 
12 The "dividend" here indicates net dividend which is dividend less any additional funds raised. 
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have to sell a partial of owning shares in order to meet their needs. It is assumed in the 
model that managers will act in the best interest of firms and current shareholders. For 
an undervalued firm, when the cash demanded by current shareholders and firms 
exceeds the overall internal cash which firms are able to supply, managers who know 
the true firm value then announce dividend to signal for the value. As a result, 
dividend announcements will raise share price, following that the shares could be sold 
at the true value. At the same time, the shareholders will be levied taxes on dividend 
but they can get compensation form the rise of share price. As for an overvalued firm, 
their managers may mimic the dividend policy of the undervalued firm, but their 
shareholders will be levied more taxes on the higher dividends. Since the shares held 
by these shareholders are not worthy enough, higher tax costs will offset their benefits 
from the rise of share price. 
What is different from that in Bhattacharya (1979) is the role of tax costs in John and 
Williams (1985). While Bhattacharya's (1979) model suggests tax costs make the 
liquidation value respond higher to dividend, tax costs in John and Williams' (1985) 
model is the signalling costs which distinguish firms' true value. Nonetheless, Alien 
and Michaely (2003) criticise that the model based on the assumption that liquidity 
needs could only be achieved by selling shares is questionable. There are still a 
number of methods which could meet shareholders' liquidity needs, such as 
borrowing from banks or using credit cards, and the interest costs might be lower than 
tax costs on dividends. 
In contrast to the aforementioned models developed on the basis of dividend's 
signalling for the proceeds of investments, Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987) 
develop a model in which both dividend and investment are employed to signal for 
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firm's value. Their model proposes that a valuable firm may signal solely by dividend, 
but signalling by both investment and dividend are more efficient and are capable of 
maximising shareholders' wealth. In their model, managers are assumed to maximise 
their shareholders' wealth and avoid their rivals' mimicry on signalling. Under these 
assumptions, Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987) compare less valuable firms with 
more valuable firms. For less valuable firms, their managers do not worry about 
mimicry and the firms do not entail signalling costs as under systematic information. 
The optimal decision to maximise their shareholders' wealth is to pay no dividend and 
to invest in non-negative NPV projects. By contrast, managers in more valuable firms 
need to signal for their value, preclude rivals' mimicry and maximise shareholders' 
wealth. Their dividend policy relies on the information which is mainly asymmetric 
between the firms and the investors. 
With asymmetric information, the present value of investment, including assets in 
place and investment opportunities, is only known by insiders (directors and 
managers), but is unobserved by outsiders (investors). In this scenario, more value 
firms could decide to signal for their true value either solely by dividend or by both 
dividend and investment. When signalling solely by dividend, the dividend has to be 
high enough to preclude mimicry given an optimal investment level. However, such 
signalling is feasible but inefficient. When the asymmetric information between firms 
and investors is mainly on assets in place, the model suggests that the more valuable 
firms reduce their investment level and pay fewer dividends, which is also capable of 
precluding mimicry and maximising shareholders' wealth. Alternatively, when the 
asymmetric information is mainly on investment opportunities, the firms could make 
the signalling efficient by increasing investment level and paying fewer dividends. In 
each of the two above scenarios, the higher marginal costs of adjusting investments 
25 
Chapter 2 Research issues in dividends and share repurchases 
for less valuable firms prevent the firms from mimicking dividend policy and help 
more valuable firms to minimise signalling costs. 
It is really an innovation of signalling model when Ambarish, John, and Williams 
(1987) propose that signalling costs could be minimised by signalling with both 
investment and dividend. However, in this model, the assumption that more valuable 
firms have to forego positive NPV investment projects or adopt negative NPV 
projects just for minimising signalling costs and precluding mimicry is not reasonable 
enough. It seems possible that the agency problem would arise while adopting 
negative NPV projects to minimise the signalling costs. 
Extending the model of Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987), Williams (1988) 
presents a multi-period signalling model with the same elements. In his model, firms 
observe their cash and possess private information about the returns on investment 
projects. Some feasible value of the returns, not necessarily the true value, is then 
reported to outsiders by the firms who possess private information. In order to make 
the report creditable, managers further signal by means of announcing dividends, 
investments and fractional new shares. If the signals are believed by investors, 
investors would buy the firm's stock accordingly and managers must optimise the 
policies on the three signals to meet the returns on investments they reported. In light 
of this model, it is assumed that the optimal investment is firstly financed by internal 
funds and secondly by issuing new shares. In equilibrium, firms exhaust all cash and 
sell sufficient shares to finance for their investment projects which maximise the firm 
value. Dividends are thereby distributed to signal for the finn value and to support the 
stock sale which in turn increases the external funds for investments. 
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The earlier models presented by Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and 
John and Williams (1985) emphasize more on signalling costs for precluding mimicry. 
By contrast, the later models developed by Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987) and 
Williams (1988) additionally consider the interaction between investment and 
dividend policies for the purpose of making signalling efficient and maximising firm 
value. Another observable difference among these models is the signalling costs, such 
as transaction costs in Bhattacharya (1979), forgone funds for investment in Miller 
and Rock (1985) and taxes in John and Williams (1985). Despite the variety of the 
signalling costs, they are all dissipated for precluding mimicry, which helps to 
distinguish a "good" firm from a "bad" firm. Moreover, the information signalled by 
dividends is a little different if comparing these models. Bhattacharya's (1979) model 
explicitly indicates that managers use dividends to signal for future earnings. 
Relatively, Miller and Rock's (1985) model likely indicates that dividend signals for 
current earnings while John and Williams (1985) suggests that dividends signal for the 
undervaluation of the current firm value. 
Despite the existence of some divergences among these models, there are common 
implications. Firstly, under information asymmetry, dividends are used as a 
communication mechanism between managers and shareholders. The signals from 
dividends are thought to be more creditable than press releases in that dividends are 
costly. Secondly, only valuable firms have a demand for signalling their true value. 
The underlying reason is that private information is only known by insiders but not 
observed by outsiders, signalling would make their shares valued correctly. By 
contrast, less valuable firms would prefer to disguise their true value and, if feasibly, 
they would try to mimic the payout policy of more valuable firms. This leads to the 
third implication that the cash payout for dividends has to be high enough to eliminate 
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information asymmetry and to preclude mimicry. Otherwise, signalling would fail and 
dividend is only waste of cash for both firms and their shareholders. 
2.2 .2. Prior evidence on dividend signalling 
Wealth effect of dividend announcements 
One of the implications from the dividend signalling theory predicts that markets 
respond positively to the good news conveyed by dividend increase and negatively to 
the bad news conveyed by dividend cuts. The market reactions to dividend 
announcements are usually measured by the abnormal returns around the 
announcements. The underlying hypothesis is that if positive (negative) abnormal 
returns are found around dividend increases (cuts), the theory is therefore confirmed. 
Another prediction to emerge from the signalling theory is that dividend signals the 
information about expected earnings or profits. In what follows is that a part of 
studies, focusing on testing the association of dividend changes with current and 
future earnings changes, expect to detect positive correlations between them. 
Pettit (1972) tests the abnormal returns around the dividend announcements for 14 
dividends and earnings intersectional portfolios sorted by dividend changes and 
earnings changes. As expected, market has the largest positive reaction to both 
dividend initiations and dividend increases that are larger than 25 percent. The 
evidence demonstrates that the largest negative market reaction is found for dividend 
cuts and dividend omissions. 
Aharony and Swary (1980) estimates the market reaction to dividend announcements 
by distinguishing the observations whose earnings are released preceding dividends 
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from those whose earnings are released following dividends. They report that market 
reacts positively to dividend increases and negatively to dividend cuts regardless of 
dividend announced preceding or following earnings. Additionally, their findings also 
demonstrate that market reacts severer to dividend cuts than to dividend increases. 
Confirming the findings of Aharony and Swary (1980), a test on dividend initiation is 
undertaken by Asquith and Mullins (1983). Their result shows that, with earnings 
announcements made within ten days from dividend announcements, the market 
reaction to dividend initiation becomes substantially smaller. An implication of this 
finding is that the information provided by dividend and earnings announcements are 
partially substituted. 
In 1984, Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) further study the market reaction to dividends 
and earnings announcements whose announced period is within ten days between 
each other. As the announcement days of dividends and earnings are close, Kane, Lee, 
and Marc us ( 1984) additionally investigate the interaction effect in an attempt to 
understand how the market reacts to the close announcements. Their evidence shows 
that, without considering the interaction effect, both dividends and earnings appear to 
positively pertain to cumulative abnormal returns. While the interaction effect is 
added to the regression model, the coefficients on dividends and earnings variables 
become insignificant. On the contrary, four out of five coefficients on the interaction 
variables appear to be significant. This finding implies that the market jointly 
evaluates dividends and earnings announcements. Easton (1991) studies Australian 
market in which dividend and earnings are announced simultaneously. His findings, 
similar to the findings of Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984), confirm the existence of 
interaction effect between dividends and earnings announcements and also show that 
abnormal returns are positively related to dividend changes. 
29 
Chapter 2 Research issues in dividends and share repurchases 
Another similar study is implemented by Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sinclair (1996) 
for the UK market. It is found that the earnings effect remains significant despite the 
model's inclusion of or exclusion from the interaction effect variables. This implies 
that, for the UK market, when earnings are announced simultaneously, dividend does 
not carry information about current earnings. Nonetheless, the interaction effect still 
appears to be significant, indicating that market evaluates the announcements jointly. 
Consistent with the UK findings of Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sin clair ( 1996), 
Conroy, Eades, and Harris (2000) point out that, in Japan, earnings effect also 
dominates dividend effect on explaining market response. Recalling the study of 
Dewenter and Warther (1998), Japanese firms, particularly keiretsu-member firms, 
revise their dividend policy immediately in order to reflect their current earnings. 
When 1) dividends are mostly made to reflect earnings and 2) dividend 
announcements are announced with earnings announcements, as Conroy, Eades, and 
Harris (2000) conclude, earnings announcements are capable of providing sufficient 
information, and dividends are likely redundant for signalling in Japan. 
In China, firms announce earnings, cash dividends and stock dividends 
simultaneously. Chen, Firth, and Gao (2002) suggest that, consistent with the 
aforementioned UK and Japanese findings, investors mainly react to unexpected 
earnings. The market reaction to cash dividends is unobvious and only two out of 
twelve coefficients on cash dividends are significant. 
In German, earnings are usually announced preceding dividend announcements. 
Amihud and Murgia (1997) employ regression analysis to test whether the price 
movements are induced by unexpected dividends and earnings. Their evidence shows 
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that both unexpected dividends and earrungs are positively related to two-day 
cumulative abnormal returns. However, as earnings are announced before dividends, 
dividends are expected to contain no information. The findings of abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcements implicitly indicate that dividends may 
contain other information additional to concurrent earnings. 
Dividend signalling and earnings performance 
Another approach widely employed to test dividend signalling is estimating the 
associations of dividends with current and future earnings. In a classic study, Lintner 
(1956) selects 28 out from 600 listed firms. From an interview with their top 
managements, it is found that, on one hand, the current dividend rate is viewed as an 
important benchmark for making dividend policy. On the other hand, through the 
consistency of the dividend policy, the firms believe that outsiders would perceive 
what the firms expect them to understand. That is, the information about current 
earnmgs. 
Based on the results ofthe interviews, Lintner (1956) establishes a model as Eq. (2.7) 
explaining dividend policy: 
(2.7) 
where Dit denotes dividend payment of firm i at time t, and P denotes earnings. What 
is observed from this model is that current dividend decision is based on the previous 
dividen!f and the concurrent earnings. Lintner's (1956) assertion that this model could 
explain 85 percent of dividend decisions over the post-war period is later confirmed 
by Fama and Babiak (1968) who examine a larger sample (392 firms) for a 19-year 
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period. A further suggestion by Fama and Babiak (1968) is that additionally including 
the lagged profits variables could possibly improve the predictive power of the model. 
Examinations on the earnings changes, based on both the year and the subsequent 
year respectively of paying special dividends and increasing regular dividends, is 
undertaken by Brickley (1983). The result shows that earnings increases are detected 
in both the year of special dividend paid and the year of regular dividend increases. 
What is more, the earnings increases in the subsequent year are also found for regular 
dividend increases. Consistent with the signalling theory, Brickley's (1983) finding 
suggests that regular dividend increases signal for current and future earnings. 
A further study with investigating the dividend policy of the firms which experience 
at least one annual earnings loss or declines during 1980 to 1985 is implemented by 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992). By employing binary logit model, they 
specifically report that dividend cuts are influenced by the earnings of the previous 
year, the current year and the subsequent year. The higher level of earnings the firms 
possess, the lower propensity they would cut dividends. Another important finding is 
that firms, with suffering initial loss but not cutting dividends, perform better in 
subsequent earnings than those cutting dividends and with initial earnings loss. Taken 
together, the result to emerge from their evidence on firms suffering initial earnings 
declines and loss supports the prediction ofthe dividend signalling theory. 
The framework in Aharony and Dotan (1994) examines the changes in earnings yield 
of the subsequent quarters following dividend changes. As indicated by their results 
from the regression, it is suggested that both dividend increases and dividend cuts 
have positive and significant relations with the changes in earnings yield for the 
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subsequent two quarters. Specifically, the coefficient for dividend cuts variables are 
more significant, signifying that dividend cuts are more creditable on explaining the 
changes in earnings. Additionally, as further demonstrated by Aharony and Dotan 
(1994), the earnings changes for the quarter of dividend payment are larger positive 
(negative) for dividend initiations (omissions) than for dividend increases (cuts). 
Overall, these findings support the dividend signalling theory. 
In contrast to earlier findings, however, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), 
suggest that dividend does not signal for future earnings. As demonstrated by their test 
on the signalling power of dividend increases and dividend cuts for unexpected 
earnings of the years surrounding dividend changes, their evidence, by using both 
categorical analysis and regression analysis, indicates that the information signalled 
by dividends tends to be current earnings changes. Remarkably, the relations between 
dividend cuts and future changes in earnings appear to be negative. This, however, is 
contradictory to the expectation of the dividend signalling theory. 
The models, developed by Nissim and Ziv (200 1 ), investigate the US firms for the 
period of 1963 to 1998 with further consideration to the mean reversion of earnings 
process. Moreover, in the context of testing whether dividend signals for future 
earnings, an innovative model is formed with controlling the information about future 
profits available for investors prior to dividend announcements. It is important to note 
that the control over the available information helps to detect the signals that are 
really conveyed by dividend. In this view, the evidence generated from this 
examination supports the dividend signalling theory, implying that dividend increases 
signal for the future earnings up to two subsequent years and dividend cuts up to one 
year. 
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In 1988, the study of Healy and Palepu (1988) examines the earnings performance 
around dividend initiations and omissions. Consistent with the prediction of signalling 
theory, their finding suggests that positive earnings changes follow dividend 
initiations for two subsequent years. By contrast, contradictory to the signalling theory, 
that earnings improvement following dividend omissions is detected. A possible 
explanation for this unexpected finding, according to Healy and Palepu (1988), might 
be that the potential survival bias of the dividend-omission sample. 
A similar study, implemented by Ho and Wu (2001), additionally takes the survival 
bias of the sample into account. That future earnings reversal following both dividend 
initiations and omissions is observed from their evidence with an indication that the 
post-announcement earnings performance of the dividend-initiation firms is inferior to 
the control group. Relatively, the omission firms outperform the control group in 
post-announcement earnings changes. By studying the UK sample, Balachandran, 
Cadle, and Theobald (1996) detect negative relations between future earnings changes 
and dividend cuts. Likewise, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) provide the similar findings about the U-shape 
earnings process surrounding dividend changes. Healy and Palepu (1988) name this 
U-shape earnings process a "dividend puzzle" whereas Balachandran, Cadle, and 
Theobald (1996) suggest that this phenomenon may stem from earnings' mean 
reversion. 
The potential effect of the mean reversion on testing dividend signalling has been well 
controlled in Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005). Thanks to the 
partial-adjustment model for profitability developed by Fama and French (2000), 
Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005), a\?plying the model on testing the 
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relations between dividend changes and the changes in future profitability, find that 
the relations between dividend changes and future profitability changes only appear in 
the linear model but not in non-linear models. The contribution of their finding 
implies that 1) the dividend puzzle is very likely induced by mean reversion and 
autocorrelation factors and 2) dividend changes do not signal for the changes in future 
profitability. 
An examination on Germany sample is carried out by Georgen, Renneboog, and Da 
Silva (2005). Their evidence suggests that Germany firms, except widely held firms, 
reduce dividend in order to reflect the concurrent earnings. In particular, Germany 
firms revise their dividend policy as soon as they experience earnings improvement. 
These findings are consistent with the Japanese findings of Dewenter and Warther 
(1998) for "keiretsu" firms. Nonetheless, different findings are provided by DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), who examine the US firms experiencing initial 
earnings declines after a long-term earnings growth. Their evidence shows that, 
among the 145 firms, only two of them cut dividends with their initial earnings 
declines while 44 of the firms do not change the dividends. Obviously, a majority of 
these firms are unwilling to cut dividends. As indicated by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (1996), it is suggested that managers' reluctance to cut dividend erodes the 
authenticity of signals conveyed by dividend increases. 
Examining firms' propensity for paying dividends during the period of 1978 to 2000, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) find that the increases in real earnings 13 of 
a small number of large firms explain most of the aggregate dividend increases during 
13 Since the examination of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) is carried out for a long-term 
period, for comparison purpose, the nominal earnings are converted to 1978 dollars based on the 
consumer price index. 
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the period of 1978 to 2000. The reduction in the number of dividend payers, 
mentioned in Fama and French (2001), can be mainly attributed to the firms which 
paid very small dividends and were subsequently delisted. This evidence indirectly 
supports the prediction of dividend signalling theory, indicating that earnings 
performance is an important factor influencing firms' dividend policy. 
Overall, two methods for exammmg the dividend signalling theory are used in 
previous studies. The first is to examine the market reactions to dividend 
announcements to understand whether the signalled information is perceived by the 
market. Normally, these studies expect to detect positive market reactions to dividend 
increases and negative reactions to dividend cuts to support the signalling theory. 
Alternatively, previous studies directly examine the correlations between dividends 
and earnings process. The findings of these examinations help to distinguish whether 
dividend changes reflect current of signal for future earnings performance. Generally, 
the studies which support the signalling theory find that dividends are positively 
associated with current or future earnings. Recently, a main problem raised by 
employing the first method is that little attention has been paid to finding an adequate 
method to control the existing earnings information held by analysts and investors 
while dividends are announced. Chapter 3 attempts to fill this gap by thoroughly 
examining the simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements in the UK. 
Another debate which is raised by employing the second method is placed on whether 
dividend changes represent current earnings changes or signal for future earnings 
changes. Chapter 4 will further discuss this debate and try to provide incremental 
evidence on this issue. 
Chapter 2 Research issues in dividends and share repurchases 
2.3. Dividends and other related models 
2.3.1. Dividends and agency models 
The aforementioned signalling models are developed based on the assumption that 
managers act to maximise shareholders' value. Differently, there are some other 
studies which suggest that dividends play a role as agency costs to ensure managers' 
interests are aligning with those of shareholders. Basically following Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), these studies assume that managers of a widely-held firm will lavish 
expenses and consume perquisites in their interests. The existence of agency problems 
rules out the assumption of perfect capital markets imposed in Miller and Modigliani 
(1961). It can therefore be suggested that dividend policy may be no longer irrelevant 
and may affect current firm value. 
By observing that firms often pay dividends and raise new capital simultaneously, 
Easterbrook (1984) explains dividend policy by agency costs. In the light of 
Easterbrook (1984) theory, it is suggested that, under the scenario of imperfect 
contracts (i.e. agency problem), shareholders have to bear the costs of monitoring 
managers. This, in turn, shows that dividends could be made to mitigate the agency 
problem. There are several possible explanations for this result. Firstly, dividends may 
force firms to fmance externally. As entering capital markets, the firm's financial 
condition will be reviewed by investment banks, lawyers or accountants. While the 
firm with worse financial condition will incur higher cost of capital, managers in need 
of frequently raising money will more likely act in shareholders' interests. Secondly, 
dividends, if made by internal cash, may reduce free cash flow available to managers 
(agents), leading to mitigation of the agency problem. Despite the scenario that 
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shareholders are incapable of directly monitoring the behaviour of managers, lower 
free cash flow would reduce the possibility that managers lavish money beyond 
optimal investments. Thirdly, dividends, to some extent, could prevent shareholders' 
wealth from being taken advantage of by bondholders. Suppose a rate of interest has 
been set before a firm prospers and raises earnings, the interests become relatively 
high, given the lower risk the bondholders bear after the firm's prospersity. 
Consequently, by paying dividends and issuing new debts, managers restore the initial 
debt-to-equity ratio. 
Based on the agency theory, Easterbrook (1984) provides a number of implications for 
empirical studies. Firstly, dividends per se are worthless for a firm with little agency 
problem. As a result, if firms externally finance for other purposes (rather than finance 
for dividends), it is expected that these firms pay lower dividends. This example can 
be found from "growth" firms in more demand for external funds than others. 
Secondly, the agency theory predicts that dividend policy has to be stable so as to 
keep firms in the capital markets. Hence, dividends are not expected to have a strong 
relation to short-term profits. Thirdly, contrary to the prediction of signalling theories, 
the agency theory assumes that dividends are related to past earnings and unrelated to 
future earnings. This is due that the interest conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders would compel managers to pay out the unexpected earnings for the 
purpose of avoiding windfalls taken advantage of by the bondholders. 
Shortly after Easterbrook (1984) develops an agency theory to explain dividends, 
Jensen (1986) advocates explaining dividends from the aspect of agency costs14. His 
theory suggests that dividends (or repurchases) are paid by managers with possessing 
14 However, Jensen (1986) focuses more on the relation between takeover and free cash flow. 
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substantial free cash flaw. Without paying out cash by dividends, managers may 
lavish the cash on perquisites or invest in low-return projects. Furthermore, managers 
may further commit permanent increase in dividends to control the use of future cash 
flow and imply that they act in shareholders' interests. Shareholders would punish the 
firms by sharp drop in firm prices when managers are incapable of meeting their 
commitment. 
Although the agency theory proposes how dividends mitigate agency problems, it 
does not show managers' strong incentive to pay dividends. The only apparent 
incentive to stem from is that managers would like to show what they behave is 
consistent with shareholders' interests. However, given the conflict interests between 
shareholders and bondholders 15 , the latter would prefer managers to pay limited 
dividends, particularly when the firms are in financial distress. Moreover, since the 
firms' financial conditions are reviewed by investment banks when they issue new 
debts, simultaneous dividend payments appear to be redundant. For the agency theory, 
the reason why some firms simultaneously pay dividends and issue new debts remains 
ambiguous. 
Another drawback criticised by Alien and Michaely (2003) is that the theory provides 
a reasonable explanation for dividend increases, but much less clear for dividend cuts. 
The main question addressed is that: do dividend cuts relatively indicate that firms are 
short of cash flow and hence free cash flow if dividend increases indicate that 
managers distribute free cash flow? If investment opportunities remain unchanged, 
dividend cuts induced by the short of free cash flow are not good news for 
shareholders. It is, therefore, logically to see share price drops responding to dividend 
15 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977). 
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cuts. Nevertheless, what the theory does not predict is that if the short of free cash 
flaw results from increases in investment opportunities, it should be rather good news 
for shareholders and it deserves a positive response in markets. 
In sum, dividends, in the agency models, play a role in mitigating agency problems. 
The models are based on the assumption of imperfect contracts which lead to interest 
conflicts between managers, shareholders and bondholders. Under the interest 
conflicts, dividends help to reduce free cash flaw available for managers and compel 
them to act in shareholders' interests. The contention of the agency models is different 
from that of dividend signalling models in which suggest that dividends are made to 
signal for firms' performance. However, similar to signalling models, there are also a 
number of empirical studies advocating of agency models. The empirical studies are 
discussed in the following section. 
2.3.2. Prior evidence on agency models of dividends 
Empirical evidence for the relation between dividends and agency problems are 
carried out much later than that for the dividend signalling theory. It may be partly 
due that dividends are directly linked to investments or (and) earnings in the 
pioneering studies of Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961 ), making the 
contention of the dividend signalling theory more intuitive and straight forward. 
Nonetheless, there are still a number of empirical studies supporting the agency theory 
of dividend policy. 
Effect of over-investments on dividend decisions 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) is the one which first applies Tobin's Q to examine the 
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agency theory for dividends. Firms with Tobin's Q greater than unity are designated to 
be at the value-maximising level of investment while firms with a Q ratio less than 
unity are labelled as over-investing firms. Accordingly, they separate the sample into 
two groups and compare the abnormal returns on dividend announcement days for 
value-maximising and over-investing firms. They test on "free cash flow hypothesis" 
which states that excess free cash flow would prompt managers' overinvestment and 
dividends could help to reduce free cash flow available for managers. As a result, 
dividend increases for firms with Q ratio less than unity signify lower probability of 
overinvestment. By only examining dividend changes greater than 1 0 percent, their 
findings show that the over-investing firms induce larger market responses on the 
dividend announcement day regardless of the signs of dividend changes. This 
evidence implying that dividend changes for over-investing firms convey more 
information about reducing free cash flaw is consistent with the notion of the agency 
theory. 
Similarly, Akhigbe and Madura (1996) test the relation between long-term 
post-announcement abnormal returns and Q ratio. For dividend initiations, they find 
negative relation between the wealth effect and Q ratio, implying that the wealth 
effect following dividend initiations is more favourable for over-investing firms. 
Extending the investigation of Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Yoon and Starks (1995), 
by additionally using the variables of capital expenditures, examine on the free cash 
flow hypothesis. Their evidence suggests that dividend increases for the 
over-investing firms have larger positive impact on share price than those for the 
value-maximising firms. Nonetheless, no significant difference in market responses to 
dividend cuts between over-investing and value-maximising firms is found, which is 
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different from the evidence ofLang and Litzenberger (1989). The framework in Yoon 
and Starks (1995) also shows that, the Q ratio loses its explanatory power on dividend 
effect after dividend changes, dividend yield and firm size are imposed to explain 
cumulative abnormal returns. Furthermore, tests on the relations between dividend 
changes and subsequent capital expenditures are undertaken. Their result suggests that, 
regardless of the Q ratio, dividend increases are followed by increases in capital 
expenditure while dividend cuts are followed by cuts in capital expenditures. This 
evidence, similar to the findings of Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994 ), is contradictory to 
the prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis. The only evidence in their studies 
supporting the free cash flow hypothesis is that the over-investing firms have higher 
dividend yields and larger dividend changes than value-maximising firms. 
Another study following Lang and Litzenberger's (1989) method is Ryan, Besley, and 
Lee (2000). They examine NASDAQ firms with fewer major press releases and thus 
evoking more obvious market reactions to dividend announcements. Consistent with 
the signalling hypothesis, their findings documents that the market reacts positively to 
dividend initiations and negatively to dividend omissions. Nonetheless, with further 
examinations in light of the Q ratio, they report that the free cash flow hypothesis 
predicts the information content of dividend initiation announcements well but no 
supportive evidence on dividend omission announcements is detected. 
Christie and Nanda (1994) take advantage of a special event, an unexpectedly 
introduced legislation of undistributed profits tax (UPT) by President Roosevelt, to 
examine the agency theory for dividend policies. The UPT potentially encourage 
firms to distribute the excess funds to avoid tax levied on retained earnings. The tests 
are implemented by examining market response to the tax announcement day (The 
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March 3, 1936) and real dividend changes during 1936. It is predicted that as the 
firms with lower payout ratios likely have more excess funds than others, they are 
expected to pay out more dividends after the UPT is in action. By examining the 
market responses for different levels of payout ratios, the agency theory for dividend 
policies suggests that the tax reform should have more impact on the firms with low 
payout ratios. The findings of Christie and Nanda (1994) support this notion, showing 
that tax announcement generally induces 1.23 percent of abnormal returns for the 
firms with payout ratios equal to 40 percent or less, and 0.19 percent for payout ratios 
greater than 80 percent. In addition, their regression analysis indicates that the market 
expects that the tax act would force low-Q firms (over-investing firms) to disgorge 
more cash than high-Q firms. 
Relatively, by examining real dividend growth during 1936, Christie and Nanda (1994) 
test whether the tax announcement has real effect on managers. Their result shows 
that, consistent with the expectation of the market, firms with lower payout ratios 
during 1935 generally have higher dividend growth than firms with higher payout 
ratios. Nevertheless, the evidence that firms with lower Q ratio respond to the tax act 
sluggishly and appear to have less dividend growth than firms with higher Q ratio is 
contradictory to the market's initial expectation. Christie and Nanda (1994), however, 
suggest that even the relatively small reduction in free cash flow available to 
managers who only behave in their interests is sufficient to increase firm value. 
Effects of other factors on dividend decisions 
Rozeff (1982) estimates a regression model of dividend payout ratios on previous and 
forecasted future growth rate of revenues which are respectively the proxy for past 
and future investment opportunities. Consistent with the agency theory, Rozeff (1982) 
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concludes that greater past and expected investment opportunities reduce dividend 
payouts. In an attempt to test whether the agency theory is valid on explaining the 
dividend policy in different periods, Dempsey and Laber (1992) apply Rozeff's (1982) 
model on a period which is characterised by lower inflation, stronger economic 
growth and lower taxes. Their evidence is consistent with Rozeff's (1982), concluding 
that Rozeff's (1982) model is stable enough to predict dividend payouts. 
In 1989, Crutchley and Hansen ( 1989) test the relation between capital expenditures 
and dividends. Their test, different from Yoon and Stark (1995), focuses on the 
concurrent capital expenditures of the event year rather than on the changes in capital 
expenditures around dividend payment. The capital expenditures, in Crutchley and 
Hansen (1989), are measured by the expenses on advertising, research and 
development. Their fmding of a negative relation between capital expenditures and 
dividends is consistent with the prediction that firms with higher growth opportunities 
would pay smaller dividends. Furthermore, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) also show a 
negative relation between the capital expenditures and the firm's leverage ratio. Their 
evidence for debts and dividends jointly implies that firms with less capital 
expenditures (and hence more free cash flow) tend to issue more debts or pay more 
dividends. These findings, consistent with the suggestion of Jensen (1986), proposes 
that the promise of paying out future cash flow for debts or dividends makes the 
managers with possessing more free cash flow operate the firms more efficiently. 
By using regression analysis, Smith and Watts (1992) test the relation between firms' 
finance policy, dividend policy and investment opportunities. The equity-to-value 
ratio is imposed as the proxy for finance policy in that higher debts would lead to 
lower equity-to-value ratio. Additionally, they use the ratio of book value of assets to 
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firm value in an attempt to measure firms' investment opportunities. As the higher 
ratio of assets in place to firm value indicates the lower ratio of the value of 
investment opportunities to firm value, the ratio of book value of assets to firm value 
is an inverse indicator for investment opportunities. Their evidence suggests that the 
ratio of equity to firm value is negatively related to the ratio of book value of assets to 
firm value. Jensen (1986) states that firms with higher free cash flow could issue more 
debts to force managers to make use of the free cash flow efficiently, which, in turn, 
leads to low ratio of equity to firm value. On the other hand, higher free cash flow 
also indicates lower opportunities and higher assets in place. Consequently, the 
negative relation between the ratio of equity to firm value and the ratio of book value 
of assets to firm value is consistent with Jensen's prediction. Furthermore, according 
to Easterbrook (1984 ), higher opportunities would demand more cash flow and result 
in lower dividends. Smith and Watts (1992) support this prediction and show that 
dividend yields are positively related to the ratio of book value of assets to firm value. 
Similarly, the findings in Gaver and Gaver (1993) also examine the relations between 
debts and investment opportunities and between dividends and investment 
opportunities. A major difference on this study is that Gaver and Gaver (1993) impose 
six variables to form an index to measure investment opportunities. Nonetheless, their 
findings are consistent with the findings of Smith and Watts (1992). Their evidence, in 
agreement with the contention of the agency theory for dividend policies, indicates 
that more investment opportunities are related to lower dividend yields and lower 
debt-to-equity ratio. 
Some other studies, by testing the market responses to debts or dividend 
announcements, examine the agency theory for dividend policy. Examining bond 
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prices around dividend announcement days, Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) test 
two vis-a-vis hypotheses which predict the bond price behaviour oppositely. The 
"information content hypothesis", based on signalling theory, predicts that both share 
prices and bond prices rise with dividend increases and drop with dividend cuts. By 
contrast, the "wealth redistribution hypothesis", based on agency theory, predicts the 
same on share price behaviour but oppositely on bond price behaviour. The different 
prediction on bond price by the wealth redistribution hypothesis is due that 
unexpected dividend increases may transfer bondholders' wealth to shareholders no 
matter "debt-financed" or "investment-financed" dividends. Their results, overall, 
suggest that dividend increases do not have apparent effect but dividend cuts possess 
negative effect on the bond prices. It can therefore be suggested that their evidence is 
more consistent with the information content hypothesis but is contradictory to the 
wealth redistribution hypothesis. 
By examining a larger sample, the findings ofDhillon and Johnson (1994) who carry 
out a similar test for share and bond prices support the "wealth redistribution 
hypothesis". For two-day abnormal returns around dividend announcements, their 
finding that bond prices are negatively associated with dividend changes indicates that 
unanticipated increases (cuts) in dividend are unfavourable (welcome) for 
bondholders. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) attribute the different findings from those of 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) to a larger sample they examine and their focus on 
larger dividend changes. 
Johnson (1995), by involving with debts, also tests the agency models for dividend 
policies. Nonetheless, different from the above studies, he examines the share price 
response to announcements of debt issues. In light of Jensen's (1986) suggestion, 
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debts could reduce the free cash flow problems as dividends do in that the necessity of 
meeting debts would force managers to avoid unprofitable projects. Based on this 
proposition, Johnson (1995) argues that debt issues should benefit more for firms with 
low dividend payout since debts and dividends are substitute devices for reducing the 
free cash flow problems. This argument is supported by his fmdings which show that 
market responds positively to debt issue announcements made by low-dividend firms 
and the price effect for low-dividend firms are significantly larger than that for 
high-dividend firms. What is more, among the low-dividend firms, bond issue 
announcements appear to have more impact on low-growth firms than high-growth 
firms. This is consistent with the notion that low-growth firms have severer free cash 
flow problems and are expected to benefit more on debt issues. In addition to test the 
market response to debt issues, Johnson (1995), in an attempt to compare the cash 
demands of the firms, directly examines the firms' frequencies of entering the capital 
markets. It is found that, among the low-growth firms, the firms with high dividends 
enter the capital market more frequently than those with low dividend. This evidence 
supports the agency model of Easterbrook (1984), indicating that higher dividends 
force firms to go through the monitoring of capital markets more frequently. 
By investigating different legal protection of minority shareholders across 33 
countries, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) compare dividend 
policies of companies whose minority shareholders bear difference degree of agency 
problems. They develop and test two agency models of dividends. The "outcome 
model" proposes that, under the effective legal protection, minority shareholders 
impose legal power in order to force managers to pay out dividends, precluding 
managers to lavish expenses and consume perquisites in their own interests. 
Shareholders, with perception of highly protected, are more willing to allow chances 
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for firms with more investment opportunities and thus ask for smaller dividends due 
to the understanding of the possibility for getting higher dividends from productive 
investment projects. In contrast, with poor legal protection, the model predicts that the 
shareholders may try to grasp whatever benefits they can although the cash may not 
be much. Additionally, the "outcome model" suggests, ceteris paribus, the better the 
legal protection of minority shareholders, the higher cash dividend managers are 
forced to pay. Another model is the "substitute model", suggesting dividends are a 
substitute for legal protection. With the necessity of financing externally occasionally, 
firms need to establish their reputation in advance so as to reduce the cost of capital. 
One of the approaches to establish reputation is to pay out dividends which mitigate 
agency problems. Since, in this model, dividends are regarded as a substitute of legal 
protection, paying dividends is less needed for managers in high-protection countries. 
Consequently, this model predicts that, other things equal, dividends should be higher 
in low-protection countries than in high-protection countries. Additionally, since 
growth firms are thought to have more investment opportunities and thus have greater 
needs for external funds, they are expected to pay more dividends than mature firms. 
The findings of La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) are in more 
agreement with the predictions of the "outcome model". Comparing the dividend 
policies in low-protection and high-protection countries, their evidence shows that 
firms in high-protection countries pay higher dividends than those in low-protection 
countries. In addition, the results also suggest that, in high-protection countries, the 
growth firms generally pay lower dividends than mature firms. This evidence supports 
the notion that, with good shareholder protection, shareholders are more willing to 
allow chances for the growth firms to invest in productive projects. For dividends in 
low-protection countries, the growth firms appear to have higher dividend payouts 
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than the mature firms. Nonetheless, the statistical difference between the dividend 
payouts of these two groups is insignificant. 
To conclude, the empirical studies which support the agency theory of dividend policy 
mainly provide the following implications. Firstly, firms with more investment 
opportunities (i.e. growth firms) generally have less free cash flow and pay smaller 
dividends. Furthermore, since dividend is capable of reducing free cash flaw, dividend 
made by over-investing firms are thought to be more important and thus induce higher 
price effect than dividend made by value-maximising firms. Thirdly, consistent with 
Jensen's (1986) suggestion, dividends and debts are substitute for reducing free cash 
flow available to managers. However, the evidence for the interest conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders are still divergent. 
2.3.3. Dividends and clientele effect 
In addition to the agency and signalling theories, clientele effect provides a different 
explanation for dividend policy. The assumption of perfect capital markets for the 
dividend irrelevant theory in Miller and Modigliani ( 1961) is characterised by no tax 
and transaction costs, symmetric information, and complete contracts. While the 
agency and signalling theories respectively interpret the effect of incomplete contracts 
and asymmetric information on dividend policy, the clientele effect explains dividend 
policy by taking account of tax and transaction costs. 
The clientele effect hypothesis suggests that investors are attracted to different 
dividend policies in light of their individual interests. When a firm changes its 
dividend policy, the investors who take an aversion to the change would sell their 
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shares. At the same time, the investors who favour this change would buy the shares. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis predicts that the firms with low dividend-yield (or payout 
ratio) attract investors who view dividend increases negatively and those with high 
dividend-yield (or payout ratio) attract investors who are in favour of dividends. The 
factors which drive the divergent preference for dividends between investors are 
kaleidoscopic. A number of studies mention that the tax discrimination between 
dividends and capital gains plays an important role in dividend clientele effect (e.g. 
Elton and Gruber, 1970). On the other hand, the investors' individual characteristics, 
such as age or personal incomes, are also considered to induce the dividend clientele 
effect (e.g. Pettit, 1977). 
Tax-induced clientele effect 
To measure the share price behaviour on ex-dividend days, Elton and Gruber (1970) 
develop a price-drop-to-dividend ratio. The tax discrimination between ordinary 
incomes and capital gains leads to investors' different appetites for dividends. 
Investors, selling their shares before the shares go ex-dividend, lose the right to claim 
upcoming dividends but get more capital gains. Making transactions before 
ex-dividend days, these investors are more likely in higher tax brackets and averse to 
dividends. As dividends are levied by ordinary income tax, investors may prefer to 
sell the shares at a higher price and pay the capital gains tax at a lower rate. By 
contrast, investors in lower tax brackets or exempted from ordinary income taxes may 
prefer to receive dividends and keep their shares as long as the gains from after-tax 
dividends are not smaller than the price drop on the ex-dividend day. Taken together, 
it can therefore be suggested that the basic condition for investors to keep their shares 
is to maintain their wealth on the ex-dividend day. 
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The price-drop-to-dividend ratio is derived from the wealth equilibrium on the 
ex-dividend day and on the day before the stock foes ex-dividend. The equation can 
be expressed as Eq. (2.8): 
(2.8) 
where PA and Ps respectively denote the share price on the ex-dividend day and the 
day before the stock goes ex-dividend. Pc denotes the original price at which the share 
was purchased. D denotes the amount of the dividend while the tax rates on capital 
gains and ordinary incomes are respectively denoted by tc and t0 . Rearranging the 
above equation generates the price-drop-to-dividend ratio as Eq. (2.9): 
(2.9) 
The price-drop-to-dividend ratio presents that the price equilibrium on the 
ex-dividend day depends on the tax brackets of prospective buyers and sellers. The 
investors would change the timing of their purchases or sales accordingly until the 
ex-dividend share prices are in equilibrium. Moreover, given a price-drop-to-dividend 
ratio, one could infer the tax brackets of investors. 
Since firms with different dividend yields or payout ratios attract investors with 
different dividend appetites, the price-drop-to-dividend ratio is expected to shift with 
different dividend yields or payout ratios. Based on this rationale, Elton and Gruber 
(1970) examine the relation 1) between price-drop-to-dividend ratio and dividend 
yields and 2) between price-drop-to-dividend ratio and payout ratios. They point out 
that the price-drop-to-dividend ratio almost monotonously increases with dividend 
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yield and payout ratio. Moreover, the implied tax bracket decreases as the dividend 
yield or payout ratio increases. Evidence based on Elton and Gruber (1970) implies 
that investors in higher tax brackets are more favourable to capital gains while those 
in lower tax brackets prefer higher dividends. 
Nevertheless, the estimates of the price-drop-to-dividend ratio is criticised for its 
inherency in a downward bias since Elton and Gruber (1970) estimate the ratio by 
closing prices. Kalay (1982) points out that the bias is equal to the expected daily rate 
of the stock return times the reciprocal of its dividend yield. The downward bias is 
severer for the stocks with low dividend yields than the stocks with high dividend 
yield due to the larger reciprocal of its dividend yield. After adjusting the 
price-drop-to dividend ratio, Kalay's (1982) findings that the correlation between the 
ratio and the dividend yield is still positive are in agreement with the findings of Elton 
and Gruber (1970). 
In an empirical test for Canadian market, to estimate the price drop on the ex-dividend 
day, Booth and Johnston (1984) suggest using the closing price of the last 
cum-dividend day (PB in Eq. (2.9)) and the opening price of the ex-dividend day (PA 
in Eq. (2.9)). The closing price on ex-dividend day (PA in Eq. (2.9)) is used by Elton 
and Grub er ( 1970) in that the opening price in the US market reflects the specialists' 
adjusted closing price. Nonetheless, this factor does not bias the opening price in 
Canadian market. Without the bias on the ex-dividend day opening price, the 
estimating method of Booth and J ohnston ( 1984) removes intervening price 
uncertainty between the prices of the last cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day, 
making the price drop only reflect the receipt of the dividends. Similar to the 
aforementioned studies, Booth and Johnston (1984) examine the correlation between 
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dividend yield and the price-drop-to-dividend ratio along with test for individual 
sample years. Their result, for five out of eleven sample years, shows that the simple 
rank correlation coefficients appear to be negative. This, however, is not completely 
consistent with the findings of the previous studies. Nevertheless, the time-serial 
mean ratio is positively correlated with the dividend yield, providing little evidence 
for the tax-induced clientele effect. 
For the UK market, Lasfer (1996) carries out a similar examination by dividing the 
sample into five groups in light of dividend yield. Contradictory to the findings of 
Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982), Lasfer (1996) fmds that the 
price-drop-to-dividend ratio monotonously declines as the dividend yield increases. 
His evidence shows that the mean ratio for the lowest-yield group is 0.934 which is 
closed to one while the ratio for the highest-yield group is only 0.365. For the whole 
sample, the ex-day share prices approximately drop by 64 percent of gross dividends. 
Overall, for the UK market, the test on the price-drop-to-dividend ratio fails to support 
the tax-induced clientele effect. 
More recent challenge against the price-drop-to-dividend ratio and the tax-induced 
clientele effect has been raised by Bali and Hite ( 1998). They argue that, while share 
prices on exchanges are constrained to be multiples of a tick, dividends are not. 
Consequently, the price drop on ex-dividend days cannot always be the exact amount 
of the dividends. What is more, for two different amounts of dividends which are 
equidistant from the nearest tick, the price-drop-to-dividend ratio for the larger 
dividend is more closed to unity than the ratio of the smaller dividend. Thus, Bali and 
Hite (1998) argue that the plausible correlation between dividend yields and the 
price-drop-to-dividend ratio may result from the discreteness of share prices in that 
53 
Chapter 2 Research issues in dividends and share repurchases 
dividends and dividend yields are highly correlated. Based on their findings, their 
argument is clearly supported, showing that the ratios approach unity with dividends 
and tick multiples increase but the ratios decline within each tick multiple (see Table 4, 
p. 139-140). In addition, when Bali and Hite ( 1998) estimate regressions of price 
drops on the tick below dividends, and the gap between dividends and the tick below 
dividends, the coefficient on the tick below dividends is insignificantly different from 
one and the coefficient for the gap is about one-half, indicating that the price drop is 
only slightly larger than the tick below dividends. Bali and Hite (1998), therefore, 
conclude that, without tax-induced dividend clienteles, the discreteness of trading 
prices are still capable of accounting for the price-drop-to-dividend ratio increasing 
with dividends. 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) develop an after-tax version of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which is expressed as Eq. (2.1 0): 
(2.10) 
where d; denotes the dividend yield of stock i and c is a positive coefficient which 
accounts for the taxation of dividends and interest. The other denotations remain the 
same with the original CAPM. Since the clientele hypothesis predicts that the 
investors in low (high) tax brackets invest in high (low) yield stocks, Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy ( 1979) hypothesise the coefficient c to be a linear decreasing function of 
the lh stock's dividend yield. Hence, the above model is rearranged as Eq. (2.11 ): 
(2.11) 
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where the coefficient c is replaced by (k - hd;) and both k and h are positive. The 
econometric model can be expressed as Eq. (2.12): 
(2.12) 
where y2 is the estimate of k and y4 is the estimate of -h. Actually, this model is not far 
different from the after-tax version of CAPM except the variable with Y4· By using 
maximum likelihood estimation, the estimate of Y2 equals to 0.336 which is significant 
and the estimate of y4 equals to -6.92 which is also significant. The suggestion to 
emerge from this result is that, for every percentage rise in dividend yields, the 
implied tax rate for ex-dividend months would decline 6.92 percent. The evidence 
presents the tax-induced clientele effect and thus supports the clientele hypothesis. 
A recent study by Lee, Liu, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2006) presents the evidence of 
tax-induced clientele effect for Taiwanese market. Since the capital gains tax is zero in 
Taiwan, the ordinary income tax becomes the only tax which may affect investors' 
dividend appetites. Lee, Liu, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2006) first compare the 
trading behaviour before and after dividend announcements. They find that the 
wealthy individuals in higher tax brackets decrease their net buying after the 
announcements of dividend increases and increase their net buying after dividend cuts. 
The trading behaviour of the less wealthy investors just appears to be opposite. In 
addition, examining the relation between dividend changes and ownership structure 
changes generates the result indicating that firms with increasing dividends decreases 
the shares proportion held by wealth individuals but increases the pr()p5>rtion held by 
middle- and lower-wealth individuals. Regarding to the shares proportion held by 
institutions, only foreign institutions increase their share holdings in response to 
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dividend increases. Nonetheless, no significant changes in the proportion of share 
holdings are found for tax-exempt and government-operated institutions. Overall, the 
tax-induced dividend clientele effect is evident in Taiwanese market. 
Clientele effect induced by other factors 
In addition to tax-induced dividend clientele effect, some other studies mention that 
the clientele effect relates to other factors besides tax discrimination. Pettit (1977) 
estimates the regression model of dividend yields on a set of variables, including 
investor's age, income, and the differential tax rate between ordinary incomes and 
capital gains. His results show that, for the whole sample, investor's age has a 
significantly positive relation to dividend yield. One-year increase in age would 
averagely increase 0.03 percentage points of dividend yields. This evidence is 
consistent with the expectation that as an investor gets older, he (she) tends to invest 
in high-dividend stocks to secure his (her) regular incomes for consumption. 
Furthermore, for those whose tax rate on ordinary incomes is higher than on capital 
gains, Pettit (1977) claims that investors with higher differential tax rate tend to invest 
in lower yield stocks, which is consistent with the prediction of the tax-induced 
clientele hypothesis. 
By testing more variables of investors' personal attributes, Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, 
and Schlarbaum (1978) implement a similar research on dividend clientele effect. 
They first estimate the mean of the variables for ten yield deciles. The F statistics 
indicates that investor's age, employment status, tax bracket, education level, sex and 
family size appear to be significantly different at the 0.01 level across the yield deciles. 
The clearest change pattern appears on investor's age which declines with dividend 
yield declines, and investor's employment status which indicates the investors with a 
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job tend to invest in low-yield stocks. More explicitly, they test the regression model 
of dividend yields on the variables of investors' personal attributes. With overall R 
square is only 1.5 percent, the variable of investor's age provides about two-thirds of 
explanatory power on dividend yields. Relatively, the taxation variable also appears to 
be significant at 0.01 percent. However, its coefficient shows that ten percentage 
points increase in the tax brackets for investors is only associated with 0.1 percent 
decline in the dividend yields of the held stocks. The tax-induced clientele does not 
seem to have economically meaningful effect on dividend yields. By judging the 
overall evidence, Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978) suggest that the 
"life cycle" rationale could explain the dividend clientele better than investor's tax 
brackets. The older investors are normally unemployed, with smaller family size 
(since dependent children may depart), and exempted from taxes (since most of them 
live on pensions). As a result, the tax-induced clientele effect may not actually exist 
and could be a by-product of the effect arisen by the other factors. 
A similar but more recent research of Scholz (1992), however, supports the notion of 
tax-induced dividend clientele effect. In his regression model, the dividend yields are 
explained by the variables, part of which are similar to those used by Pettit (1977). 
Differently, Scholz (1992) uses dummies for the variables of investor's age, and three 
proxies for investor's risk appetites. Consistent with the findings of Pettit (1977), he 
finds positive association between dividend yields and age. Moreover, for investors 
whose marginal tax rate on ordinary incomes exceeds the tax rate on capital gains, he 
detects negative association between differential tax rate and dividend yields. 
However, partly inconsistent with the findings of Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and 
Schlarbaum (1978), Scholz (1992) finds the relationship between family size and 
dividend yield is convex. Yields decline as family size increases up to about 
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four-person family, but yields increase when family size is beyond four persons. His 
findings, overall, confirm the dividend clientele effect. 
With 192 firms announcing their first cash dividend, Richardson, Sefcik, and 
Thompson (1986) investigate the effects of dividend signalling and dividend clientele 
on trading volume around the announcement day. Hypothesising that dividend 
clientele and signalled information are the only two components which induce 
abnormal volume, they constitute a model in which signalling effect and clientele 
effect are respectively captured by the variables of the abnormal returns in the week 
of announcement and the intercept. They find that the coefficients on the abnormal 
returns variable are significantly positive on explaining the abnormal volume in the 
interval from announcement day to ex-day while the intercepts are insignificant. 
Remarkably, their evidence implies that the abnormal volume is mainly induced by 
dividend signalling while the effect of dividend clientele is weaker. 
Similarly, Bajaj and Vijh (1990) also examme the dividend clientele and the 
information content of dividend changes. They hypothesise that investors with 
preference for dividends tend to invest in high-yield stocks, and abnormal returns 
around dividend change announcements should be higher for high-yield stocks than 
for low-yield stocks. Consistent with this hypothesis, their initial evidence shows that, 
for dividend increases (cuts), the abnormal returns for the high-yield stocks are the 
largest positive (negative), and the magnitude of the abnormal returns declines with 
dividend yields. Furthermore, Bajaj and Vijh (1990) consider whether dividend 
changes for high-yield stocks are more informative, and are accompanied by a larger 
change in systematic risk, or with a greater reduction in free cash flow. If dividend 
yield is found to link one of these elements, the initial evidence cannot be fully 
ss 
Chapter 2 Research issues in dividends and share repurchases 
attributed to clientele effect. To test whether dividend changes are more informative 
for high-yield stocks, Bajaj and Vijh (1990) use share price as the proxy for the 
information effect. The evidence presents that firms with lower share price indeed 
have higher abnormal returns than firms with higher share price. Nevertheless, the 
signalling effect does not rule out the existence of clientele effect. For each group of 
share price, dividend changes for high-yield stocks still have larger impact than the 
changes for low-yield stocks. As for the systematic risk and free cash flow, Bajaj and 
Vijh (1990) do not find obvious relation between such elements and dividend yields. 
Another study which similarly supports cash flow signalling and dividend clientele 
hypotheses is presented by Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994). Their evidence from 
regression analysis confirms that, for dividend increases, both dividend changes and 
dividend yields are positively related to the stock price reaction to dividend changes. 
But for dividend cuts, only the coefficient on dividend changes is significant. 
To conclude, the dividend clientele hypothesis predicts dividend policy from a 
perspective of the dividend appetites of various investors who constitute their own 
portfolios in their best interests. The elements of affecting investors' appetites for 
dividends are varied, such as differential taxation between dividends and capital gains, 
personal incomes or investor's age etc. A majority of prior studies confirm the 
existence of dividend clientele effect. Nonetheless, the evidence regarding whether 
the dividend clientele is solely induced by investors' tax discrimination is still a 
debatable point. While the tax brackets are thought to relate with some of the 
investors' personal attributes (e.g. age or employment status etc.), the debatable point 
cannot generate a clear answer unless future studies successfully control the relation 
between the variables of dividend yields and investor's attributes. 
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2.4. Share repurchases 
Share repurchases are an alternative payout policy to cash dividends. Due to the 
limitation of regulations on share repurchases, share repurchases have not grown as a 
popular payout method until 1980s for the US market and 1990s for the European 
countries 16. In perfect capital markets, share repurchase decisions, the same with 
dividend decisions, do not have influence on firm value. According to this explanation, 
without increases in investments, managers cannot increase the firm value merely by 
paying out more cash and buying back their own share from their shareholders. 
By indicating the notion that share repurchases, in perfect capital markets, can be 
regarded as adverse new shares issuance, the dividend irrelevance proposition (Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961) can be easily applied on share repurchases. Recall Eq. (2.1), 
the balance exists between the uses and the sources of firm's funds 17. It follows that 
the residuals of retained earnings after investments should be equal to dividend 
payouts minus the funds financed externally, which is shown in Eq. (2.5). With an 
adverse direction of external finance, such as share repurchases, the firms still have to 
make the uses and the sources of their funds in equilibrium. Still, firm value, 
determined only by current retained earnings and investments, is irrelevant to 
dividends and share repurchases. 
Releasing the assumption of perfect capital markets, empirical studies provide several 
possible explanations for why managers distribute cash through share repurchases. 
The signalling hypothesis, as it predicts for dividends, assumes that share repurchases 
are made to signal the firms' superiority in earnings performance. The undervaluation 
16 See Badrinath, Varaiya, and Ferling (2001), Fama and French (2001), and Stonham (2002). 
17 See the section of introduction in this chapter. 
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hypothesis assumes that managers engage in share repurchases since they believe their 
firms are undervalued. Taken together, both of these hypotheses predict the 
repurchases from the perspective of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. Nonetheless, share repurchases could also mitigate the agency problem as 
dividends if it effectively reduces the free cash flow available for managers. The 
evidence could be found in Lie (2000), for example. There are some other empirical 
studies comparing share repurchases with dividends. The substitution hypothesis, for 
instance, predicts that share repurchases are viewed as interchangeable payout 
methods for dividends. This, implicitly, indicates that managers and investors are 
indifferent to the tradeoffs between dividends and share repurchases. Nevertheless, 
from the perspective of taxation, some studies assert that repurchases are made to 
benefit investors who are in higher tax brackets. This is due that repurchases are 
levied by capital gains tax while dividends are levied by ordinary income tax. The 
empirical findings for the relative hypotheses are discussed as follows. 
2.4.1. Undervaluation hypothesis 
One of the implications to emerge from undervaluation hypothesis is that the share 
repurchase announcements are preceded by undervalued share prices. By examining 
the long-term return performance preceding and following the UK repurchase 
announcements, Rau and Vermaelen (2002), for open market share repurchases, they 
fmd -2.47 percent of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the one-year period 
preceding the announcements. This finding is consistent with the undervaluation 
hypothesis but the estimate is statistically insignificant. Extending Rau and 
Vermaelen's (2002) study, Oswald and Young (2004) focus on examining open market 
repurchases with a more complete sample. Their evidence shows that the one-year 
61 
Chapter 2 Research issues in dividends and share repurchases 
pre-announcement CARs are -10.08 percent and -5.46 percent for the two 
sub-samples18 . This is consistent with the finding ofVermaelen (1981), showing that 
the cumulative abnormal returns during the period of 60 to two days preceding to 
open market repurchase announcements are -7.08 percent. In order to make the 
evidence robust, Oswald and Young (2004) estimate the regression model of the 
percentage of share repurchased on the abnormal returns over the twelve-month 
preceding and following the share repurchases completion. The evidence shows that 
the preceding abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of share 
repurchases. In other words, the lower the preceding share prices are, the more the 
shares managers buy back. 
Another implication from the undervaluation hypothesis is that firms with buying 
back own shares should have lower market-to-book ratio (or high book-to-market 
ratio), indicating market's undervaluation relative to book value. Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) estimate the long-term abnormal returns for the 
four-year period subsequent to repurchases announcements. They detect that the 
portfolio with the highest book-to-market ratio has 135.91 percent of four-year 
compounded abnormal returns, which is 45 percent above those for the reference 
portfolio with similar size and book-to-market ratio. Another finding shows that the 
divergence of the compounded abnormal returns between the repurchase and the 
reference portfolios shrinks with the book-to-market ratio decreases. This evidence 
indicates that the market revises their valuation for the firms with high 
book-to-market ratio after the share repurchase announcements, while such revision is 
not obvious for those firms with low book-to-market ratio. Since book-to-market ratio 
is a proxy for undervaluation, the evidence, therefore, supports the undervaluation 
18 They divide the sample into two sub-samples based on the data sources to compare their findings 
with Rau and Vermaelen 's (2002). 
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hypothesis. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) further extend their test to the 
repurchases in Canada. A large part of this study devotes to test the managers' trading 
strategy and the price movement. Consistent with the UK finding of Oswald and 
Young (2004), their evidence signifies that the preceding abnormal returns are 
negatively related to the portion of the share repurchased while the variable of 
book-to-market ratio is positively related. Another striking finding is that the firms 
which do not actually buy back after the repurchases announced averagely experience 
higher abnormal returns than those which actually buy back shares. Based on the 
evidence, it suggests that managers are sensitive to stock prices and undervaluation is 
a factor inducing repurchases. In contrast, Dittmar (2000) does not find significant 
relation between the previous stock returns and the portion of shares repurchased but 
she finds the evidence for undervaluation hypothesis from the variable of 
market-to-book ratio. Her evidence shows that, for most of the sample years, the 
market-to-book ratio negatively relates to the proportion ofthe shares repurchased. 
Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004) study the relation between abnormal returns around 
share repurchase announcements and the previous twenty-day price performance. In 
line with the expectation of the undervaluation hypothesis, they claim that the market 
reacts to repurchase announcements more severely as the previous price drop is larger. 
The evidence is significant for the sub-sample of repurchases completions. More 
explicitly, by using logit and probit model, they examine whether the undervaluation 
induces managers to buy back shares. The evidence reveals that the more the previous 
share prices drop, the higher the probability managers execute share repurchases. This 
finding is consistent with the Canadian findings of Li and McNally (2003) who also 
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apply a probit model to examine the effect of undervaluation on announcing open 
market share repurchases. 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) examine the firm's characteristics with different 
frequencies of share repurchases. They find lower market-to-book ratio associated 
with firms which infrequently make share repurchases, suggesting that, the share price 
undervaluation is the motive of infrequently-repurchasing firms for announcing share 
repurchases. Another study which indirectly supports the undervaluation hypothesis is 
carried out by Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992). They test the managers' trading 
around fixed price and Dutch auction tender offer repurchases. For Dutch auction 
repurchases, they do not detect unusual frequencies of managers' trading. Nonetheless, 
for fixed price repurchases, managers averagely increase their frequency of buying 
and decreasing their frequency of selling prior to fixed price repurchase 
announcements. After the announcements, no unusual frequency of managers' trading 
is detected. According to this finding, it can thus be suggested that managers take 
advantage of their private information to buy back their firm's stocks when they are 
potentially undervalued. 
Based on the evidence of Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992), D'Mello and Shroff 
(2000) also examine whether managers' increasing buying stems from managers in 
possession of private information about share undervaluation. By using realised 
earnings and book value of five years subsequent to tender offer announcements, they 
estimate firm's economic value and compare this value with the market value to 
define whether the firm is undervalued. It is shown on the evidence that 74 percent of 
repurchasing firms are undervalued, compared to only 51 percent of the control 
sample (non-repurchasing firms). Additionally, the tender premium is positively 
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related to but is smaller than the magnitude of undervaluation, indicating that the 
undervaluation is a factor inducing share repurchases but managers are conservative 
in setting tender premiums. Finally, consistent with Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch 
(1992), they find that, in the previous year oftender offer announcements, the insiders 
of the undervalued firms have significantly larger net buying than the insiders of the 
overvalued firms. 
2.4.2. Signalling hypothesis 
Similar to the prediction for dividend policy, the signalling hypothesis predicts that 
share repurchases signal the information about current or future earnings. A number of 
studies examine this hypothesis by testing the changes of operating incomes around 
repurchase announcements. Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) study the earnings 
information contained in tender offer repurchases. The earnings forecast errors appear 
to be positive for each of five years after the announcements of tender offer 
repurchases. However, the significance of the forecast errors is found in year 0 (the 
event year) and year 3 for both EPS and EBIT variables and in year 5 for only EPS 
variable. Moreover, stock price reactions to tender offer repurchase announcements 
are positively related to subsequent unexpected earnings. These findings support the 
prediction of the signalling hypothesis, presenting that tender offer repurchase 
announcements signal the information about future earnings. 
Hertzel and Jain (1991) estimate the revision of analysts' earnings forecasts around 
tender offer repurchase announcements. For both short-term and long-term earnings 
forecasts, they find positive and significant rev1s10n around repurchase 
announcements. Nonetheless, the results of regression analysis show that the 
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announcement-period market reactions are only positively related to the revision of 
short-term earnings forecasts. This evidence indicates that the information signalled 
by share repurchases is about transitory rather than permanent earnings changes. 
The earnings signalled in fixed-price and Dutch auction tender offer repurchases is 
examined by Lie and McConnell (1998). The evidence, consistent with the signalling 
hypothesis, suggests that the operating performance of the repurchase firms is better 
than their industry peers, and the outperformance continues for up to five subsequent 
years. However, the operating performances are not different between the two 
repurchase methods. 
Different from the aforementioned studies, Lie (2005) examines the changes in 
operating performance around open market repurchase announcements. He finds that, 
over eight quarters following the announcements, the repurchasing firms have 
significant improvement in operating performance. Furthermore, since the firms 
announcing open market repurchases do not necessarily buy back shares later, he tests 
whether the divergent behaviours contain different information about future earnings. 
The evidence shows that the firms which actually buy back shares experience 
improvement in the subsequent operating performance whereas the firms which 
merely make announcements do not. Lie's (2005) evidence not only supports the 
signalling hypothesis, but also implies that, when the firms do not perform well as 
what managers expected, the flexibility of share repurchases provides managers an 
opportunity to change their mind on payout decisions. 
A signalling model for open market stock repurchase is developed by McNally (1999). 
His model suggests that 1) the repurchase proportion is a positive signal for earnings, 
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and 2) given the repurchases level, firms with higher insider ownership are related to 
higher earnings. The first suggestion is the basic implication of the signalling 
hypothesis. The rationale for the second implication is as follows. Since firms with 
higher insider holdings make their insiders exposed to greater undiversified risk, for a 
given level of earnings, firms with higher insider ownership would like to repurchase 
less. Relatively, given the repurchase level constant, the market will infer the greater 
earnings the higher insider holdings. Taken together, McNally (1999) finds empirical 
supports for his model. 
2.4.3. Substitution hypothesis 
The substitution hypothesis indicates that managers make share repurchases as a 
substitutive payout method for dividends. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) argue that 
managers learn to use share repurchases for replacing dividends by virtue of tax 
advantage inherent in the former payout mechanism. A survey-based study, 
implemented by Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar (1989), however, reveals manager's view 
on share repurchases by indicating that about a half of respondents disagree with the 
statement, that is, repurchases substitute for cash dividends. Among the repurchasing 
firms, the percentage of disagreement is even higher, which is about 60 percent. 
A more recent survey-based study by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) 
presents that, for managers, dividend decisions are priority to investment decisions 
which are in turn priority to share repurchase decisions. Consistent with the argument 
of Miller and Rock (1985), managers may forgo potential investment opportunities for 
dividends. Nonetheless, managers do not tend to forego investments for share 
repurchases. This result implicitly objects to the substitution hypothesis. 
Chapter 2 Research issues in dividends and share repurchases 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) present that firms paying only dividends have similar 
firm characteristics to firms paying dividends and repurchase shares. Relatively, firms 
which only make share repurchases have similar characteristics to firms which do not 
pay out any cash. While Grullon and Michaely (2002) test the association between 
dividend forecast errors and repurchase yields, the dividend forecast errors turn to be 
negative as the repurchases yield19 increases. The evidence by regression analysis 
also shows a negative relation between repurchases expenses and dividend forecast 
errors. On the other hand, they study whether the market perceives dividends and 
repurchases as substitutes. The evidence implies that, when firms cut dividends, those 
which do not make share repurchases experience -1.93 percent of three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns while those which make repurchases only experience 
-0.45 percent. The evidence supporting the substitution hypothesis is explicit. 
2.4.4. Other Related Hypotheses 
There are still some other hypothesis providing different explanations for share 
repurchases. Howe, He, and Kao (1992) test the free cash flow hypothesis for tender 
offer repurchases. If this hypothesis predicts repurchases correctly, it is expected to 
find that the market reacts to repurchases more positively for over-investing firms 
than for value-maximising firms. Howe, He, and Kao (1992) employ the similar 
method used by Lang and Litzenberger (1989), but differently, they do not detect 
significant difference between the two-day abnormal returns for high-Q firms 
(value-maximising firms) and low-Q firms (over-investing firms). 
Fenn and Liang (2001) employ 1) EBITDA less capital expenditures and 2) 
19 The repurchases yield is the capital expenditure on share repurchases scaled by the market value of 
equity. 
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market-to-book ratio respectively as the proxy for firm's free cash flow and 
investment opportunities. The firms with higher EBITDA less capital expenditures 
(lower market-to-book ratio) normally have higher free cash flow (less investment 
opportunities) and pay higher dividends or repurchase more shares. In addition, their 
model includes the variable of debts. In the light of the agency theory for payout 
policy (Jensen 1986), firms which reply more on debts to disgorge free cash flow will 
rely less on dividends and repurchases. Their evidence suggeststhat the free cash flow 
hypothesis and the agency theory predict both dividends and share repurchases 
correctly. 
Another explanation for share repurchases is that managers use them to prevent 
dilution of earnings. Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003) examine the relation 
between share repurchases, targeted earnings per share and employee stock options. 
Their fmding suggests that the share repurchases by firms whose earnings growth falls 
below the target are higher than the other firms' repurchases by 1.3 percent of shares 
outstanding. Furthermore, when examining the relation between the numbers of share 
repurchased and exercise proceeds, they find that the coefficient on the variable of 
exercise proceeds is significant and close to one. This finding suggests that the 
repurchasing firms use exercise proceeds to buy back own shares. Similarly, using a 
logit model, Jolls (1998) documents a positive relation between repurchase decisions 
and the granted executive options. However, she does not find evidence about the 
influence of the overall employee options on repurchase decisions. Weisbenner (2000), 
examining the level of share repurchases in 1995, also find positive relation between 
share repurchases and total outstanding options. Moreover, in his study, large firms 
are found to buy back own shares gradually to offset the dilution effect of stock option 
grants on earnings per share. 
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The clientele effect hypothesis predicts that investors invest the stocks whose payout 
policy is consistent with their interests. Chhachhi and Davidson (1997) compare 
tender offer repurchases and special dividends, confirming the existence of clientele 
effect. According to the clientele hypothesis, their arguments are presented as follows. 
Firstly, if shareholders, with preference to higher dividends, tend to invest in the 
high-yield firms, firms that pay special dividends are expected to have higher 
dividend yield than repurchasing firms. Secondly, since insiders do not take part in the 
tender offer but they receive special dividend when it is paid, firms that pay special 
dividends are expected to have greater insider ownership. Consistent with these 
expectations, firms that pay special dividends averagely have 5. 79 percent of dividend 
yield and 34.53 percent of insider ownership, both of which are greater than those of 
repurchasing firms. 
Nonetheless, for open market share repurchases, Isagawa (2000) suggests that firms 
which possess higher insider ownership, greater cash and less investment 
opportunities have a stronger motivation to make share repurchases in that insiders 
could benefit from the resulting share price increases. This statement is empirically 
confirmed by the findings of Li and McNally (2003), showing that greater insider 
ownership and free cash flow would lead to higher possibility of open-market 
repurchases. 
To conclude, the undervaluation and signalling are the two which most empirical 
studies suggest to be the motives for share repurchases. Nonetheless, there are still 
other studies which provide evidence supporting other predictions. Since share 
repurchases have more flexibility than dividends, managers may use them for 
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different purposes, resulting in divergent findings from previous studies. Additionally, 
different regulations for share repurchases may also make managers use them in 
different ways (Kim, Varaiya, and Schremper, 2004). For example, in the UK, share 
repurchases are only allowed to pay out by distributable profits. This regulation 
apparently limits the uses of repurchases to reallocate the capital structure. Moreover, 
the methods of share repurchases are kaleidoscopic and each of the method may 
convey different information (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). This is probably another 
factor which results in divergent empirical findings. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
While Miller and Modigliani (1961) propose the potential imperfection elements 
which may induce dividend effect on firm value, a large number of studies on payout 
policy try to find out the correlations between the payouts and the imperfection 
elements. For dividends, the three major imperfection elements which are believed to 
induce dividend effects are 1) information asymmetry, 2) agency problems and 3) the 
tax differentials. 
When information asymmetry exists, managers, compared to investors, possess more 
information about firm's investment opportunities and expected profits. Consequently, 
investors cannot accurately evaluate the real firm value and can only estimate the 
firm's expected profits or earnings by dividend payouts. In comparison to audited 
financial reports, dividends need to be backed up by sustainable earnings, making the 
information signalled by dividend creditable. The dividend signalling models 
primarily provide two implications for dividend policies. Firstly, since dividend 
payouts require firms' sustainable earnings, the models predict that unexpected 
dividends provide information about current and future earnings. Secondly, based on 
the first implication, positive (negative) unexpected dividends convey good (bad) 
news about current and future earnings, to which markets should react positively 
(negatively). 
The agency theory for dividend policy predicts that dividend payouts would reduce 
free cash flow and mitigate agency problems. Firms with greater investment 
opportunities are expected to have less free cash flow and therefore lower dividends. 
By contrast, mature firms which tend to have less opportunities should have more free 
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cash flow and pay higher dividends. 
The dividend clientele effect hypothesis interprets dividends based on the perspective 
that investors would maximise their wealth by investing the stocks whose dividend 
policy is consistent with their best interests. The investors' preference may result from 
tax differentials, personal incomes or risk appetites. 
Some studies believe that the above models or hypotheses can still provide 
explanatory power for share repurchases. Nonetheless, there are still some other 
studies which provide different findings for share repurchases. For example, some 
studies compare share repurchases to dividends and suggest that share repurchases are 
the substitute for dividends (e.g. Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Moreover, some 
studies suggest that share repurchases are funded for management or employee stock 
options since the exercise of stock options would dilute firm's earnings per share (e.g. 
Fenn and Liang, 2001; Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2003). The controversy 
findings for share repurchases may stem from the different methods and the flexibility 
of repurchases. Consequently, the hypothesis which predicts open market share 
repurchases well may fail to predict tender offer share repurchases. The findings for 
repurchase announcements may not be the same as the findings for repurchase 
completion (e.g. the UK findings from Rees, 1996 and Rau and Vermaelen, 2002). 
Even for tender offer repurchases, empirical studies also generate different findings 
for Dutch auction repurchases and fixed price repurchases (e.g. Comment and Jarrell, 
1991; Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch, 1992). 
Among these potential hypotheses, this thesis mainly focuses on examining the 
signalling theory and the undervaluation hypothesis of share repurchases. Chapter 3 
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tests the shareholders' wealth effect of the simultaneous dividend and earmngs 
announcements. The examinations attempt to find out whether the dividend 
announcements remain informative while the simultaneous earnings announcements 
capture most of the information about earnings performance. Chapter 4 directly 
examines the association of dividend changes with current and future earnings 
changes. Previous studies have long argued about whether dividends are announced to 
represent current earnings or to signal for managers' prospect of future earnings. 
Chapter 4 expects to provide incremental evidence to clarify this issue. Share 
repurchase announcements are examined in Chapter 5. The main interest of Chapter 5 
is estimating the wealth effect of the announcements, and comparing the managerial 
motives for share repurchase announcements and for other payout decisions. The 
evidence of Chapter 5 will help to understand the role and the function of share 
repurchases in firms' payout policy. 
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Chapter3 
Market Reactions to Simultaneous Dividend 
and Earnings Announcements 
3.1. Introduction 
Information asymmetry is known to exist between managers and investors. Under the 
circumstances of information asymmetry, dividends are thought as one of the 
mechanisms which managers employ to communicate with markets. Empirical 
evidence for this is provided by a number of studies, showing that abnormal returns 
are positively associated with dividend changes20. Since dividend policy per se does 
not change overall shareholders' wealth in perfect capital markets, the existence of 
dividend effect implies that the market, to some extent, must receive certain 
information from dividend announcements to mitigate the information asymmetry. 
For this, this chapter intends to provide an insight into the market's perceptions of the 
information implicit in dividends, and thereby helps managers to make us of 
dividends as the signalling device more efficiently. Of particular interest are the 
objectives of this chapter including 1) to examine the shareholders' wealth effect of 
the simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings, 2) to examine whether 
the market reaction to the simultaneous announcements is dependent on the level of 
information asymmetry, and 3) to examine the relative effects of dividends and 
earnings on the market reactions. 
Interpreting dividend effect by dividend signalling model, Miller and Rock (1985) 
20 See Charest (1978); Aharony and Swary (1980); Asquith and Mullins (1983); Bajaj and Vijh (1995) 
and many others. 
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argue that dividends are merely a mechanism for firms to signal the missing piece of 
information about current earnings. It follows that the market applies this information 
to revise their expectations of future earnings. By this indirect route, dividends appear 
to possess predictive power for future earnings. When dividends are thought to 
convey the information about earnings, it is important to note that, empirical studies 
which examine the dividend announcement effect have to control for the conveyed 
information. Otherwise, abnormal returns observed around the dividend 
announcements could be a compound of dividends and earnings effects. 
This notion motivates this chapter to examine simultaneous dividend and earnings 
announcements whose implicit information are released at the same time and based on 
the same information set. Many attempts have been made to control the earnings 
effects in previous studies but the information implicit in dividend announcements 
and earnings announcements is not examined on the same information set, which 
increases the difficulty in controlling the effect of earnings information of dividend 
announcements. For example, Aharony and Swary (1980) control the earnings effect 
by comparing the wealth effect of dividend announcements which are made before 
earnmgs announcements with those made after earnings announcements. Their 
evidence indicates that dividend announcements made before earnings 
announcements are not more informative than those made after earnmgs 
announcements. Similarly, Penman (1983) examines the dividend announcements 
which are announced before and which are announced after the announcements of 
management's forecast for future earnings. Nonetheless, he finds that dividend 
announcements made after the forecast announcements are less informative. In 
addition, Mozes and Rapaccioli (1995) control the earnings effect by using a dummy 
variable. Their evidence suggests that dividends which are announced before earnings 
Chapter 3 Market Reactions to Simultaneous Dividend and Earnings Announcements 
announcements mitigate the information asymmetry for small firms. Although mix in 
prior evidence could be attributed to the difference of the examined sample, it could 
be also possibly induced by the research designs which do not adequately control the 
earnings information. 
Furthermore, this chapter attempts to fill this gap and examines whether the market 
reaction to the simultaneous announcements is dependent on the level of information 
asymmetry. Previous studies suggest that different levels of information asymmetry 
exist between large and small firms, leading to the greater market reactions to the 
information released by small firms than large firms (Freeman, 1987; Ball and Kothari, 
1991; Bajaj and Vijh, 1995; Bali, 2003). However, while prior studies respectively 
examine this issue for either earnings or dividend announcements, none has examined 
this issue for simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings. A question 
merits considering is that whether investors have different demands for dividend 
signals released by small firms and by large firms when earnings information is 
simultaneously released. 
This chapter, examining the simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings 
in the UK market, starts from forming six intersectional portfolios according to the 
directions of dividends and earnings changes. With this grouping, the relative effects 
of dividend changes and earnings changes can be clearly observed and compared. The 
tests on dividend and earnings effects are mainly twofold. Event study is applied 
firstly to examine the market reactions around the announcements for each 
intersectional portfolio. More tests are then implemented by using regression analysis 
to explicitly examine the relative effects of earnings and dividends on the market 
reactions. 
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The use of event study generates abnormal returns for each intersectional portfolio to 
be the proxy of market reactions. To detect whether "pure" dividends effect exists, 
one can compare the market reaction to the portfolios which possess the same 
direction of earnings changes but different directions of dividend changes. In light of 
the dividend signalling hypothesis, if dividend effect exists, the market is predicted to 
react positively to dividend increases, and negatively to dividends cuts. If the earnings 
announcements have captured most information about earnings performance, the 
market reactions are not expected to depend on the announcements of dividend 
changes. The evidence of this chapter, confirming the existence of both dividend and 
earnings effects, is found to be more prominent in dividend effect. 
Furthermore, the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors is 
bigger in smaller firms than in larger firms due to differential information. Therefore, 
the firms' market capitalisations are used as the proxy for the level of information 
asymmetry in this chapter. The market reactions to the simultaneous announcements 
are compared for each intersectional dividend and earnings portfolios with the ranks 
of firm size. The differential information hypothesis predicts that, around the days of 
the simultaneous announcements, the market reaction to the announcements should be 
larger for small firms than for large firms. Consistent with the findings of Ball and 
Kothari (1991) for earnings announcements and Bali (2003) for dividend 
announcements, the shareholders of small firms which announce dividend increases 
are found to react more greatly to the announcements than those of large firms, 
indicating that the market reactions are dependent on the level of information 
asymmetry. 
Explicitly exammmg the relative effects of dividends and earnings, regression 
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analysis is imposed to test the associations of the abnormal returns with dividend and 
earnings changes. Dividends are thought to serve as a mechanism to signal for 
earnings, and hence the coefficient on the dividend variable is expected to be 
insignificant when the model simultaneously includes the earnings variables. In 
addition, owing to the nature of simultaneous announcements of dividends and 
earnmgs, the market may jointly rather than separately evaluate the information 
signalled by the simultaneous announcements. This, thus, leads to an interaction effect 
on stock price (Kane, Lee, and Marcus, 1984). By using restricted least square (RLS) 
approach, the model additionally tests the significance in the effects of dividends, 
earnings and interaction. A partial of the evidence of this chapter, however, disagrees 
with the Australian findings of Easton (1991), the US findings of Kane, Lee, and 
Marcus (1984) and the UK findings of Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sinclair (1996). 
The evidence of this chapter signifies that the market responds to more convinced 
signals from dividends rather from earnings. In additional to dividend effect, the 
evidence alike supports the existence of the interaction effect, indicating that market 
evaluates the compound information of the announcements. 
More broadly, this chapter constitutes another model and further considers the 
possibilities which result in insignificance on the effect of current earnings in the first 
model. According to the dividend signalling theory, it is proposed that dividends are a 
mechanism to signal managers' future prospects. The underlying idea is that markets 
may have accurately anticipated the current earnings but they still need dividend's 
signals to revise their expectations for future earnings. Therefore, the second 
regression model examines the explanatory power of the changes in future earnings 
on the event-day abnormal returns. Furthermore, as indicated by DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), managers, with firms' financial status getting worse, 
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are reluctant to cut dividends, making dividend increases unreliable. In this case, 
dividend announcements may not convey reliable information about earnings declines, 
making the announcements of earnings declines relatively valuable. Hence, the 
second regression model examines the earnings increases and earnings declines 
separately to study whether the wealth effect of the announcements of earnings 
declines is larger than that of the announcements of earnings increases. 
The results of this examination, partially consistent with findings of Conroy, Eades, 
and Harris (2000) for Japanese market, point out that the changes in future earnings 
have a significant and positive relation with the event-day abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, with jointly considering the future earnings, the dividends and the 
earnings declines still contribute strong explanatory power to the market reactions. 
This evidence suggests that both dividend announcements and the announcements of 
earnings declines are important to investors, and moreover, investors seem to revise 
their expectations of future earnings in light of the information implicit in the 
simultaneous announcements. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the previous studies. Section 
3.3 provides a description of the data resource and descriptive statistics of the main 
variables, followed by a discussion of the methodology and the research design in 
Section 3.4. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 3.5 and 
Section 3.6 contains the implications and conclusions. 
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3.2. Prior evidence on dividend effect 
The dividend irrelevant theory, as proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961 ), 
indicates that, given a firm's investment policy, its dividend policy is irrelevant to its 
current market valuation in a perfect market. Nonetheless, when dividend effect is 
detected under the scenario of information asymmetry, empirical studies21 presume 
that the effect is induced by the information, conveyed by dividends, about future 
earnings prospects. In the study of Miller and Rock (1985), it is suggested that 
dividends are a mechanism to convey missing information about earnings to the 
market. Therefore, the dividend effect is actually market's response to unexpected 
earnings rather than to dividends per se. Moreover, the earnings information in 
dividends is also an implicit factor that makes dividend possess predictive power on 
future earnings (Miller and Rock, 1985). The implications to emerge from the 
argument of Miller and Rock (1985) include 1) what the market reacts to is good or 
bad news about earnings but not dividend changes, and more importantly 2) dividend 
announcements would become less informative when investors could get the 
information about earnings from elsewhere. Consequently, this chapter argues that an 
important task of examining the dividend effect on share price is to control the 
earnings information which has been known by investors when dividends are 
announced. 
Forming the portfolios in light of the degrees of dividend changes and the directions 
of earnings changes, Pettit (1972) tests the abnormal returns around the dividend 
announcements for 14 dividend and earnings intersectional portfolios. He points out 
that the market mainly reacts to dividends particularly when dividends are cut .or 
21 See Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), and Asquith and Mullins (1983) and many others. 
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substantially increased. However, he fails to find the earnings effect around dividend 
announcements, which may stem from the inadequate control of earnings information. 
By investigating Australian sample for the period of 1963 to 1972, Brown, Finn, and 
Hancock (1977) apply event studies to examine the abnormal returns around dividend 
announcements. Substantially, they do not encounter the problem as Pettit (1972) does 
in that 98 percent of dividends and earnings are announced simultaneously in 
Australia. As a result, they could compare the dividend and earnings effect on the 
same information set. Additionally, regression analysis is applied by Brown, Finn, and 
Hancock (1977) to examine the relation between dividends, earnings and the 
abnormal returns. Despite the evidence suggesting that both changes in dividends and 
in earnings have positive relation with the abnormal returns, only dividend effect 
appears to be significant. Regarding the interaction effect, Brown, Finn and Hancock 
(1977) observe the effect from the results of event studies but do not explicitly test it 
by regression analysis, leaving a doubt about whether including the interaction effect 
would reduce the explanatory power of dividends or not. 
Aharony and Swary (1980) examine the sample whose earnings and dividends are 
announced on different days. In order to isolate dividend effects from those of 
earnings, they distinguish the observations whose earnings are released preceding 
dividends from those whose earnings are released following dividends. It is found that 
market reacts positively to dividend increases and negatively to dividend cuts. Besides, 
the market has larger response to dividend cuts than to increases. Their evidence, 
however, does not indicate that market reacts differently to the groups whether 
earnings announcements precede or follow dividend announcements. Aharony and 
Swary (1980) furthermore test whether market reacts differently to earnings 
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announcements released before and after dividend announcements. Remarkably, they 
still fail to find different market response to these two groups. Concluding their 
evidence, Aharony and Swary (1980) suggest that dividends provide additional 
information beyond that conveyed by earnings announcements. Unlike the study of 
Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), in their test, consider the timing of earnings 
announcements, which helps to control the information set that the market has about 
earnings when dividends are announced. However, in most of their test, Aharony and 
Swary (1980) neglect the directions of earnings changes. This would make their 
evidence biased when dividends and earnings are not independent. For example, 
dividend increases following the announcement of earnings increases might be 
thought as confirmative information. Conversely, dividend increases following the 
announcement of earnings declines might be interpreted as either manager's 
reluctance to cut dividends (Lintner, 1956) or as positive signal for future 
performance. 
Confirming the findings of Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983) 
carry out a test on dividend initiations. They detect that the market reaction to 
dividend initiations appears to be smaller when there is an earnings announcement 
happening within ten days from dividend announcements. Another finding is that the 
information provided by dividend and earnings announcements are partial substituted. 
Similar to Aharony and Swary (1980), they do not consider the direction of 
unexpected earnings, and this might be a factor resulting in the declines of the 
abnormal returns when there are earnings announced closely. 
Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) examine the market reaction to dividend and earnings 
announcements which are announced within ten days of each others. They empirically 
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test the interaction effect of dividend and earnings announcements, which are not 
done in the analogues study of Brown, Finn, and Hancock (1977). Moreover, taking 
account of the direction and the timing of earnings announcements, their study more 
adequately capture the earnings effect. On one hand, when the variables of interaction 
effect are exclusive in the regression model, their result signifies that both changes in 
dividends and earnings have significantly positive relation to the cumulative abnormal 
returns around the announcements. On the other hand, when taking account of 
interaction effect, the explanatory power of dividends and earnings variables reduces. 
Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) conclude that the market jointly evaluates dividend and 
earnings announcements, and the interaction effect exists between these two 
announcements. 
Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) are followed by a number of studies applying their 
approach in examining the abnormal returns around the simultaneous announcements 
and the interaction effect between dividends and earnings. Among others, Easton 
(1991) studies Australia sample for the period of 197 5 to 1981. Different from the 
sample examined in Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984), the Australian sample comprises 
the observations whose dividends and earnings are announced simultaneously. 
'Examining simultaneous announcements explicitly tests the relative contribution of 
the earnings and dividend announcements to market reactions without concern for 
whether the announcements are based on the same information set' (Conroy, Eades, 
and Harris, 2000; p. 1201). Easton's (1991) findings confirm the existence of 
interaction effect between dividends and earnings. His evidence is crucial in that it 
implies that the interaction effect does not only exist in the US market but also in 
other markets. Moreover, it also shows that the interaction effect is not sensitive to 
discretion in the relative timing of the dividend and earnings announcements. 
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The study of simultaneous announcements can also be found on the event study of 
Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sinclair (1996) for the UK market. Their evidence 
suggests that firms announcing increases in both earnings and dividends earn the 
largest positive abnormal returns while those announcing declines in both earnings 
and dividends earn the largest negative abnormal returns. Explicitly examining the 
dividend, earnings and interaction effects by regression analysis, their evidence is 
only partially consistent with Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) and Easton (1991). The 
evidence of Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sinclair (1996) confirms the existence of 
interaction effect. Additionally, they present that earnings effect dominates over 
dividend effect and remains significant after introducing interaction effect. This 
finding is not found in the US and Australian studies. 
Another study on simultaneous announcements is carried out by Conroy, Eades, and 
Harris (2000). They similarly find that earnings effect dominates dividend effect on 
explaining market response, which is consistent with the findings of Lonie, Abeyratna, 
Power, and Sinclair (1996) for the UK market. They conclude that, at least in Japan, 
earnings announcements are capable of providing sufficient information to the market, 
making dividends appear to be a redundant signalling mechanism. Furthermore, 
management forecasts of next year's dividends are also relevant to abnormal returns 
although the coefficient is not as significant as that of next year's earnings forecasts. 
The evidence presents that future dividend forecasts provide additional information 
beyond that contained in current earnings announcements or future earnings forecasts. 
Chen, Firth, and Gao (2002) study the simultaneous announcements in China. The 
announcements comprise the information about earnings, cash dividend and stock 
dividend. Consistent with Japanese and the UK findings, their result suggests that the 
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share price movement is more related to unexpected earnings. Cash dividend in China 
only plays a limited role in signalling while stock dividend is made to corroborate or 
to modify the previous earnings signals. 
Different from the above studies mainly focusing on testing the wealth effect of 
simultaneous announcements, Eddy and Seifert (1992) compare the market reaction to 
contemporaneous and non-contemporaneous dividend and earnings announcements. It 
is found that market's response to contemporaneous announcements is almost twice 
than that to non-contemporaneous announcements (i.e. single dividend or earnings 
announcement). Their evidence implicitly supports the argument by Chang and Chen 
(1991 ), stating that the total effect of the two signals from the joint announcements are 
additive, but not multiplicative or synergistic. Chang and Chen (1991) investigate the 
sensitivity of the interaction effects given the different intervals between dividend and 
earnings announcements. When they employ the regression model as that used by 
Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984), they find that dividend and earnings effects are almost 
significant regardless of announcement intervals but interaction effect is only 
significant for the portfolios with wider announcement intervals. Conversely, they 
control for the announcement interval as constant and test whether "interaction" F 
statistics vary with different cumulative windows. Their results show that the 
interaction effect dummies (indicated by interaction F statistics) are only jointly 
significant when the abnormal returns are cumulated over a long window. 
Additionally, similar to Eddy and Seifert's (1992) findings, they fail to find evidence 
supporting that market has larger reactions to joint announcements than to separate 
announcements. Chang and Chen (1991), thus, conclude that the information 
signalled by dividend and earnings announcements does not differ with the types of 
announcements. They also conclude that the interaction effect suggested by Kane, Lee, 
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and Marcus (1984) is likely caused by various corporate noise factors during the 
announcements. The information of two signals is additive rather than multiplicative. 
Although simultaneous announcements provide a unique opportunity for testing the 
dividend and earnings effects based on the same information set, they are not always 
feasible in financial markets. For example, in German, earnings announcements 
usually precede dividend announcements. By using regression analysis, Amihud and 
Murgia (1997) study dividend and earnings effects in Germany market to test whether 
the price movements are related to unexpected dividends and earnings. Their finding 
is consistent with Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984), showing that both unexpected 
dividends and earnings possess explanatory power on share price movement. 
Considering that the earnings in German are announced preceding dividend 
announcements, Amihud and Murgia's (1997) evidence implies that dividend 
announcements signal for the information about current earnings beyond that 
signalled by the earlier earnings announcements. 
Similarly, Koch and Sun (2004) also provide evidence that the market reactions to 
dividend announcements are significantly related to the preceding and the following 
earnings changes when dividend and earnings have the same direction of changes. 
Their evidence confirms that dividends are made to signal for unexpected current and 
future earnings. However, when dividend change and preceding earnings change are 
different in signs, market reactions to dividend announcements are negatively related 
to the preceding earnings changes but positively related to the following earnings 
changes. This evidence is partially consistent with Chinese findings of Chen, Firth, 
and Gao (2002), implying that dividend changes play a role in modifying the signals 
of the previous earnings announcements. 
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To conclude, the market reaction to dividend announcements has been well 
documented by previous empirical studies. The majority agree that market responds 
positively to good news (dividend increases) and negatively to bad news (dividend 
cuts). However, evidence on the relation between dividend and earnings effects still 
lacks for conclusiveness. The main difficulty encountered in examining dividend 
effect is to adequately control the earnings effect. The approach used by Kane, Lee, 
and Marcus (1984) could be an applicable sample when studying the UK market in 
that the approach examines both dividend and earnings effects as well as interaction 
effect. Most importantly, the approach examines the effects based on the same 
information set. In addition, the findings of Conroy, Eades, and Harris (2000) and 
Koch and Sun (2004) suggest that market's response to dividends is also correlated 
with future unexpected earnings. This chapter, therefore, carries out a similar test for 
the UK market to understand what the market views the information implicit in the 
dividend announcements when they are announced simultaneously with earnings. 
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3·3· Data and descriptive statistics 
This section consists of two sub-sections. The first sub-section discusses the source of 
the examined data and the criteria of data selection. The second sub-section presents 
the descriptive statistics, including the frequencies of the announcements by year, the 
means and the percentiles for the main variables. 
3.3.1. Data 
This chapter starts from daily price observations for all the UK firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) during the period from January 1992 to March 2004. 
The dates of the dividend announcements and the size of the dividends are acquired 
from "Extel Card" of Thomson Research. Datastream is the database providing the 
data of earnings, daily adjusted share prices, FTSE All Share Index and the market 
value. The dividends and earnings are announced semi-annually in the UK. Thus, the 
time unit of the data is on the semi-annual basis. 
To fit the needs of the test, the following selection criteria are imposed to filter the 
data: 
1. Sixty-five observations whose raw earnings changes equal to 0 are dropped. 
These observations also report zero earnings, indicating that finance problems 
are likely inherent in these observations. In addition, there are only six ofthese 
observations with dividend cuts. The numbers are not sufficient to form a 
portfolio for testing the abnormal returns. 
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2. The observations with negative earnings per share are also forsaken in that 
they are inappropriate for computing earnings changes. 
3. Since dividend initiations and omissions are the extreme cases of dividend 
changes and are thought to signal difference information, these observations 
are not included in the sample. 
4. Market value and daily adjusted price should be feasible for computing the 
daily returns of individual stocks and the value-weighted average returns of 
portfolios. Consequently, the observations which miss the price data are 
crossed out. 
The selection criteria finally yield a total of 4,978 observations. 
3.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.1 presents the frequencies of the announcements by year. Six 
intersectional portfolios are formed in light of the raw dividend changes (RDC in Eq. 
(3.1)) and raw earnings changes (REC in Eq. (3.2)): 
RDC; 1 = Div;, - Div; 1_ 2 , 
' ' ' 
(3.1) 
RECi.t = EPS;,, - EPS;,1_ 2 , (3.2) 
where Div;,r and EPS;,r denotes the dividends and earnings per share announced by 
firm i in the semi-annual period t. 
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Panel A shows that the announcements are well spread in each year, except 1992 and 
2004. The number of dividend increases is 3,607, which is much larger than 357 for 
dividend cuts, and 1,014 for dividend continuations. In each individual year, the 
numbers of dividend increases are still much larger than those of dividend cuts and 
continuations. On the other hand, the number of earnings increases is 3,252 (i.e. the 
sum of 104, 382 and 2,766), overwhelming the number of earnings declines (1,726). 
Dividend cuts and continuations are more announced with earnings declines (i.e. 
totally 885 out of 1,371 observations) while only about 50 percent (841 out of 1,726) 
of earnings declines are released with dividend cuts and continuations. In contrast, a 
large portion of earnings increases (2,766 out of 3,252) are reported with dividend 
increases. This situation does not differ much for the individual years. 
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the mean and the percentiles of the main variables. The 
percentage change of dividends and earnings per share are respectively defined as the 
raw divided changes (RDC1) divided by Div;,1_2 and the raw earnings changes (REC1) 
divided by EPS;, 1_2• Daily security returns are computed as Eq. (3.3): 
( pd J R;,d = ln -'·- , P;,d-1 (3.3) 
where R;,d is the return on security i on day d, and P;,d denotes the daily adjusted price 
of security i on day d. 
The mean percentage change in dividends is 0.1300 for the whole sample and the 
median is 0.0877. Most of the percentiles and the means of the dividend changes 
signify that the portfolios with earnings declines announce more dividend cuts and 
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less dividend increases than the portfolios with earnings increases. The mean (median) 
dividend change for the portfolio of earnings declines and dividend cuts is -0.4306 
(-0.5994) while the mean (median) for the portfolios of earnings declines but dividend 
increases is -0.3282 (-0.5000). Regarding the portfolios with dividend increases, the 
one with earnings increases averagely has larger dividend increases than that with 
earnings declines (0.2275 versus 0.1913). The median dividend change of the former 
portfolio is 0.1226, which is also larger than 0.0951 of the latter portfolio. 
The mean and median percentage changes in earnings for the whole sample are 
0.3008 and 0.0926 respectively. For the portfolios with earnings increases, the one 
with dividend increases has the largest mean earnings increases (0.6455), but the 
largest median earnings increases appear on the portfolio with dividend cuts (0.2931 ). 
The standard deviation of the earnings changes is notably large on the portfolio of 
dividend and earnings increases (4.2004), indicating that the observations in the 
portfolio with dividend increases are more divergent in earnings performance than 
those in the others. Among the portfolios with earnings declines, their standard 
deviations of earnings changes range from 0.22 to 0.31, which are not far different. 
Both means and medians suggest that the portfolio with dividend cuts has inferior 
earnings performance than the other two portfolios. The mean and the median for the 
portfolio of dividend cuts and earnings declines are respectively -0.4846 and -0.4349, 
while those for dividend continuations are -0.3725 and -0.2778 and those for dividend 
increases are -0.2110 and -0.1330 respectively. 
The mean returns on the event day are 0.0067 and the median is 0.0031 for the whole 
sample. Among six intersectional portfolios, the portfolios with dividend increases 
appear to have positive mean returns on the event day which are 0.0065 for the one 
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with dividend increases but earnings declines and 0.0135 for the one with dividend 
and earnings increases. For the other four portfolios, the one of dividend cuts and 
earnings declines possesses the lowest mean and median returns, which are 
respectively -0.0188 and -0.0131. The mean returns for both of the portfolios with 
dividend continuations are -0.0063 and -0.0005 respectively while the median for 
these portfolios appear to be zero. 
The mean market value of the samples is about 1,005 million pounds, and the median 
is only about 122 million pounds. The median is far smaller than the mean of market 
value, implying that a vast majority of the sample is dominated by the small firms. 
The standard deviation of the market value, which is 4323.464, presenting that the 
large divergence ofthe firm sizes is inherent in the sample. 
To sum it up, this chapter tests the market reaction to simultaneous dividend and 
earnings announcements by forming six intersectional portfolios. Each portfolio has 
different directions of dividend and (or) earnings changes. By testing these portfolios, 
it is expected to figure out whether the information in dividends or earnings 
announcements is what the market mainly responds to. 
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3·4· Methodology and hypotheses development 
The aim of this chapter is to test the existence of information effect and to identify 
which factors (i.e. dividends, earnings or both) that explain changes in firm value on 
the event day. Since the dividends and earnings in the UK are announced 
simultaneously, dividends and earnings are examined on the same information set and, 
furthermore, the changes in information induced by the announcements can be fully 
captured. Accordingly, six portfolios are formed on the basis of dividend and earnings 
changes. In what follows, the investigation is carried out by observing and comparing 
the market reactions to the portfolios. In addition, dividing the sample by the rank of 
firm size, event study methodology is imposed to test whether the market reaction is 
dependent on the level of information asymmetry. Following the event study 
methodology, regression analysis is adopted to test the associations of abnormal 
returns with dividends and earnings changes. This procedure is important in that it 
helps to clarify if it is dividends, earnings or both inducing the abnormal returns (if 
any) on the announcement day. 
3.4.1. Market reactions to dividend information - Event-time 
·approach 
The examinations start by using the standard event study to detect the abnormal 
returns during the event period. The tests assume that, following the semi-strong form 
market efficiency, the market would only react to new information implicit in the 
simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings. To examine the existence of 
the market reactions, the abnormal returns are estimated to measure the reactions, and 
the event study is carried out as the following processes: 
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1. using the stock returns prior to the event period (i.e. the estimation period) to 
form a model for estimating the expected stock returns, 
2. estimating the divergence between the real stock returns and the expected 
stock returns during the event period to generate the abnormal returns, and 
3. testing whether the abnormal returns are different from zero. 
The details of the methodology are presented as follows. 
Firstly, the event period and the estimation period have to be defined. Due that the 
dividends and earnings are announced semi-annually in the UK, it does not allow this 
test to employ a long estimation period, such as one-year pre-event period. Thus, the 
estimation period is defined as an eighty-day period (about 4 trading months) which 
starts from 95 days to 16 days prior to the announcements. The event period is 
designed to be a 31-day period, which is from 15 days before the announcements to 
15 days after the announcements. 
For each observation, the market model is imposed to be the benchmark model for 
estimating the expected returns. The market model is shown as Eq. (3 .4): 
(3.4) 
The FTSE All Share Index is used as the proxy to compute th,e m~ket returns Rm.t· 
The daily return of the firm ion day t (Ru) is computed as the natural logarithm of the 
security price on day t minus the natural logarithm of the price on day t-1. The returns 
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during the eighty-day estimation period are employed to estimate the f3 and the 
intercept a. The f3 and a are then used to generate the expected returns for each day of 
the event period. 
Secondly, g1ven the estimated expected returns, the abnormal returns could be 
computed as Eq. (3.5): 
(3.5) 
where AR;,1 denotes the abnormal returns of the firm i on day t. In addition, the 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, which do not make an implicit assumption of 
portfolio rebalancing on each event day, are imposed to represent the shareholders' 
wealth over an event period. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the period form 
t 1 to t2 (e.g. 6 to 10 days relative to the event day) are computed as Eq. (3 .6): 
12 
BHARi,T = L ARi,T . 
T=tl 
(3.6) 
Thirdly, the event study statistically tests whether the cross-sectional average 
abnormal returns or buy-and-hold abnormal returns are different from zero. The 
(buy-and-hold) abnormal returns which are significantly different from zero indicate 
the prominent market reaction to the information conveyed by the simultaneous 
announcements of dividends and earnings. The significant tests on the cross-sectional 
average abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns are carried out by using 
student's t test. The standard deviations for the t test, which take account of 
cross-correlation, are estimated from the time series of the cross-sectional average 
abnormal returns over the eighty-day estimation period. Failure to consider 
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cross-correlation when it exists would result in underestimating the variance of the 
abnormal returns and over-rejecting the null hypotheses (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
As for the tests on the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, the standard deviation is 
computed by using the above standard deviation times the square root of the days 
compounded. 
The signalling hypothesis states that, if dividend effect exists, the announcements of 
dividend increases should induce positive wealth effect while the announcements of 
dividend cuts should induce negative wealth effect. If the information about earnings 
has been captured by the announcements of earnings changes, the market reactions are 
not expected to depend on the announcements of dividend changes. 
3.4.2. Market reactions to dividend information - Calendar-time 
approach 
An alternative approach used to measure the abnormal returns during the event period 
is the calendar-time method, which is firstly introduced by Jaffe (1974) and 
Mandelker (1974) and advocated by Fama (1998). This method examines time-serial 
portfolios whose composition is renewed over time in light of the calendar date on 
which each firm's event period (e.g. day -15 to day -6, or a specific event day, day 5) 
is investigated. 
The advantage of this approach is that the vanances of the time-serial returns 
portfolios automatically account for the cross-correlations in stock returns at each 
point in calendar time. Furthermore, the calendar-time approach could overcome a 
potential problem which the event-time approach suffers. The problem raised on 
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event-time approach is that the short interval between two subsequent announcements 
(i.e. normally six months) is not appropriate for an estimation period longer than the 
short interval. The typical length of the estimation period is suggested at least 100 
trading days (Peterson, 1989). When the estimation period is limited to a shorter 
interval, it may reduce the accuracy for the market model on estimating expected 
returns. The calendar-time approach, however, would not encounter the similar 
problem since this approach does not require an estimation period. 
Accordingly, the time-serial portfolios are formed for each calendar day from January 
1992 to March 2004. For the purpose of simplifying the illustration, the following 
takes the event day (day 0) for example. For a given calendar day, the portfolio 
includes all observations whose dividends and earnings are announced on the day. A 
time-serial portfolio may consist of two or more observations when two or more firms 
made the announcements on the same calendar day. The observations' returns on the 
given day are then used to compute the value-weighted average returns for the 
portfolio. The employment of the value-weighted average returns corresponds to the 
value-weighted explanatory variables of the benchmark models, CAPM and the 
three-factor model (discussed later). Moreover, Fama (1998) suggests that adopting 
the equally-weighted returns incurs severer bad-model problem in inferences in that 
systematic problems in explaining the average returns on the categories of small 
stocks are inherent in all the asset pricing models. For computing the value-weighted 
returns, considering that the share price would fluctuate during the event period, the 
firms' market values 16 trading days prior to the simultaneous announcements (i.e. 
the last trading day prior to the event period) are used. The above procedure is 
repeated for each calendar day until the end of March 2004. 
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The similar procedure is likewise applied to estimate the average abnormal returns 
during a specific event period. Take the event period of day 6 to day 10 for example; 
the time-serial portfolio for a given day consists of all observations whose 
announcements are made within previous six to ten days. The portfolio renews daily 
to drop all observations that reach the end of their five-day event period (i.e. day 6 to 
day 1 0), and add all observations that just start their five-day event period. The 
computation of the portfolio returns for the event period is exactly the same as that for 
the individual event day. 
After the returns of the time-serial portfolios are computed, the test makes use of two 
models to estimate the abnormal returns for each dividends and earnings intersectional 
portfolio. The first model in use is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) introduced 
by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Jensen (1968) applies the CAPM on estimating 
abnormal returns and argues that, given the empirical validity of the CAPM, the risk 
premium on the individual portfolio can be expressed as a liner function of the risk 
factor fJ, the market premium and the residual, whose expected value equals zero. The 
model is given as Eq. (3.7): 
(3.7) 
where Rp,t, Rj,1 and Rm,t respectively denote the returns on capital asset, the returns on 
risk-free asset, and the returns of the market on calendar day t. The returns on capital 
asset are the value-weighted returns of the time-serial portfolios. The annual discount 
rate of the UK Treasury Bill (T-bill) is converted into daily interest rate to be the 
proxy of the return on the risk-free asset. The FTSE All Share Index is used to 
compute the returns of the market. 
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The CAPM would predict the returns well when fJ is stable and thus the expected 
value of the residual equals zero. However, if the dividend and earnings 
announcements have information effect on the share prices, it may induce the prices 
to fluctuate, resulting in that 1) Rp,d becomes divergent to what the model predicts and 
2) expected residual no longer equals zero. Jensen (1968) allows a constant adding to 
the right hand side of the model to capture the divergence caused by the event and to 
leave white noise to the residual. The model therefore becomes as Eq. (3.8): 
(3.8) 
where bp,t is the new residual after the intercept ap,t is added to estimate the 
information effect of the dividend and earnings announcements. The intercept is the 
main interest of the test. Positive (negative) intercepts indicate positive (negative) 
market reactions to the announcements. The null hypothesis states that the intercept 
equals to zero for all portfolios. Rejecting the null hypothesis suggests the prominence 
of the market reactions. 
Additionally, Fama and French (1993) assert that the three-factor model could be a 
common model explaining stock returns. While the CAPM only makes use of 
systematic risk to predict the returns, the three-factor model additionally includes the 
size factor, "SMB" (small minus big) and the book-to-market factor "HML" (high 
minus low), to respectively capture the size effect and the book-to-market effect. 
Fama and French (1996) empirically compare the prediction ability of the CAPM and 
the three-factor model, showing that the CAPM mis-prices some portfolios, such as 
high and low book-to-market portfolios. They argue that many anomalies are caused 
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from the CAPM's failure to take account of size and book-to-market factors. In order 
to mitigate the "bad model problem" interfering with the estimation, the three-factor 
model is employed to provide the supplemental evidence for the test. The three-factor 
model is given as Eq. (3.9): 
(3.9) 
where f31, f32, and f33 are the coefficients in the time-series regression. The coefficient of 
market premium, f31, is analogous to the beta of the CAPM but not equal to it since the 
additional factors provide some of the explanation for risk premium (Rp,t- RJ.1). The 
size factor, SMB (small minus big), is the difference between the return on a portfolio 
of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks. On the other hand, the 
book-to-market factor, HML (high minus low), is the difference between the return on 
a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low 
book-to-market stocks22 . All the other factors are the variables remaining the same 
with the CAPM. 
Similar to the test on the CAPM model, the foremost interest is placed on the intercept 
of the three-factor model. The model is tested upon the assumption that the expected 
value of the residual equals to zero. In other words, the three factors are assumed to 
capture all the variation in the returns of the time-serial portfolios, and the intercept 
could capture the anomalies induced by the announcements, leaving only white noise 
to the residual. Ifthe simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements convey new 
and positive information, the market, which is characterized by semi-strong form 
efficiency, would have immediate and positive response to the information. Relatively, 
22 Sincere appreciation is placed for the data provision of SMB and HML from Professor Krishna 
Paudyal, Durham Business School, Durham University, UK. All remaining errors are mine. 
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the market should respond negatively to disfavoured news conveyed by the 
announcements. Therefore, according to the dividend signalling hypothesis, if 
dividend announcement effect exists, the intercepts, for measuring average abnormal 
returns, are predicted to be positive for the portfolios with dividend increases and 
negative for the portfolios with dividend cuts. If earnings announcements convey 
most information about earnings performance, the market is only expected to respond 
to the earnings announcements. 
3·4·3· Testing the existence of differential infonnation 
After examining the market reactions to the simultaneous announcements of 
dividends and earnings, this chapter further examines whether the market reactions to 
the simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings are dependent on the level 
of information asymmetry. Previous findings suggest that the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements are greater for small firms than 
large firms (Freeman, 1987; Ball and Kothari, 1991). Since analysts tend to focus 
more on large firms and bring more related information to the market, the share price 
may already incorporate the information before it is announced or signalled. By 
contrast, the information about small firms is relatively rare, making the market rely 
more on official announcements and the small firms rely more on dividend signalling. 
Based on the notion that the level of information asymmetry is inversely related to the 
firm size, this chapter imposes firms' market capitalisations as the proxy for the level 
of information asymmetry23 . The differential information hypothesis predicts that, 
23 The use of firm size as the proxy for the level of information asymmetry can also be found in the 
studies of Bajaj and Vijh (1990), Bajaj and Vijh (199~), Mougoue and Rao (2003) , Bali (2003) and 
many others. · e 
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around the days of the simultaneous announcements, the market's reactions to the 
announcements should be larger for small firms than for large firms. To test this 
hypothesis, the observations are sorted and split into five quintiles by the market 
capitalizations 16 days prior to the announcements. The first quintile consists of the 
observations with the smallest 20 percent in firm size while the fifth quintile consists 
ofthose with the largest 20 percent in firm size. The observations for each quintile are 
further grouped in light of the directions of dividends and earnings changes. The 
average abnormal returns are estimated by Fama and French's (1993) three-factor 
model for each dividend-earnings-size portfolio. 
3·4·4· Estimations of relative dividends and earnings effects 
One intention of this chapter, in addition to examine the information effect of the 
simultaneous announcements, also aims to understand whether it is dividends, 
earnings or both inducing the market response. As stated by Miller and Rock (1985), 
the dividend effect stems from that dividends convey the missing piece of information 
about current earnings. The market then revises the expectation of future earnings in 
light of the dividend changes. However, when dividends and earnings are announced 
simultaneously, earnings announcements should signal most information about 
earnings, edging out the signalling power of dividend announcements. In this case, the 
abnormal returns may only pertain to earnings changes unless dividends still possess 
information additional to current earnings. A regression model is formed to examine 
the explanatory power of dividend changes and earnings changes on the event-day 
abnormal returns. The dividend signalling hypothesis for this examination states that 
the coefficients on the dividends and earnings variables should be positive but the 
coefficient on the earnings variable should be larger than that on the dividends 
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variable. 
Another possibility is that the market compounds the information conveyed by the 
simultaneous announcements and judges the information jointly. To investigate this 
possibility, the model additionally imposes five dummy variables for the six 
intersectional portfolios as the proxies for the interaction effect between dividends and 
earnings announcements. When the interaction effect is taken into account, it is simple 
to anticipate market response to the portfolios with simultaneous increases or declines 
in dividends and earnings. Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict how the market 
responds to the announcements whose dividends and earnings signal contradictory 
information. For example, if earnings declines are expected and the dividend increases 
are unexpected, market would respond positively to the announcement. Conversely, 
market would respond negatively to the unexpected earnings. However, when both 
factors are unexpected, the market's response is expected to be ambiguous and no 
abnormal returns would be detected. In this case, the abnormal returns are not 
expected to relate to the interaction effect. Equation (3 .1 0) expresses the model 
discussed above: 
AROi,l =a+ f31 X Wivi,l + flz X MPSi,l + r X Dummy(Wivi,l ,MPSi,l )+si,/' (3.10) 
where L1Div;, 1 and L1EPS;,1 respectively denote the percentage changes of dividends and 
earnings. The coefficient y is a vector of coefficients on a vector of five dummy 
variables which are imposed as the proxies for the interaction effect. Kane, Lee, and 
Marcus (1984) apply restricted least square (RLS) to test the joint significance of 
dividends and earnings as well as the joint significance of the dummies for the 
interaction effects. The former is tested by "first order" F statistic whose restricted 
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model includes only a constant and the interaction dummies. The latter is tested by 
"interaction" F statistic whose restricted model includes a constant, dividend changes 
and earnings changes. The unrestricted model for the both F statistics includes a 
constant, dividend changes, earnings changes, and the interaction dummies. When 
dividends or earnings possess information effect, the "first order" F statistic will be 
significant and reject the null hypothesis which states that both of the coefficients 
equal to zero. Similarly, when the interaction effect exists, the "interaction" F statistic 
will be significant, indicating that not all the coefficients of the dummies equal to 
zero. 
In the second part of regression analysis, the tests are conducted for the respective 
effect of earnings increases and earnings declines. When a firm experiences increases 
in earnings, simultaneous increases in dividends would more or less confirm the 
signals of earnings. Nonetheless, when a firm experiences declines in earnings, the 
signals from dividends might be redundant if dividends only signal for current 
earnings. Particularly, Lintner (1956) suggests that managers are reluctant to cut 
dividends . .The reluctance of cutting dividends when the firms experience declines in 
earnings makes dividends increases less creditable (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner, 1996). Hence, when the market evaluates the information from a firm 
incurring earnings recession, it would rely more on the earnings signals than 
dividends signals. Consequently, examining the explanatory power of dividends, 
earnings increases, and earnings declines on the event-day market reactions, the tested 
hypothesis states that the coefficients on the explanatory variables should be positive, 
while the coefficient on the earnings declines variable should be larger than that on 
the earnings increases variable. 
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Prior findings furthermore suggest that that managers or investors believe that 
dividend changes signal for the future earnings (Baker and Powell, 1999; Conroy, 
Eades, and Harris, 2000; and Koch and Sun, 2004). Thus, it is possible that the 
apparent market responses to dividend changes are actually to future earnings. In this 
chapter, the hypothesis for examining the future earnings variables states that future 
earnings should have positive relation to the abnormal returns and reduce the 
explanatory power of dividend changes. Otherwise, dividend changes will remain as 
significant as they do in the model without future earnings. Assuming that the 
earnings process follows a random walk in this chapter, the variables of the future 
earnings are the raw earnings changes of the first and the second following semi-years. 
The future earnings changes are computed as Eq. (3.11) and Eq. (3.12): 
MPS = EPSI+1 - EPSI-1 
1,1+1 EPS 
1-1 
(3.11) 
MPS = EPS/+2 - EPS1 
1,1+2 EPS 
I 
(3.12) 
The model for testing the effects of earnings increases, earnings declines and future 
earnings can be expressed as Eq. (3.13): 
where DED denotes the dummy variable which equal one for earnings declines and 
zero otherwise. The variables, L1EPSi,t+I and L1EPS;,1+2, are respectively the percentage 
changes of future earnings of the first and the second subsequent semi-years. 
The dependent variable, for all the models in this section, is the abnormal returns on 
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event day (day 0) estimated by the standard event study. The test only employs the 
abnormal returns on day 0 rather than three-day or two-day buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns around day 0 for two reasons. Firstly, in the market with semi-strong form 
efficient, market should respond to news immediately. Thus, the abnormal returns on 
the event day are the best indicator for information effect. Secondly, the evidence 
from the event study (discussed in the next section) indicates that the information 
effect on the event day is more prominent than that on either day 1 or day -1. 
Consequently, employing the abnormal returns on day 0 as the dependent variable 
should be more appropriate (at least not worse) than employing the two- or three-day 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns around the event day. 
To conclude, the examinations of this chapter start from testing the market reaction to 
the simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings. The market is expected to 
react positively to good news and negatively to bad news if the announcements 
convey new information. Additionally, this chapter investigates whether the market 
reactions to the announcements are dependent on the level of information asymmetry. 
Using the firm's market capitalisations as the proxy for the level of information 
asymmetry, the differential information hypothesis predicts that the announcements 
made by small firms would induce larger market responses than those made by larger 
firms. More explicitly, this chapter examines the relative effects of dividends and 
earnings changes on the market reactions. The explanatory variables of the changes in 
dividends, current earnings and future earnings are all expected to have positive 
relation to the event-day abnormal returns. However, earnings changes should capture 
most unexpected information about current earnings, and leave little information in 
dividends. In this case, the relation between dividend changes and the abnormal 
returns should become trivial. Furthermore, if the information conveyed by dividends 
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is also about future earnings, including the future earnings variables in the model 
should reduce the explanatory power of dividends. Otherwise, the significance of 
dividends will not be affected when dividend announcement effect actually exists. 
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3·5· Empirical results 
Generally, the results of event studies suggest that market has significant responses to 
the simultaneous announcements around the event day. The evidence appears to be 
consistent regardless which approach of event study is employed to estimate the 
abnormal returns. As the earlier expectation, market responds positively to good news 
and negatively to bad news, indicating the existence of both dividend and earnings 
effects. In addition, for the announcements with dividend increases, the market 
appears to respond more prominently to the information released by small firms than 
large firms. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is not found on the announcements with 
dividend continuations or dividend cuts. When directly testing the dividend and 
earnings effects by regression analysis, dividend effect appear to dominate earnings 
effect on accounting for abnormal returns. Furthermore, the abnormal returns are 
likewise positively related to current earnings declines and future earnings changes of 
the first subsequent half-year. Current earnings increases only play a limited role in 
signalling. 
3.5.1. Event-time abnormal returns around simultaneous 
dividends and earnings announcements 
Estimates of the abnormal returns during the event period for each intersectional 
portfolio are presented in Table 3 .2. Consistent with the evidence well documented in 
previous studies24, the market is found to respond positively to dividend and (or) 
earnings increases and negatively to dividend and (or) earnings decreases. Panel A of 
Table 3.2 presents that, on day 0 (the event day), the portfolio of dividend and 
24 SeeAharony and Swary (1980); Penman (1983); Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sinclair (1996) and 
many others. 
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earnings increases earns the largest positive abnormal returns, which is 1.30 percent. 
By contrast, the portfolio of dividend and earnings decreases earns the largest 
negative abnormal returns (-1.84 percent). For the portfolios whose dividends and 
earnings signal contradictorily, the market reactions seem to be driven by the 
announcements of dividend changes. The portfolio of dividend increases but earnings 
declines earns 0.64 percent of abnormal return on day 0 while the portfolio of 
dividend cuts but earnings increases earns -0.64 percent of abnormal returns. When 
dividends are announced to remain unchanged, market reacts negatively to the 
portfolio with earnings declines (-0.55 percent) and insignificantly to that with 
earmngs mcreases. 
In addition to the event day, price behaviour shown in Panel A of Table 3.2 for each 
portfolio is also different during the rest of the event period. During the periods of day 
-6 to day -10 and day -6 to day -15, only the portfolio of dividend and earnings 
increases earns significantly positive abnormal returns. None of the other portfolios 
earn significant abnormal returns during these periods. Share price has more apparent 
movements during the week prior to the event day. Positive abnormal returns for the 
portfolio of dividend and earnings increases remain significant throughout this week. 
The magnitude of the market reaction becomes larger as the announcement day is 
getting close. Even though, the pre-announcement market reactions are still much 
smaller than that on the event day. Similar pattern of the price behaviour is found on 
the portfolio of dividend increases but earnings declines. The significantly positive 
abnormal returns emerge from three days prior to the announcement and reach the 
maximum on the event day. Another portfolio earns three days of significant abnormal 
returns is that of dividend cuts but earnings increases. Surprisingly, the market reacts 
to this portfolio positively prior to the announcement day but negatively when 
110 
Chapter 3 Market Reactions to Simultaneous Dividend and Earnings Announcements 
dividends and earnings are announced. For the other portfolios, the price movement 
prior to the announcement appears to be positive but rarely significant. 
During the post-announcement period, Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that the direction 
of price movement appears to reverse for some portfolios but appears to continue for 
some others. Price movement for the two portfolios with dividend increases continues 
to be significantly positive posterior to the announcement. The market reaction to the 
portfolio of dividend and earnings increases remains significant until five days after 
the announcements. For the portfolio of dividend increases but earnings declines, 
significantly positive abnormal returns are found up to three weeks (15 trading days) 
of the post-announcement period. The reversal of the price movement during the 
post-announcement period is the most obvious for the portfolio of dividend 
continuations but earnings declines. During the week following the announcements, 
abnormal returns for this portfolio appear to be significantly positive on four out of 
five trading days. Similar pattern of price movement happens to the portfolio of 
dividend and earnings decreases though the price movement is less significant. Note 
that the trend of the reversal seems to continue even after six days following the 
announcement. During the period from day 6 to day 15, the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns are 2.18 percent for the portfolio of dividend and earnings decreases, and are 
1.05 percent for the portfolio of dividend continuations but earnings declines. These 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are much larger in size than those during the 
corresponding period for other portfolios. 
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents the wealth earned by shareholders during the event 
period centred on the simultaneous announcement day. During the three-day period 
centred on the announcement day, shareholders whose stocks announcing increases in 
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both dividend and earnings earn 1.92 percent of abnormal returns which is statistically 
significant. By contrast, shareholders whose stocks announcing declines in both 
dividends and earnings suffer 1.61 percent loss of abnormal returns. While dividends 
remain unchanged, it seems that the market only reacts to the information conveyed 
by earnings changes. The three-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns are -0.57 percent 
for the portfolio of dividend continuations but earnings declines while those for 
dividend continuations but earnings increases are 0.28 percent. Given constant on 
dividend changes, the market reacts to bad news about earnings more prominently 
than to good news about earnings. As for the portfolios with contradictory information, 
shareholders with dividend increases but earnings declines earn significant and 
positive abnormal returns (1.07 percent) during the three-day period centred on the 
announcement day. By comparison, shareholders with dividend declines but earnings 
increases experience 0.4363 percent loss of abnormal returns. However, the loss is 
insignificant. For the event periods with longer intervals, shareholders with dividend 
continuations and dividend increases experience positive abnormal returns around 
these periods. The announcements with dividend increases are found to induce lager 
positive wealth effect than the announcements with dividend continuations. 
Nonetheless, during the 31-day event period, the abnormal returns earned by 
shareholders with dividend increases or dividend continuations range between 1.98 to 
3.1 0 percent, which are not far different. Surprisingly, the announcements of declines 
in both dividends and earnings, which induce the largest negative abnormal returns on 
the announcement day, also evoke 2.23 percent of abnormal returns during the 31-day 
period. The results seem to imply that the announcements do not have much effect for 
longer event periods. 
Figure 3.1 provides a clear overview of the share price behaviours over the 31-day 
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event period. Before dividends and earnings are announced, the price performances do 
not seem to have much difference among the intersectional portfolios although the 
portfolio of dividend and earnings increases outperforms the others a little. The largest 
divergence of the share price performance happens on day 0, showing that three of the 
portfolios induce obviously negative market reactions and two of them evoke positive 
market reactions. During the post-announcement period, all except the portfolio of 
dividend cuts but earnings increases have an uptrend of share price performances. 
During the six-week event period centred on the announcement days, the portfolio of 
dividend cuts but earnings increases end up with about 0.5 percent of buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns while the other portfolios at least earn about two percent of 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The portfolio of simultaneous increases in dividends 
and earnings is the one whose event-period buy-and-hold abnormal returns exceed 3 
percent. 
Consistent with the prediction of the dividend signalling hypothesis, the evidence 
suggests the existence of both dividend and earnings effects. The wealth effect is the 
most prominent for the announcements of simultaneous increases (declines) in 
dividends and earnings. However, when dividends remain unchanged, the market 
reactions are found to depend on news about earnings performance. As for the 
announcements with contradictory information, the market reactions are likely more 
dependent on the information of the dividend announcements. 
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3.5.2. Calendar-time abnormal returns around simultaneous 
dividends and earnings announcements 
Abnormal returns estimated by CAP M 
The evidence of the calendar-time abnormal returns is mostly consistent with that of 
event-time abnormal returns. Table 3.3 presents the estimates of the abnormal returns 
by CAPM. Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that, the largest positive market response on 
the announcement day (day 0) is created to the portfolio of increases in both dividends 
and earnings. Consistent with the signalling hypothesis, the daily abnormal returns 
illustrated in Panel A for the portfolio of simultaneous increases in both dividends and 
earnings appear to be positive and significant. Moreover, the significance of the 
average abnormal returns during the period of day 6 to day 10 or to day 15 is notable 
in that this finding is different from that provided by event-time approach. The 
average 0.07 percent of daily abnormal returns is analogous to 0. 7 percent of 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns during the period of day 6 to day 15. The estimate by 
CAPM is almost ten times larger than the estimate by even-time approach. The reason 
for this divergence might stem from that the calendar-time approach estimates 
value-weighted average returns which take account of the firm capitalisations. Panel 
B of Table 3.3 clearly indicates that the increases in shareholders' wealth induced by 
the announcements of increases in dividends and earnings are prominent. Throughout 
the 31-day event period, shareholders with the announcements of simultaneous 
increases in dividends and earnings averagely earn 0.10 percent of abnormal returns 
per day. The average abnormal returns during the three-day period around the 
announcements are even as large as 0.54 percent which is analogous to 1.6 percent of 
three-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
As the evidence shown in Panel A of Table 3.3, the market also reacts positively to the 
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portfolio of dividend increases but earnings declines from day -3 to day 2. The largest 
market reaction, which is measured as 0.55 percent of abnormal returns, is found on 
day 0. The signals from this portfolio comprise the mix of good and bad news, which 
is not as favourable as those from the portfolio of dividend and earnings increases. 
Therefore, during the event period, the abnormal returns for the portfolio of dividend 
increases but earnings declines are generally smaller in size and less significant, 
comparing to those for the portfolio of simultaneous increases in dividends and 
earnings. Estimates in Panel B provide the similar implication, although, over the 
various periods, the shareholders' wealth induced by the announcements of dividend 
increases but earnings declines all appears to be positive. 
Market reaction to another portfolio which signals contradictory information (i.e. 
dividend cuts but earnings increases) also appears to be positive for the 
pre-announcement period but negative on the announcement day. Panel A of Table 3.3 
shows that the abnormal returns on day -5 to day -1 are positive while some of the 
abnormal returns are even significant at ten percent level. From day 0 to day 2, the 
abnormal returns are found to be negative but insignificant, which are respectively 
-0.54, -0.29 and -0.12 percent. On day 3, the portfolio earns 0.43 percent of abnormal 
returns and thereafter the abnormal returns diminish. In Panel B of Table 3.3, the 
market reacts negatively but insignificantly to the announcements of dividend cuts but 
earnings increases during the period from day -1 to day 1. However, during the 
two-week event period (day -5 to day 5), such announcements induce 0.21 percent of 
abnormal returns which appear to be significant. For the other event periods, the 
average abnormal returns are found to be insignificant. Taken together, the evidence 
presented here, therefore, suggests that the returns on this portfolio are volatile, which 
may stem from investors' indecision on responding to the contradictory information. 
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The pattern of the abnormal returns for the portfolio of decreases in both dividends 
and earnings is partially different from that estimated by event-time approach. The 
abnormal returns estimated by event-time approach all appear to be positive during 
the pre-announcement period while most of those estimated by CAPM appear to be 
negative. Even though, the estimates from both approaches are not statistically 
significant during the pre-announcement period. On the announcement day, the 
abnormal returns estimated by CAPM are found to be -1.82 percent which is closed to 
the finding of the event-time approach. The post-announcement abnormal returns turn 
into positive but only significant on day 2. The findings in Panel B of Table 3.3 
indicate that the negative market reactions, which are -0.80 percent of average 
abnormal returns, appear to be significant during the three-day period around the 
announcement day. For the other event periods, the abnormal returns are negative but 
insignificant. 
When dividend continuations are thought as a neutral signal, the signalling hypothesis 
predicts that the market reaction should depend on the information signalled by 
earnings announcements. Consistent with this anticipation, Panel A of Table 3.3 
shows that the market reacts to the announcements of dividend continuations but 
earnings declines negatively on day -1 and day 0. The abnormal returns on these days 
are respectively -0.31 and -0.64 percent, both of which are significant. The estimates 
in Panel B also present -0.26 percent of the average abnormal returns during the 
three-day period around the announcements. By comparison, during the same period, 
the market is not found to have prominent reaction to the portfolio of dividend 
continuations but earnings increases. The significant abnormal returns for this 
portfolio are found during the period of day -5 to day 5, and the period of day -10 to 
day 10. Consistent with the dividend signalling hypothesis, the average abnormal 
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returns for the two periods are respectively 0.13 percent and 0.06 percent per trading 
day. 
To conclude, the evidence supports the dividend signalling hypothesis which predicts 
that the existence of dividend announcement effect. The evidence is particularly sound 
on the announcement day (day 0) and the three-day event period centred on day 0. 
The largest positive market reactions are found to the announcements of increases in 
both dividends and earnings while the largest negative market reactions are found to 
the announcements of simultaneous declines in dividends and earnings. As for the 
announcements with dividend continuations, the market reactions mainly rely on the 
information signalled by earnings changes, suggesting the existence of earnings 
announcement effect. When the announcements signal contradictory information, the 
market reactions on the event day are found to follow the information signalled by 
dividend announcements. The overall evidence suggests the existence of both 
dividend and earnings effects, but dividend effect is more prominent. 
Abnormal returns estimated by the three-factor model 
Table 3.4 demonstrates the abnormal returns estimated by using the three-factor 
model. Although Fama and French (1993) assert that this model could capture size 
and book-to-market effects, the evidence provided by this model is virtually the same 
as that provided by CAPM. The results in Panel A again show that, supporting the 
signalling hypothesis, the simultaneous announcements of both increases in dividends 
and earnings have the largest positive effect on share price. The abnormal returns 
emerge from average 0.08 percent during two and three weeks prior to the 
announcement, reach 1.20 percent of maximum on day 0, and gradually diminish after 
the announcement. The wealth effect induced by simultaneous increases in dividends 
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and earnings lasts for almost six weeks. Confirming this evidence, Panel B shows that 
the average abnormal returns are significant and about 0.1 percent during the 31-day 
event period. Regardless of the length of the event period examined, the significance 
of the positive average abnormal returns induced by simultaneous increases in 
dividends and earnings is explicit and the abnormal returns for the period from day -1 
to day 1 are the most prominent. 
The contradictory signals of dividend increases but earnings declines also induce 
positive effect for several days around the announcements. Panel A of Table 3.4 
presents that the significant and positive abnormal returns emerge from five days prior 
to the announcements (0.15 percent) and grow into the most prominent on the day of 
announcements (0.59 percent). For the various event periods centred on day 0, the 
evidence in Panel B shows that the average abnormal returns induced by dividend 
increases but earnings declines all appear to be significantly positive. However, due to 
the negative changes in earnings performance, the abnormal returns are smaller in size, 
comparing to the abnormal returns induced by simultaneous increases in dividends 
and earnings. 
Besides, the results in Panel A of Table 3.4 indicates that the simultaneous decreases 
in dividends and earnings induce the largest negative impact on shareholders' wealth 
on day 0 (-1.50 percent of abnormal returns). Surprisingly, the market reactions turn 
to be positive following the announcement. The evidence in Panel B suggests that, the 
abnormal returns during the period of day -1 to day 1, consistent with the signalling 
hypothesis, are found to be significant and about -0.68 percent per trading day. The 
average abnormal returns for the other longer event periods appear to be negative but 
insignificant. 
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The announcements of dividend continuations and earnmgs declines also induce 
negative wealth effect around the day of announcements. Panel A of Table 3.4 shows 
that the abnormal returns on day -1 and day 0 are respectively -0.31 and -0.53 percent 
which are very similar to the findings provided by CAPM. For the three-day period 
from day -1 to day 1, the average abnormal returns presented in Panel B are about 
-0.22 percent and are significant at ten percent level. When dividend continuations are 
though as neutral news, the evidence shows that the market mainly reacts to the 
information implicit in earnings changes, which suggest the existence of earnings 
announcement effect. 
With respect to the announcements of dividend continuations but earnings increases, 
the evidence in Panel A of Table 3.4 shows that, except the abnormal returns on day 4 
which appear to be significantly positive, those on each event day from day -5 to day 
5 are insignificant. Nonetheless, for the period of day 6 to day 10, the market appears 
to react significantly and positively to the information of dividend continuations but 
earnings increases announcements. Positive average abnormal returns, which are 0.13 
percent and 0.06 percent, are also respectively found in Panel B for the event periods 
of day -5 to day 5 and day -10 to day 10. The late market reactions are not predicted 
by the signalling hypothesis but the direction of the market reactions is consistent 
with the prediction. 
As for the portfolio of dividend cuts but earnings increases, Panel A of Table 3.4 
illustrates that the announcements induce negative wealth effect during the period 
from day 0 to day 2 but positive wealth effect are found on the event days preceding 
and following this period. Panel B shows that the abnormal returns for the three-day 
period centred on the announcement day are averagely -0.02 percent, but those for the 
119 
Chapter 3 Market Reactions to Simultaneous Dividend and Earnings Announcements 
11-day period are approximately 0.2 percent. The findings on this portfolios show that 
the market's view on the announcements of dividend cuts but earnings increases are 
divergent, making the shareholders' wealth volatile during the event period. 
To conclude, consistent with the expectation of the dividend signalling hypothesis, the 
announcements of dividend increases (cuts) induce positive (negative) abnormal 
returns, indicating the existence of dividend effect. The evidence also suggests the 
existence of earnings announcement effect. When dividend continuations are viewed 
as neutral news, the market is found to react positively to earnings increases and 
negatively to earnings declines. When contradictory information is signalled, the 
dividend announcement effect is found to be more prominent than earnings 
announcement effect. 
3·5·3· Differential information and market reactions to the 
simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings 
The hypothesis of differential information maintains that, the market reacts more 
prominently to the information released by small firms than large firms. The 
underlying reason is that analysts have stronger motivations to follow large firms and 
bring more information about large firms to the market, indirectly reducing the level 
of information asymmetry in large firms. By using the firm size as the proxy for the 
level of information asymmetry between managers and investors, the market reactions 
to the simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings in light of the size rank 
are presented in Table 3.5. Panel A to Panel D respectively demonstrate the average 
abnormal returns for the three-day, 11-day, 21-day and 31-day event periods centred 
on the announcement day. Some of the results obtained in Table 3.5 confirm the 
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prediction of the differential information hypothesis25 . 
The most striking evidence supporting the hypothesis comes from the market reaction 
to the announcements of simultaneous increases in dividends and earnings. The 
magnitude and the significance of the market reactions almost monotonously 
magnifies as the firm size shrinks. The findings in Panel A of Table 3.5 illustrate that, 
comparing with 0.3359 percent of the average three-day abnormal returns of the 
largest-firm quintile, the abnormal returns of the smallest-firm quintile are about five 
times larger and are averagely 1.5653 percent. The average abnormal returns of the 
second to the fourth quintiles decline progressively, which are respectively 0.8317, 
0.5503 and 0.4554 percent. Remarkably, the three-day abnormal returns of the five 
quintiles all appear to be significant at one percent level but the abnormal returns of 
the smallest-firm quintile are the most prominent. A similar pattern of return 
performance is likewise demonstrated from the results in Panels B, C and D. 
Comparing these panels, it is apparently found that the market reactions to the 
announcements made by the smallest firms all appear to be greater than the reactions 
to the largest firms. From the diagram in Figure 3.2 illustrating the abnormal returns 
accumulated from 15 trading days prior to the announcements 26 , the returns 
performances of the five quintiles are shown to diverge 11 days prior to the 
announcements (day -11). This, however, may stem from the leakage of good news to 
the market before the announcements are formally made. On the other hand, after day 
-11, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of the smallest firms are found to 
outperform those of the other quintiles and finish at about 8. 5 percent on day 15. 
Accordingly, the magnitude of the abnormal returns around the announcement days is 
25 The following discussion mainly focuses on the results of the three-day event period, but also refers 
to the results of the longer-event periods as appropriate. 
26 The results of the daily abnormal returns for each size quintile are available upon request. 
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also inversely related to firm size. These findings are consistent with the findings of 
Bali (2003) on dividend announcements and the findings of Ball and Kothari (1991) 
on earnings announcements. In addition, the BHARs of the fourth and the largest-firm 
quintiles do not show far divergent but, on day 0, the abnormal returns of the fourth 
quintile are slightly larger than those of the largest-firm quintile. Overall, the evidence 
obtained unequivocally supports the differential information hypothesis, indicating 
that the announcements of simultaneous increases in dividends and earnings made by 
the small firms are more informative than those made by the large firms. 
The evidence to emerge from the portfolio of dividend increases but earnings declines 
is also supportive for the differential information hypothesis. Throughout the four 
panels of Table 3.5, except the second size quintile, it is apparent that the market 
reactions swell as the firm size declines. For the three-day period centred on the 
announcement day, the smallest firms averagely earn 0.8325 percent of abnormal 
returns which are significant at one percent level and are about thirty times larger than 
the three-day abnormal returns of the largest firms. The abnormal returns of the third 
and the fourth quintiles are respectively 0.5284 and 0.3837 percent, which are smaller 
than the abnormal returns of the smallest firms and larger than those of the largest 
firms. Presenting similar returns pattern, the evidence in Panels B, C and D is also, in 
support of the prediction that the market reacts more prominently to the 
announcements made by small firms. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that the smallest firms 
appear to experience the largest BHARs during the event period, indicating that the 
announcements made by the smallest firms are the most informative. The BHAR 
performance of the second, third and fourth quintiles are not far divergent, whilst the 
BHARs of the largest-firm quintile appear to be the smallest compared to the others. 
The diagram presented in Fig. 3.3 remarkably supports the differential information 
122 
Chapter 3 Market Reactions to Simultaneous Dividend and Earnings Announcements 
hypothesis, stating that the market reactions are inversely related to the level of 
information asymmetry. 
For the portfolio with the worst news (simultaneous declines in dividends and 
earnings), during the three-day period around the announcement day, the largest 
abnormal returns in Panel A of Table 3.5 appears on the third size quintile which is 
about -1.2458 percent and significant at 10 percent level. By contrast, the quintile of 
the smallest firms and the second quintile respectively incur -0.6923 and -0.6353 
percent of the three-day abnormal returns. Taken together, these results are contrary to 
the prediction that the announcements made by the smaller firms induce larger market 
reactions. Nonetheless, the abnormal returns of these three quintiles are all greater 
than the abnormal returns of the largest firms in magnitude. On this portfolio, this is 
the only evidence supporting the differential information hypothesis. The results of 
the longer event periods does not show much supportive evidence and, surprisingly, 
only the abnormal returns of the third quintile appear to be significantly negative. One 
can clearly get the pattern of the BHAR performance of each quintile from Fig. 3.4. 
During the 31-day event period, the second quintile has the largest positive BHAR 
performance but the third quintile incurs the largest decline in abnormal returns. The 
smallest-firm and the largest-firm quintiles also earn positive abnormal returns and, 
furthermore, the BHAR trends of these two quintiles are similar during the event 
period. While the differential information hypothesis predicts that the announcements 
made by small firms would induce larger market reactions, the evidence of this 
portfolio does not support this prediction and the level of the information asymmetry 
is unlikely related to the market reactions to the announcements of simultaneous 
declines in dividends and earnings. 
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The results for the portfolio of dividend continuations and earnings declines are 
ambiguous and weak. The three-day average abnormal returns presented in Panel A of 
Table 3.5 show that the firms in the second quintile experience the largest negative 
abnormal returns (-0.4393 percent) and the magnitude of the market reaction shrinks 
from the second quintile to the fourth quintile. The market reaction to the quintile of 
. the smallest firms is a little larger than that to the fourth quintile but much smaller 
than that to the second quintile. For the abnormal returns during the longer event 
period, the abnormal returns of the smallest firms appear to be positive and the largest 
in magnitude. If dividend continuations are regarded as neutral news and the earnings 
declines are regarded as bad news, this evidence is contrary to the signalling 
hypothesis which predicts that the market reacts negatively to bad news. Figure 3.5 
reports that, although all the quintiles experience abnormal declines in share prices 
around the announcement day, the market does not suffer obvious loss of share returns 
over the 31-day event period. The smallest-firm and the second quintiles respectively 
earns the largest and the second largest positive BHARs while the third and the 
largest-firm quintiles experience the BHARs which are close to zero. The evidence, 
therefore, does not show obvious relation between the level of information asymmetry 
and the market reactions to the announcements of dividend continuations and earnings 
declines. 
The evidence for the portfolios of dividend continuations and earnings increases is 
also weak. The three-day abnormal returns of the smallest-firm quintile shown in 
Panel A of Table 3.5 are 0.3091 percent which is insignificant but larger than the 
abnormal returns of the fourth and the largest-firm quintiles. However, while testing 
the abnormal returns for the longer periods, the divergences of the average abnormal 
returns among these three quintiles become smaller (see Panels Band C). On the other 
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hand, the results of the three-day window present that the market reacts negatively to 
the announcements made by the second and, particularly, the third quintiles. The 
negative abnormal returns of the third quintile are found in all the four panels and are 
significant in Panel A and Panel B. Figure 3.6 indicates that the third quintile 
experience the worst BHAR performance during the event period while the BHARs of 
the second quintile slightly fluctuate around zero. The smallest-firm quintile, 
consistent with the differential information hypothesis, earns larger BHARs than the 
largest-firm quintile around the announcements and over the 31-day event period. 
Overall, consistent with the differential information hypothesis, the announcements of 
dividend continuations and earnings increases made by the smallest firms induce the 
largest market reactions. However, the results on the second and the third quintiles are 
out of the prediction of the differential information hypothesis. The hypothesis is only 
partially supported. 
With respect to the market reactions to the announcements of dividend declines and 
earnings increases, the results are mixed. Throughout the four panels of Table 3.5, the 
market seems to react similarly to the announcements made by the smallest firms and 
the largest firms. Surprisingly, during the three-day period around the announcements, 
the largest market reactions in Panel A are not found on either the smallest-firm or the 
largest-firm quintile but on the third quintile. The abnormal returns of the third 
quintile even appear to be significantly negative in Panels A, B and C while none of 
the average abnormal returns of the smallest-firm quintile appears to be significant. 
The diagram in Figure 3. 7 also shows that the third quintile suffers dramatic loss of 
share returns over the 31-day event period. The BHARs of the smallest-firm and the 
largest-firm quintiles appear to have similar trends but the BHARs of the 
smallest-firms are larger. This is the only evidence on the announcements of dividend 
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declines and earnings increases, supporting the differential information hypothesis. 
To conclude, the differential information hypothesis is strongly supported by the 
evidence on the portfolios with dividend increases. The most prominent evidence is 
found on the portfolio of simultaneous dividend and earnings increases, showing that 
the magnitude of the market reactions monotonously declines as the firm size 
magnifies. For the portfolio of dividend increases but earnings declines, except the 
second quintile, the evidence also coincides with the differential information 
hypothesis. The findings of this section are consistent with the previous findings of 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990; 1995), Bali (2003) and Amihud and Li (2006) on dividend 
announcements and the findings of Ball and Kothari ( 1991) on earnings 
announcements, suggesting that the market reactions to the simultaneous 
announcements of dividend increases are dependent on the level of information 
asymmetry. 
3-5·4· The relative effects of dividends and earnings on the market 
reactions to the simultaneous announcements 
Dividends, earnings and interaction effects 
The initial findings of the regression analysis suggest the existence of dividends and 
interaction effects. The Column 1 estimates in Table 3.6 indicate that the UK sample 
generates different results from those of previous studies. A notable difference is that 
earnings changes almost do not associate with the abnormal returns on the event day. 
The coefficient of earnings changes is close to zero (-0.0001) and is insignificant. 
Relatively, the coefficient of dividend changes is 0.0348 which highly exceeds one 
percent of significance level. The results suggest that when dividends and earnings are 
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announced simultaneously, dividend effect dominates earnings effect on inducing 
market reactions. One unit increases or decreases in dividends would result in 0.0348 
units of rise or fall in the market reaction. The F statistic, which is 63.34, rejects the 
null hypothesis which states that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
The Column 2 estimates are analogous to comparing the abnormal returns of each 
intersectional portfolio to the portfolio with simultaneous decreases in dividends and 
earnings. The intercept represents the abnormal returns for the portfolio of the worst 
news (simultaneous declines in dividends and earnings), and the coefficient of each 
dummy represents the incremental abnormal returns resulting from different 
directions of the signals. All the coefficients are positive and significant, implying that 
simultaneous decreases in dividends and earnings are the most unwelcome signals to 
the market. By contrast, the dummy for simultaneous increases in dividends and 
earnings has the largest positive coefficient, suggesting that the simultaneous 
increases are the most favourable signals. The dummy for dividend increases but 
earnings declines have a larger coefficient than the dummy for dividend cuts but 
earnings increases. It implicitly indicates that, when holding constant the alternative 
effect, dividends generally have larger impact on abnormal returns than earnings. 
The Column 3 estimates present the model comprising the dividend changes, earnings 
changes and the dummies which capture the interaction effect. In comparison with the 
Column 1 estimates, including the dummies of interaction effect reduces the size and 
the significance of the coefficient on the dividend variable. Even though, the 
coefficient of dividend changes becomes 0.0260, which is still highly significant. The 
coefficient on the earnings variable is unlikely affected, which equals -0.0006 and still 
remains insignificant. However, including dividends and earnings variables also 
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absorbs a partial of interaction effect. Comparing with the Column 2 estimates, only 
two coefficients of the dummies remain significant in Column 3. The "first order" and 
the "interaction" F statistics are respectively 23.16 and 6.43, both of which are 
significant at one percent level. These results suggest the existence of dividends effect 
and interaction effect. Surprisingly, earnings changes only have little impact on 
abnormal returns. 
The evidence of the interaction effect confirms the findings in other studies (Kane, 
Lee, and Marcus, 1984; Easton 1991; and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sinclair, 
1996). However, none of these studies detect dividends effect while this chapter finds 
that dividends effect dominates even when jointly considering earnings and 
interaction effects. Earnings changes, not in agreement with the prediction of the 
dividend signalling hypothesis, only possess little power on explaining the event-day 
market reactions. The evidence here implies that the simultaneous existence of 
earnings announcements does not mitigate the signalling power of dividend 
announcements. Conversely, the information signalled by dividends rather than 
earnings is what the market reactions rely on. 
Effects of earnings increases, earnings declines and future earnings 
The findings that lack of earnings effect and existence of dividends effect on the event 
day contradict the anticipation of dividend signalling theory (Miller and Rock, 1985). 
Table 3.7 presents the estimates of the model which separately examines the effects of 
earnings increases and earnings declines and additionally considers the prospect of 
future earnings changes. The Column 2 estimates show that, without dividend changes 
as the explanatory variable in the model, current earnings changes have significantly 
positive relation to abnormal returns. However, the size and the significance of the 
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coefficient are much smaller than that of the dividend variable presented in Column 1. 
When the model additionally includes the earnings changes of the first subsequent 
semi-year, the Column 6 estimates show that both current and future earnings changes 
possess explanatory power on abnormal returns. The coefficient on the future earnings 
variable is larger and more significant than that on the current earnings variable. It 
suggests that a part of market reaction stems from market's expectation for future 
performance. The Column 4 estimates confirm the implication from the Column 6 
estimates. Nevertheless, the Column 5 estimates imply that the market's expectation is 
only for the future performance in the first subsequent semi-year. The earnings 
changes of the second subsequent semi-year do not appear to associate with the 
abnormal returns on the event day. 
The model in Column 3 separately examines the effects of earnings increases and 
declines. The estimates show that, with the variable of earnings declines, the 
coefficient of earnings changes becomes insignificant. Consistent with the earlier 
anticipation, earnings declines are an important signal for the market to understand the 
firms which are in difficult time but reluctant to cut dividends to signal for bad news. 
The estimates in Columns 7, 8 and 9 jointly examine the effects of dividends, earnings 
increases, earnings declines and future earnings. The coefficients of dividend changes, 
earnings declines and the earnings changes of the first subsequent semi-year appear to 
be significantly positive. The variables of earnings increases and the earnings changes 
of the second subsequent semi-year almost lose their explanatory power on the 
event-day abnormal returns. The finding of the future earnings effect is consistent 
with the findings ofConroy, Eades, and Harris (2000) for Japan. 
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In this section, this chapter argues that the existence of the earnings effects should 
edge out the signalling power of dividends. Inconsistent with this prediction, the 
evidence implies that, for earnings increases, dividend effect exists and dividends play 
a confirmatory role in signalling. However, when experiencing earnings declines, the 
market tends to respond to the information of earnings declines since dividends in this 
scenario do not always signal creditably. In addition, consistent with the argument of 
Miller and Rock (1985), the market updates their expectations for the future earnings 
performance based on the information signalled by the simultaneous announcements. 
Overall, it seems that the event-day abnormal returns could be attributed to four 
effects which are respectively dividends, earnings declines, expectations for future 
earnings and interaction effects. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
Since dividends and earnings are announced simultaneously in the UK, the signals of 
the earnings should capture the change of the information set beyond which investors 
already have about earnings on the time of announcements. In this context, the 
dividend announcements should convey little information about earnings and the 
market is expected to react mainly to the earnings changes. In other words, when 
dividend effect is found around the announcement after controlling the signals form 
earnings changes, the dividend effect should be "pure" dividend effect. 
Event studies and regression analysis are employed to examine dividends, earnings as 
well as interaction effects. Event studies are carried out by event-time and 
calendar-time methods, testing 1) the abnormal returns for the portfolios formed by 
the directions of dividend and earnings changes and 2) whether the market reactions 
to the announcements are dependent on information asymmetry. Regression analysis 
first examines the model suggested by Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984). The model 
investigates the dividend, earnings and interaction effects. Since the chapter is unable 
to find significant earnings effect from the first regression model, the test is further 
implemented by examining the potential effects of earnings declines and market's 
prospect of future earnings. The second part of the regression analysis indicates that, 
additional to dividend changes, the market reactions also depend on the 
announcements of earnings declines and the market's prospect of future earnings. 
Generally, as the prior evidence which has been well documented27, this chapter 
presents that the market responds positively to good news and negatively to bad news 
27 See Abeyratna, Lonie, Power, and Sinclair ( 1996), Gunasekarage and Power (2002), Brown, Finn, 
and Hancock (1977) and some others. 
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m simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings. More specifically, by 
examining the market reactions to the six intersectional portfolios, this chapter finds 
the existence of dividend effect and earnings effect. When dividend and earnings 
simultaneously signal for good news or bad news, the announcements induce the 
largest wealth effect on the event day. When dividends signal for neutral news, the 
market reactions are dependent on the information of earnings announcements. 
However, when dividend and earnings signal for contradictory news, the market 
reactions seem to depend more on the information of dividend announcements. The 
evidence from examining the wealth effect of the simultaneous announcements 
suggests that both dividend announcements and earnings announcements are 
informative for investors but the effect of dividend announcements are greater. 
The evidence from examining differential information confirms the notion that the 
market reactions are dependent on the level of information asymmetry. Consistent 
with the differential information hypothesis, the findings suggest that the 
simultaneous increases in dividends and earnings announced by small firms induce 
larger market reactions during the event period than those announced by large firms. 
Similar evidence is also found on the portfolio of dividend increases but earnings 
declines. The implication of these findings suggests that the market reactions are 
dependent on the level of information asymmetry. Therefore, signalling is more 
needed for small firms. 
Regression analysis, which explicitly examines variOus effects, provokes some 
striking evidence. Firstly, the evidence confirms previous findings of interaction effect 
existing between simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements. However, this 
evidence contradicts to Change and Chen's (1991) argument which states that 
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interaction effect is caused by noisy information during the interval between dividend 
and earnings announcements. Secondly, this chapter finds that dividend effect 
dominates earnings effects on explaining the event-day abnormal returns. Not only is 
this evidence inconsistent with the findings of previous studies, but also is opposing to 
the prediction of the dividend signalling theory. However, after examining the effects 
of earnings declines and future earnings (discussed in the following), the implication 
from this evidence becomes reasonable. The dividends actually play a role in 
confirming the signals implicit in the earnings announcements, particularly the signals 
of earnings increases. Since dividend payment is costly, it makes dividends creditable 
when it is announced with earnings increases. Thirdly, in addition to dividend effect, 
there are also the effects of earnings declines and future earnings. Since managers are 
reluctant to cut dividends, it results in lack of creditable signals available for earnings 
declines. The evidence suggests that, unlike earnings increases, earnings declines per 
se are important signals to the market under the circumstances which lacks of other 
signals for these bad news. On the other hand, the link between abnormal returns and 
future earnings changes implies that the market revises their expectations of future 
earnings performance based on the signals of the simultaneous announcements. This 
finding is consistent with the fmdings of Conroy, Eades, and Harris (2000) for the 
Japanese market and the findings of Koch and Sun (2004) for the US market. 
To conclude, this chapter reveals clear evidence supporting the dividend signalling 
theory and the differential information hypothesis. Besides, this chapter also provides 
a number of implications for managers. Firstly, as the information of small firms is 
more needed, it is suggested that managers of small firms incorporate more 
information in the simultaneous announcements to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry. Moreover, that the announcements of earnings increases alone are not 
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creditable enough indicates that managers announce the signals of earnings increases 
with dividend increases in order to earn investors' trust. Nonetheless, unlike earnings 
increases announcements, the announcements of earnings declines per se are 
informative for investors. Last but not least, the evidence specifically signifies that 
future earnings are associated with the event-day abnormal returns. It is implied that 
the market uses the signals of the simultaneous announcements to update their 
expectations for the future earnings performance. Accordingly, managers could make 
use of dividend announcements to signal for their prospects of future performance. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the frequencies of the portfolios scattered in each sample year and the distribution of 
the main variables. The frequencies are presented in panel A. The portfolios are formed on the basis of 
the changes in dividends and earnings, which are respectively denoted by f..Div and f..EPS. 
Panel B presents the distributions of the variables, which are the percentage changes in dividends, the 
percentage changes in earnings, security returns on even day and firms' market value 16 days prior to the 
event day. The statistics, which include mean, median, standard deviation (SD), the I 51 percentile (PI), 
lOth percentile (PIO), 151 quartile (Ql), 3rd quartile (Q3), 90th percentile and 99th percentile (P99), are 
presented for the whole sample as well as for each intersectional dividends and earnings portfolio. 
Panel A: The frequencies of dividend announcements by year 
~Div<O ~Div=O ~Div>O 
Year Total 
~EPS<O ~EPS>O ~EPS<O ~EPS>O ~EPS<O ~EPS>O 
1992 1 1 5 5 6 18 36 
1993 20 4 44 23 50 119 260 
1994 14 10 51 41 55 247 418 
1995 17 9 42 55 72 380 575 
1996 18 7 90 48 102 347 612 
1997 19 10 79 53 102 357 620 
1998 40 18 64 46 75 364 607 
1999 41 15 75 27 123 275 556 
2000 23 9 45 29 98 254 458 
2001 26 9 49 17 73 179 353 
2002 21 10 49 20 49 126 275 
2003 13 2 38 17 33 92 195 
2004 0 0 1 3 8 13 
EPS Portfolio's Total 253 104 632 382 841 2766 
4978 
Div Portfolio's Total 357 1014 3607 
Table 3.1 -Continued 
Panel B: The distributions of the main variables 
Variables Mean SD PI PlO Q1 Med Q3 P90 P99 
aDiv 0.1300 0.4807 -0,7088 0.0000 0.0000 0.0877 0.1538 0.2997 1.5000 
Portfolio' (aDiv<O, .6EPS<O) -0.4306 0.2462 -0.9741 -0.7714 -0.5994 -0.4149 -0.2502 -0.0693 -0.0055 
Portfolio (aDiv<O, aEPS>O) -0.3282 0.2160 -0.8801 -0.6148 -0.5000 -0.3200 -0.1506 -0.0525 -0.0129 
Portfolio (Wiv>O, aEPS<O) 0.1913 0.5894 0.0105 0.0348 0.0515 0.0951 0.1497 0.2531 1.9215 
Portfolio (aDiv>O, aEPS>O) 0.2275 0.4996 0.0226 0.0511 0.0834 0.1226 0.2079 0.4118 1.8874 
aEPS 0.3008 3.1850 -1.0000 -0.4103 -0.1030 0.0926 0.2815 0.6369 3.6737 
Portfolio (.LlDiv<O, .LlEPS<O) -0.4846 0.3121 -1.0000 -1.0000 -0.7139 -0.4349 -0.2253 -0.0884 -0.0053 
Portfolio,(.LlDiv<O, .LlEPS>O) 0.5555 0.7624 0.0015 0.0325 0.0841 0.2931 0.7190 1.7704 4.8250 
Portfolio(.LlDiv=O, .LlEPS<O) -0.3725 0.2991 -1.0000 -1.0000 -0.5497 -0.2778 -0.1375 -0.0625 -0.0080 
Portfolio (.LlDiv=O, .LlEPS>O) 0.6046 1.4718 0.0038 0.0326 0.0763 0.2006 0.4807 1.3841 7.6333 
Portfolio (.LlDiv>O, .LlEPS<O) -0.2110 0.2242 -1.0000 -0.4962 -0.2836 -0.1330 -0.0597 -0.0184 -0.0019 
Portfolio(.LlDiv>O, .LlEPS>O) 0.6455 4.2004 0.0070 0.0472 0.1072 0.2103 0.4085 0.8419 5.6933 
Returns on Event Day 0.0067 0.0600 -0.1753 -0.0527 -0.0146 0.0031 0.0308 0.0659 0.1805 
Portfolio (.LlDiv<O, aEPS<O) -0.0188 0.1110 -0.3151 -0.1294 -0.0675 -0.0131 0.0247 0.0686 0.2480 
Portfolio(.LlDiv<O, LlEPS>O) -0.0060 0.0662 -0.2774 -0.0742 -0.0323 0.0003 0.0234 0.0570 0.1884 
Portfolio (Wiv=O, aEPS<O) -0.0063 0.0610 -0.1836 -0.0811 -0.0336 0,0000 0.0206 0.0613 0.1510 
Portfo1io{Wiv=O, aEPS>O) -0.0005 0.0595 -0.1825 -0.0585 -0.0261 0.0000 0.0271 0.0626 0.2111 
Portfolio (.LlDiv>O, LlEPS<O) 0.0065 0.0589 -0.1668 -0.0491 -0.0155 0.0000 0.0273 0.0611 0.2366 
Portfolio (.LlDiv>O, aEPS>O) 0.0135 0.0514 -0.1164 -0.0348 -0.0078 0.0071 0.0343 0.0707 0.1596 
MY (million GBP) 1005.5891 4323.4644 3.1158 11.9690 31.5050 122.1500 421.8450 1987.4990 15051.4194 
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Table 3.2: Market reactions to the simultaneous announcements estimated by the 
event-time methods and the market model 
This table presents the average abnormal returns around the announcements by intersectional dividends 
and earnings portfolios. The estimation period, which is employed as a benchmark of expected returns, 
starts from 95 to 16 days prior to the event day (day 0), and the event period is designed as a 31-day 
period centred on the event day. The expected returns are estimated by using the market model. The t 
statistic testing the abnormal returns (AR) on each event day is computed as the AR divided by the 
standard deviation of the abnormal returns over the estimation period. As for the t statistic testing the 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), the statistic equals to the BHAR divided by the standard 
deviation of the estimation period times the square root of the numbers of the days accumulated. The 
statistics are presents in the parentheses, and statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels are 
marked with*,**, and*** respectively. 
Market model: R1 = a + f3Rm + s1 (3.4) 
Panel A: AR and BHAR for individual event days and various event periods 
t.Div<O t.Div<O t.Div=O t.Div=O Wiv>O t.Div>O 
Portfolio 
Day t.EPS<O t.EPS>O t.EPS<O t.EPS>O t.EPS<O t.EPS>O 
N 253 104 632 382 841 2766 
0.0711% -0.5160% 0.3921% -0.0307% -0.0717% 0.3677%··· (-15,-6) BHAR 
(0.1241) (-0.6805) (1.3048) ( -0.1 050) (-0.3711) (3.9809) 
0.2161% -0.5222% 0.1649% -0.1215% -0.1338% 0.1211%* 
(-10,-6) BHAR 
(0.5331) (-0.9740) (0.7760) (-0.5883) (-0.9798) (1.8535) 
0.0576% 0.3311% 0.0881% 0.0277% 0.0832% 0.0633% .. 
-5 AR 
(0.3176) (1.3808) (0.9271) (0.3002) (1.3619) (2.1660) 
0.2625% 0.3993%* 0.0463% 0.0020% 0.0341% 0.0680% •• 
-4 AR 
(1.4481) (1.6655) (0.4869) (0.0218) (0.5579) (2.3264) 
0.0103% 0.6354%··· 0.1794%' 0.1426% 0.1320% .. 0.1450% ... 
-3 AR 
(0.0571) (2.6499) (1.8876) (1.5439) (2.1620) (4.9651) 
0.0479% 0.0474% 0.0732% 0.1583%' 0.2043%··· 0.1220% ... 
-2 AR 
(0.2644) (0.1975) (0.7699) (1.7138) (3.3456) (4.1756) 
-0.0614% 0.5857% .. -0.2060% •• 0.1616%* 0.2510% ... 0.3455% ... 
-1 AR 
(-0.3388) (2.4428) (-2.1679) (1.7500) (4.1103) (11.8270) 
-1.8411%··· -0.6496% ... -0.5587%··· 
-0.0195% 0.6479% ... 1.3030%··· 
0 AR 
(-10.1545) (-2.7093) (-5.8792) (-0.2111) (10.6079) (44.6078) 
0.2908% -0.3724% 0.1870% .. 0.1432% 0.1797%··· 0.2755%··· 
AR 
(1.6041) (-1.5532) (1.9680) (1.5509) (2.9424) (9.4310) 
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Table 3.2 - Continued 
0.3391%. 
-0.2302% 0.3295%··· 0.1379% 0.1834% ... 0.1187% ... 
2 AR 
(1.8701) (-0.9600) (3.4672) (1.4933) (3.0025) (4.0652) 
0.2006% 0.4423%* 0.2940%··· 0.1078% 0.1398% .. 0.1076% ... 
3 AR 
(1.1064) (1.8445) (3.0935) (1.1674) (2.2882) (3.6843) 
0.4023% •• 0.3517% 0.1004% 0.1606%. 0.1211% .. 0.0635% .. 
4 AR 
(2.2190) (1.4669) (1.0568) (1.7391) (1.9831) (2.1730) 
0.2703% -0.0379% 0.2681% ... 0.1193% 0.0646% 0.0507%. 
5 AR 
(1.4908) (-0.1581) (2.8211) (1.2920) (1.0575) (1.7363) 
0.8916% .. -0.9832%* 0.8183%··· 0.7365% ... 0.5451% ... 0.1044% 
(6,10) BHAR 
(2.1993) (-1.8337) (3.8508) (3.5668) (3.9916) (1.5982) 
2.1857% ... 
-0.5887% 1.0557%··· 0.8762% ... 0.4453% .. 0.0739% 
(6,15) BHAR 
(3.8122) (-0.7764) (3.5131) (3.0004) (2.3053) (0.7998) 
Panel B: BHAR for various event periods centred on the announcement day 
~Div<O ~Div<O ~Div=O ~Div=O ~Div>O ~Div>O 
Period 
~EPS<O ~PS>O ~EPS<O ~EPS>O ~EPS<O ~EPS>O 
-1.6117% ... 
-0.4363% -0.5777%··· 0.2853%. 1.0786% ... 1.9239% ... 
(-1 '1) 
(-5.1322) (-1.0506) (-3.5098) (1.7839) (10.1964) (38.0276) 
-0.0210% 1.5027%* 0.8012% .. 1.1415% ... 2.0411% ... 2.6626%··· 
(-5,5) 
(-0.0349) (1.8896) (2.5421) (3.7271) (10.0763) (27.4851) 
1.0868% -0.0027% 1.7844% ... 1.7566% ... 2.4524%··· 2.8881% ... 
(-10,10) 
(1.3080) (-0.0024) (4.0975) (4.1509) (8.7623) (21.5765) 
2.2359% .. 0.3980% 2.2491% ... 1.9871% ... 2.4147%··· 3.1042% ... 
(-15,15) 
(2.2149) (0.2982) (4.2507) (3.8647) (7.1009) (19.0876) 
Figure 3.1: Shareholders' wealth around the simultaneous announcements of 
dividends and earnings 
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Table 3.3: Market reactions to the simultaneous announcements estimated by 
CAPM 
This table presents the average abnormal returns around the announcements by intersectional dividends 
and earnings portfolios. The dividend changes are denoted by D.Div and the changes in earnings per 
share (EPS) are denoted by D.EPS. For each trading day, the average daily security return ( R;,,) is the 
value-weighted mean of the daily returns of the securities whose event periods examined comprise the 
trading day. The FTSE All Share Index is employed to compute the proxy of the market returns (Rm. 1), 
and the interest rate of one-month treasury bill (T-Bill) is converted into daily rate as the proxy of the 
daily returns of risk-free assets (RJ.1). The average abnormal returns (AR) of the event periods are then 
estimated by the intercepts (a) of the CAPM models. N denotes the numbers of the announcements for 
each intersectional dividends and earnings portfolio. The t statistics which test whether the ARs are 
significantly different from 0 are presented in the parentheses beneath the ARs. Statistical significance 
at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels are marked with*,**, and*** respectively. 
CAPM: Ri,t- R1,, =a+ fJ(Rm,t- RJ.t) + e, (3.8) 
Panel A: Average abnormal returns for individual event days and various event periods 
D.Div<O D.Div<O D.Div=O D.Div=O D.Div>O D.Div>O 
Portfolio 
Day D.EPS<O D.EPS>O D.EPS<O D.EPS>O D.EPS<O D.EPS>O 
N 253 104 632 382 841 2766 
-0.0396% -0.0011% -0.0185% -0.0593% 0.0024% 0.0659% •• (-15,-6) AR 
(-0.7294) (-0.0177) (-0.5366) (-1.6117) (0.0803) (2.5527) 
-0.0439% -0.0482% -0.0373% -0.0491% -0.0043% 0.0685% .. 
(-10,-6) AR 
(-0.5862) (-0.6457) (-0.8424) (-1.1280) (-0.1213) (2.3613) 
-0.0563% 0.2639% 0.0445% 0.0082% 0.1110%* 0.0672%* 
-5 AR 
(-0.3443) (1.1569) (0.4840) (0.0788) (1.6738) (1.7943) 
0.0895% 0.4343%* 0.0507% -0.0029% 0.0059% 0.1002% .. 
-4 AR 
(0.6080) (1.6959) (0.4187) (-0.0309) (0.0957) (2.4249) 
-0.0836% 0.6708%* 0.1181% 0.1251% 0.1835% ... 0.1575% ... 
-3 AR 
(-0.4956) (1.8600) (1.5364) (1.1804) (2.8083) (3.2545) 
-0.0387% 0.0606% 0.0574% 0.1426% 0.1996%** 0.1119% .. 
-2 AR 
(-0.2497) (0.2739) (0.7011) (1.3616) (2.3832) (2.5754) 
-0.0926% 0.5577%* -0.3101% .. 0.0764% 0.2417% .. 0.2960%··· 
-1 AR 
(-0.3184) (1.8046) (-2.4573) (0.5577) (2.0609) (4.8395) 
-1.8203%** 
-0.5643% -0.6419% .. -0.0600% 0.5531% .. 1.1696%··· 
0 AR 
(-2.5312) (-0.8788) (-2.4947) (-0.1877) (2.4826) (9.6009) 
0.1447% -0.2911% 0.1840% 0.1360% 0.2152%* 0.3618%··· 
AR 
(0.5836) (-0.9532) (1.20 16) (0.9020) (1.8396) (5.5955) 
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Table 3.3 - Continued 
0.3288% .. 
-0.1262% 0.2666% •• 0.0526% 0.1612% .. 0.1592% ... 
2 AR 
(2.1316) (-0.4078) (2.0147) (0.5088) (1.9796) (3.3286) 
0.0390% 0.4307%. 0.2621% •• 0.0679% 0.0999% 0.1358% ... 
3 AR 
(0.2001) (1.6945) (2.4991) (0.6306) (1.0832) (3.1551) 
0.3290%. 0.2932% 0.0329% 0.1610% 0.0816% 0.0797%' 
4 AR 
(1.6808) (0.9702) (0.3895) (1.3890) (1.1077) (1.7866) 
0.1621% 0.0110% 0.2473% ... 0.1001% 0.0378% 0.0938% .. 
5 AR 
(0.9796) (0.0661) (2.6569) (0.9466) (0.5661) (2.1920) 
0.0490% -0.2091% .. 0.1235% ... 0.1139% .. 0.0720% .. 0.0763%··· 
(6,10) AR 
(0.6093) (-2.1157) (2.6373) (2.3138) (2.0891) (2.7578) 
0.1186% .. 
-0.0429% 0.0641%. 0.0081% 0.0486%. 0.0704% ... 
(6, 15) AR 
(1.9850) (-0.6511) (1.7836) (0.2296) (1.7870) (2.8851) 
Panel B: Average abnormal returns for various event periods centred on the announcement day 
L\Div<O ~Div<O ~Div=O ~Div=O ~Div>O ~Div>O 
Period 
~EPS<O ~EPS>O ~EPS<O ~EPS>O ~EPS<O ~EPS>O 
-0.8058%··· 
-0.0544% -0.2680% •• 0.0010% 0.3089%··· 0.5432%··· (-1,1) 
(-3.3616) (-0.2074) (-2.1647) (0.0073) (3.0831) (8.8633) 
-0.1231% 0.2108% •• 0.0271% 0.1380% .. 0.1549% ... 0.2404% ... 
(-5,5) 
(-1.3141) (1.9806) (0.4826) (2.3678) (3.9341) (7.7908) 
-0.0886% 0.0608% -0.0081% 0.0681%. 0.0767% .. 0.1390% ... 
(-10,10) 
(-1.4050) (0.9258) (-0.2148) (1.7877) (2.5739) (5.7133) 
-0.0335% 0.0602% -0.0173% 0.0144% 0.0589% •• 0.1065%··· 
(-15,15) 
(-0.6373) (1.1400) (-0.5537) (0.4293) (2.4901) (5.2564) 
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Table 3.4: Market reactions to the simultaneous announcements estimated by 
three-factor model 
This table presents the average abnonnal returns around the announcements by intersectional dividends 
and earnings portfolios. The dividend changes are denoted by t.Div and the changes in earnings per 
share (EPS) are denoted by ilEPS. For each trading day, the average daily security return ( R;,,) is the 
value-weighted mean of the daily returns of the securities whose examined event periods comprise the 
trading day. The FTSE All Share Index is employed to compute the proxy of the market returns (Rm, 1), 
and the interest rate of one-month treasury bill (T-Bill) is converted into daily rate as the proxy of the 
daily returns of risk-free assets (RJ,1). SMB, and HML, are respectively size and book-to-market factors 
suggested by Fama and French (1993) to capture the size and book-to-market effects on returns. The 
average abnormal returns (AR) of the event periods are estimated by the intercepts (a) of the 
three-factor models. N denotes the numbers of the announcements for each intersectional dividends and 
earnings portfolio. The t statistics, which test whether the ARs are different from 0, are presented in the 
parentheses beneath the ARs. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels are marked with*,**, 
and *** respectively. 
Three-factor model: R;,,- R1,, =a+ f3(Rm,t- Rf.t) + ]'SMB, + J,.,HML, + e, (3.9) 
Panel A: Average abnormal returns for individual event days and various event periods 
ilDiv<O ilDiv<O ilDiv=O ilDiv=O ilDiv>O ilDiv>O 
Portfolio 
Day ilEPS<O ilEPS>O ilEPS<O ilEPS>O ilEPS<O ilEPS>O 
N 253 104 632 382 841 2766 
-0.0446% -0.0004% -0.0027% -0.0565% 0.0107% 0.0826% ... (-15,-6) AR 
(-0.8210) (-0.0062) (-0.0785) (-1.5355) (0.3596) (3.2090) 
-0.0494% -0.0588% -0.0209% -0.0457% -0.0040% 0.0830%*** 
(-I 0,-6) AR 
(-0.6551) (-0.7727) (-0.4704) (-1.0493) (-0.1138) (2.8728) 
-0.0448% 0.3145% 0.0538% 0.0110% 0.1548%** 0.0822%** 
-5 AR 
(-0.2729) (1.3938) (0.5769) (0.1033) (2.3475) (2.1848) 
0.1054% 0.4759%* 0.0902% 0.0237% -0.0021% 0.1092%*** 
-4 AR 
(0.7134) (1.8259) (0.7433) (0.2489) (-0.0344) (2.6201) 
-0.0893% 0.5938% 0.1079% 0.1372% 0.1986%*** 0.1741%*** 
-3 AR 
(-0.5377) (1.6054) (1.3904) (1.2829) (3.0367) (3.5842) 
-0.0220% 0.0238% 0.0610% 0.1387% 0.1990%** 0.1284%*** 
-2 AR 
(-0.1408) (0.1043) (0.7429) (1.3168) (2.3181) (2.9435) 
-0.0334% 0.5526%* -0.3123%** 0.0763% 0.3017%** 0.3135%*** 
-1 AR 
(-0.1120) (1.7660) (-2.4149) (0.5624) (2.5792) (5.0704) 
-1.5012%** 
-0.4390% -0.5306%** -0.1120% 0.5929%*** 1.2015%*** 
0 AR 
(-2.0704) (-0.6718) (-2.0163) (-0.3486) (2.6257) (9.7252) 
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0.1459% -0.3578% 0.2168% 0.1656% 0.2551% •• 0.3908%··· 
AR 
(0.5847) (-1.1492) (1.3672) (1.0766) (2.1498) (5.9958) 
0.3736% •• 
-0.1905% 0.2838% •• 0.0275% 0.1513%. 0.1802%··· 
2 AR 
(2.4364) (-0.5920) (2.1551) (0.2626) (1.8307) (3.7999) 
0.0404% 0.4666%* 0.2576% .. 0.0990% 0.1487% 0.1389%··· 
3 AR 
(0.2106) (1.7855) (2.4348) (0.9077) (1.6070) (3.1947) 
0.3528%* 0.2151% 0.0267% 0.1940%. 0.1187% 0.1159%··· 
4 AR 
(1.7852) (0.6822) (0.3135) (1.6691) (1.5865) (2.6047) 
0.2549% -0.0111% 0.2673%··· 0.0862% 0.0861% 0.1247%··· 
5 AR 
(1.5470) (-0.0654) (2.8021) (0.7991) (1.2995) (2.9056) 
0.0850% -0.1602% 0.1392%··· 0.1291%··· 0.0932%··· 0.0928%··· 
(6, 1 0) AR 
(1.0540) (-1.6231) (2.9479) (2.6082) (2.7078) (3.3494) 
0.1327% •• 
-0.0272% 0.0789% •• 0.0150% 0.0568% •• 0.0779%··· 
(6, 15) AR 
(2.2055) (-0.4066) (2.1827) (0.4251) (2.0767) (3.1864) 
Panel B: Average abnormal returns for various event periods centred on the announcement day 
.!lDiv<O .!lDiv<O LlDiv=O .!lDiv=O .!lDiv>O .!lDiv>O 
Period 
.!lEPS<O LlEPS>O LlEPS<O .!lEPS>O LlEPS<O .!lEPS>O 
-0.6886%··· 
-0.0263% -0.2280%. -0.0084% 0.3285%··· 0.5543%··· (-1,1) 
(-2.8532) (-0.0992) (-1.8024) (-0.0608) (3.2519) (8.9571) 
-0.0944% 0.2130%. 0.0398% 0.1351% •• 0.1591%··· 0.2337%··· 
(-5,5) 
(-1.0022) (1.9609) (0.7030) (2.2860) (3.9954) (7.4906) 
-0.0658% 0.0773% 0.0041% 0.0689%* 0.0814%··· 0.1404%··· 
(-10,10) 
(-1.0356) (1.1571) (0.1080) (1.7939) (2.7039) (5.7200) 
-0.0139% 0.0726% -0.0061% 0.0158% 0.0585% •• 0.1025%··· 
(-15,15) 
(-0.2633) (1.3589) (-0.1931) (0.4685) (2.4460) (5.0138) 
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Table 3.5: The information asymmetry and the market reactions to the 
simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings 
This table presents the average abnormal returns around the announcements for the portfolios grouped 
by dividends, earnings and firm size. The sample consists of the simultaneous announcements of 
dividends and earnings made by the UK firms during the period from January 1992 to March 2004. 
The observations are sorted by firm size and divided into five quintiles. The first quintile consists of the 
observations with the smallest 20 percent in firm size and the fifth quintile consists of those with the 
largest 20 percent. For each size quintile, the observations are further split by dividend and earnings 
changes. The dividend changes are denoted by b.Div and the changes in earnings per share (EPS) are 
denoted by .:lEPS. The calendar-time event study approach is imposed for estimating the ARs, and the 
three-factor model suggested by Fama and French (1993) is applied as the benchmark model. The 
FTSE All Share Index is employed to compute the proxy of the market returns (Rm, 1), and the interest 
rate of one-month treasury bill (T -Bill) is converted into daily rate as the proxy of the daily returns of 
risk-free assets (Rt.1). SMB, and HML, are respectively size and book-to-market factors. N denotes the 
numbers of the announcements for each intersectional dividend-earnings-size portfolio. The t statistics, 
which test whether the ARs are different from 0, are presented in the parentheses beneath the estimates 
of ARs. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels are marked with*,**, and*** respectively. 
Three-factor model: Ri,t- R/,1 =a+ fJ(Rm,t- R1 ,1) + ySMB, + lHML, + &1 (3.9) 
Panel A: Average abnormal returns for the period from day -1 to day 1 by firm size 
b.Div<O b.Div<O b.Div=O b.Div=O Wiv>O b.Div>O 
Size Rank 
.:lEPS<O b.EPS>O b.EPS<O b.EPS>O .:lEPS<O b.EPS>O 
N 114 25 194 113 134 416 
AR -0.6923%. 0.3463% -0.0840% 0.3091% 0.8325% ... 1.5653%··· (Smallest) 
t-statistic (-1.7659) (0.5417) (-0.3719) (1.2883) (3.0403) (9.5522) 
N 46 15 181 105 151 498 
2 AR -0.6353% -0.8846% -0.4393% .. -0.1053% 0.3130% 0.8317%··· 
t-statistic (-1.2882) (-0.8496) (-2.2308) (-0.4391) (1.5491) (7.5850) 
N 32 16 94 50 188 616 
3 AR -1.2458%" -1.3498%"" -0.1886% -0.7077% •• 0.5284% ... 0.5503% ... 
t-statistic (-1.8943) (-2.0469) (-0.6835) (-2.1483) (2.9159) (5.8378) 
N 27 13 81 54 181 639 
4 AR 0.1917% 0.6903% -0.0564% 0.2639% 0.3837% .. 0.4554%··· 
t-statistic (0.2629) (1.0796) (-0.2038) (0.7565) (2.1015) (6.1242) 
N 34 35 82 60 187 597 
5 
AR -0.5423% 0.3924% 0.1130% 0.1057% 0.0279% 0.3359%··· 
(Largest) 
t-statistic (-1.1598) (1.1691) (0.5439) (0.3932) (0.1785) (3.8821) 
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Panel B: Average abnormal returns for the period from day -5 to day 5 by firm size 
fl.Div<O fl.Div<O fl.Div=O fl.Div=O fl.Div>O fl.Div>O 
Size Rank 
fl.EPS<O fl.EPS>O fl.EPS<O fl.EPS>O fl.EPS<O fl.EPS>O 
N 114 25 194 113 134 416 
AR -0.0095% 0.4264% 0.0681% 0.1745% .. 0.3336% ... 0.5745% ... (Smallest) 
t"statistic (-0.0677) (1.6261) (0.8572) (2.0168) (3.6605) (8.9558) 
N 46 15 181 105 151 498 
2 AR -0.0372% 0.0014% 0.0053% 0.0377% 0.1976% ... 0.3520% ... 
t-statistic (-0.2301) (0.0040) (0.0692) (0.3963) (2.7252) (8.3850) 
N 32 16 94 50 188 616 
3 AR ~0.5217% .. -0.4123%* 0.0287% -0.1933%* 0.2533% ... 0.2756% ... 
t-statistic (-2.5031) ( -1. 7446) (0.2556) (-1.7421) (3.9471) (7.5378) 
N 27 13 81 54 181 639 
4 AR -0.1686% -0.0059% -0.0054% 0.1773% 0.2113%··· 0.1666%··· 
t-statistic (-0.7022) (-0.0289) (-0.0528) (1.4871) (3.3779) (5.0449) 
N 34 35 82 60 187 597 
5 
0.4491% ... 0.1853% .. 0.2041% ... AR 0.0030% 0.0089% 0.0788% 
(Largest) 
t-statistic (0.0167) (3.3756) (0.1043) (2.0253) (1.2833) (5.1601) 
Panel C: Average abnormal returns for the period from day -10 to day 10 by firm size 
fl.Div<O fl.Div<O fl.Div=O fl.Div=O fl.Div>O fl.Div>O 
Size Rank 
fl.EPS<O fl.EPS>O fl.EPS<O fl.EPS>O fl.EPS<O fl.EPS>O 
N 114 25 194 113 134 416 
AR 0.0150% 0.1694% 0.0649% 0.1454%** 0.2164% ... 0.3955% ... (Smallest) 
t -statistic (0.1829) (1.1892) (1.1486) (2.2865) (3.9865) (9.3637) 
N 46 15 181 105 151 498 
2 AR 0.0518% 0.0778% 0.0267% 0.0491% 0.1309%··· 0.2255%··· 
t-statistic (0.4912) (0.4304) (0.5349) (0.7877) (2.6050) (7.3614) 
N 32 16 94 50 188 616 
3 AR -0.2668%* -0.3768%··· -0.0364% -0.0802% 0.1710% 0.1549% ... 
t-statistic (-1.8742) (-3.0489) (-0.5065) (-1.1740) (4.2298) (6.8210) 
N 27 13 81 54 181 639 
4 AR -0.1903% -0.0424% 0.0359% 0.1283%* 0.1012% ... 0.1219% ... 
t-statistic (-1.2836) (-0.2796) (0.5064) (1.7786) (2.6257) (5.6445) 
N 34 35 82 60 187 597 
5 
AR 0.0261% 0.1937% .. -0.0087% 0.1039% 0.0705%* 0.1399% ... (Largest) 
t-statistic (0.2306) (2.2862) (-0.1468) (1.6270) (1.6797) (4.6830) 
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Panel D: Average abnormal returns for the period from day -15 to day 15 by firm size 
~Div<O ~Div<O ~Div=O ~Div=O ~Div>O ~Div>O 
Size Rank 
~EPS<O ~EPS>O ~EPS<O ~EPS>O ~EPS<O ~PS>O 
N 114 25 194 113 134 416 
AR 0.0244% 0.1360% 0.0513% 0.0599% 0.1821% ... 0.2673%··· (Smallest) 
t-statistic (0.3720) (1.2436) (1.1619) (1.1818) (4.3538) (8.8039) 
N 46 15 181 105 151 498 
2 AR 0.0635% 0.0682% 0.0244% 0.0112% 0.0586% 0.1592% ... 
t-statistic (0.8000) (0.5266) (0.6333) (0.2213) (1.4453) (6.0562) 
N 32 16 94 50 188 616 
3 AR -0.1651%. -0.1743% -0.0046% -0.0624% 0.1209% ... 0.1280% ... 
t-statistic (-1.6656) (-1.6366) (-0.0841) (-1.1658) (4.2138) (7.1725) 
N 27 13 81 54 181 639 
4 AR -0.0218% 0.0509% 0.0275% 0.1104% .. 0.0797% ... 0.1220% ... 
t-statistic (-0.1881) (0.5015) (0.4946) (2.0249) (2.5842) (7.2111) 
N 34 35 82 60 187 597 
5 
0.0992%··· AR 0.0517% 0.1027% -0.0300% 0.0741% 0.0278% 
(Largest) 
t-statistic (0.5860) (1.5467) (-0.6602) (1.4031) (0.8370) (4.0579) 
Figure 3.2: Shareholders' wealth around the announcements of simultaneous 
increases in dividends and earnings 
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Figure 3.3: Shareholders' wealth around the announcements of dividends 
increases and earnings declines 
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Figure 3.4: Shareholders' wealth around the announcements of simultaneous 
declines in dividends and earnings 
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Figure 3.5: Shareholders' wealth around the announcements of dividends 
continuations and earnings declines 
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Figure 3.6: Shareholders' wealth around the announcements of dividends 
continuations and earnings increases 
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Figure 3.7: Shareholders' wealth around the announcements of dividends cuts 
and earnings increases 
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Table 3.6: The dividend, earnings and interaction effects on the event-day 
abnormal returns 
The table presents the estimations on dividend, earnings and interaction effects. The dependent variable 
is the abnormal returns of the event day (day 0). The estimation of the models is carried out by using 
the ordinary least square (OLS). The percentage changes in dividends are denoted by b.Div and the 
percentage changes in earnings per share (EPS) are denoted by b.EPS. The five dummies are 
respectively equal to one for the intersectional dividend and earnings portfolio indicated in the 
parentheses and zero otherwise. The F statistic suggests the significance of the regression and the R 
square. The "first order" F statistic tests the joint significance of the dividend and earnings variables 
while the "interaction" F statistic tests the interaction dummy variables. The t statistics testing the 
significance of the coefficients are presented in the parentheses. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 
O.Ollevels are marked with*,**, and*** respectively. 
AROi,l =a+ /31 X Wivi,t + f3z X MPSi,t + r X Dummy(Wivi,t 'MPSi,t )+ Bi,t (3.10) 
Model 
Intercept 
L\Div 
L\EPS 
Dummy (L\Div<O, L\EPS>O) 
Dummy (L\Div=O, L\EPS<O) 
Dummy (L\Div=O, L\EPS>O) 
Dummy (L\Div>O, L\EPS<O) 
Dummy (L\Div>O, L\EPS>O) 
N 
F Statistic 
"First Order" F Statistic 
"Interaction" F Statistic 
Adjusted R2 
Column 
0.0026··· 
(2.9020) 
0.0348 ... 
(11.1250) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2523) 
4835 
63.3465 ... 
0.0251 
2 
-0.0184··· 
(-4.9788) 
0.0122. 
(1.7454) 
0.0128··· 
(2.9306) 
0.017o··· 
(3.4912) 
0.0253··· 
(5.9854) 
0.0311··· 
(8.0311) 
4835 
22.4509 ... 
0.0217 
3 
-0.0075* 
(-1.8650) 
0.0260 ... 
(6.8032) 
-0.0006 
(-1.0251) 
0.0098 
(1.4058) 
0.0017 
(0.3668) 
0.0064 
(1.2514) 
0.0104 •• 
(2.1975) 
0.0154 ... 
(3.3907) 
4835 
22.8008··· 
23.1605 .. . 
6.4399 .. . 
0.0306 
Table 3. 7: The dividends, earnings increases, earnings declines and future earnings effects on the event-day abnormal returns 
This table presents the estimates of the regression model explained by dividend changes and different periods of earnings changes. The dependant variable is the abnormal 
returns of the event day (day 0). The percentage changes in dividends are denoted as 6.Div, and the percentage changes in earnings at timet are denoted as 6.EPS. The suffix 
of the explanatory variables denotes the period of the changes (e.g. 0 represents current changes, and 1 represents the period following the period 0). DED denotes the dummy 
of earnings declines, which equals to I if the current earnings changes less than 0 and equals to 0 otherwise. The F statistic indicates the significance of the regression and the 
R square. The t statistics testing the significance of the coefficients are presented in the parentheses. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and O.Ollevels are marked with*,**, 
and *** respectively. 
AID;,, =a+A_tilli-v;,, +f321 MP~.' +fJ20(DEDxMP~J+f33MP~.t+t +f34MP~.t+z +&;,r 
~Explanatory · Colu~ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0.0026*** 0.0060*** o.oo88··· o.oo57*** 0.0066*** 0.0054*** 0.0045*** 
Intercept 
(2.8916) (6.9924) (9.0063) (6.2242) (6.9331) (5.8891) (4.2408) 
0.0347*** 0.032(** 
~Divo ( 11.2541) (9.9542) 
0.0009* 0.0001 0.0014 .. -0.0005 
~EPSo (1.6894) (0.1466) (2.0824) (-0.9693) 
0.0233*** o.ons··· 
DEo X ~EPSo (5.9761) (3.3895) 
0.0045··· 0.0042"** 
~EPS 1 (5.6821) (5.1792) 
0.0009 
~EPSz (1.3471) 
N 4835 4835 4835 3967 3722 3967 4835 
F Statistic 126.6538··· 2.8541* 19.2939··· 32.2864··· 1.8148 18.3249··· 46.1522··· 
Adjusted R2 0.0253 0.0004 0.0075 0.0078 0.0002 0.0087 0.0273 
8 
0.0041*** 
(3.6166) 
0.0294*** 
(8.1781) 
-0.0001 
( -0.1317) 
0.0167*** 
(3.5869) 
0.0037 ... 
(4.6682) 
3967 
34.3207"** 
0.0325 
(3.13) 
9 
o.oo45··· 
(3.6623) 
0.0258··· 
(6.5066) 
-0.0005 
(-0.6751) 
0.0208··· 
(3.9173) 
0.0034··· 
(4.0477) 
0.0010 
(1.1246) 
3391 
20.4591"** 
0.0279 
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Chapter4 
Dividend Signalling and Information about 
Earnings 
4.1. Introduction 
Previous empirical studies which find the existence of dividend effect attribute that to 
dividend's signalling for future earnings 28 . Miller and Rock (1985) provide an 
explanation for these findings under the circumstance of information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. They state that the dividend effect induced by 
unexpected dividend changes reflects the gap between firm's real earnings and 
markets' expectation for earnings. Moreover, dividends themselves, determined by 
earnings and investments, are employed by managers to provide missed information 
about current earnings under information asymmetry. It follows that investors use the 
earnings information conveyed by dividends to update their expectations for future 
earnings (Miller and Rock, 1985). Consequently, it seems that dividends are related 
with both current and future earnings. 
The links between dividends and earnings have long been one of the major issues in 
discussions on dividend policy. Recently, several findings regarding dividend 
signalling have been presented, but the findings are mixed. Some findings support that 
dividends contain the information about current earnings (e.g. Benartzi, Michaely, and 
Thaler, 1997; and Grullon, Michaely, Benart~i, anci Thaler, 2005) while some others 
suggest that future earnings are the information signalled by dividends (Aharony and 
28 See Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (I 980) and Asquith and Mullins (I 983). 
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Do tan, 1994; and Nissim and Ziv, 2001 ). The miscellany of the prior evidence on 
dividend signalling motivates this chapter to investigate this issue by imposing 
various methods and models. By carrying out these comprehensive examinations, this 
chapter aims to help investors understand better the information signalled by dividend 
announcements and thereby more correctly evaluate their shares. 
Furthermore, many of previous studies provide evidence by testing special cases of 
dividend changes (e.g. dividend omissions or initiations) or financial conditions (e.g. 
firms with their initial loss after long-term earnings increasesi9. These findings only 
interpret the firms' signalling behaviour in special scenarios, but do not necessarily 
apply to general cases. This chapter, however, studies the sample of dividend 
increases, cuts and continuations in the UK market and generates the empirical 
evidence which could explain general dividend policy in the UK. 
To this end, the major objective of this chapter is, by examining dividend changes 
(except initiations and omissions) in the UK market, to find out which period of 
earnings changes the dividend changes reflect or signal. Based on the dividend 
signalling theory, this chapter hypothesises that, in addition to the information about 
current earnings, the changes in dividends also have predictive power for future 
earnings changes to mitigate the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. As a consequence, if the hypothesis is in favour of, it is expected to detect 
the positive association of dividends changes with both current and future earnings. 
The examinations start from comparing the earnings performance of the firms whose 
decisions on dividend payout are varied. According to the dividend signalling 
29 See DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner ( 1992; 1996) and Healy and Palepu (1988) and some others. 
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hypothesis, it is suggested that firms with superior performance pay higher dividends 
to signal their outstanding performance. If dividend payment is not high enough, 
inferior firms may easily mimic the dividend policy of superior firms, resulting in 
dividend losing its signalling function. Consequently, the firms with larger earnings 
increases (declines) are predicted to make larger dividend increases (cuts). To test the 
dividend signalling hypothesis, the categorical analysis is imposed to compare the 
unexpected earnings on the event year and the two subsequent years across the groups 
with different levels of dividend changes. The findings of this chapter, consistent with 
the signalling hypothesis for current earnings and the findings of Benartzi, Michaely 
and Thaler's (1997) for the US market, remarkably indicate that dividend changes are 
positively associated with concurrent unexpected earnings. However, the findings do 
not support the prediction of the dividend signalling hypothesis on future earnings. 
Particularly, after controlling the unexpected earnings for the event year, this chapter 
does not observe significant difference in future earnings changes among the groups. 
Furthermore, by imposing multivariate regression analysis, this chapter explicitly tests 
the relations between the dividend changes and the earnings changes of the different 
years. Previous studies, as implied by Elgers and Lo (1994) and Fama and French 
(2000), demonstrate that earnings changes are characterised by mean reversion. 
Without considering this factor may result in paradoxical fmdings on the relation 
between dividends and earnings. For example, while positive earnings changes in year 
0 (the event year) are likely followed by negative earnings changes in year 1 (the first 
year subsequent to the event year) due to the mean reversion in earnings process, lack 
of taking account of this factor may lead to a conclusion that positive (negative) 
dividend changes signal for negative (positive) future earnings. Surprisingly, the 
negative association between dividend changes and future earnings changes is indeed 
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found in Healy and Palepu (1988), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992), and Ho 
and Wu (200 1 ). To avoid the nonlinear patterns in the behaviour of earnings 
potentially influencing the findings of this chapter, various models and variables are 
imposed by the regression analysis in this chapter. The hypothesis of these regression 
models states that the associations of dividend changes with both current and future 
earnings changes should be positive to support the dividend signalling theory. The 
evidence of the regression analysis is found to be consistent with that generated by the 
categorical analysis, suggesting that the information conveyed by dividend changes is 
only about current earnings changes. However, no significant relations between 
dividend changes and future earnings changes are found. 
Additionally, the regression analysis is undertaken for a secondary objective. It is 
argued that managers are reluctant to cut dividends in that cutting dividends are 
thought to contain unfavourable information (Lintner, 1956). Consequently, given the 
same magnitude of dividend changes, the magnitude of earnings declines signalled by 
dividend cuts should be larger than the magnitude of earnings increases signalled by 
dividend increases. It can therefore be hypothesised in this chapter that the coefficient 
on the dividend cuts variable should be larger and more significant than the 
coefficient on the dividend increases variable. Supporting Lintner's (1956) argument, 
the evidence demonstrated in this chapter manifests that dividend cuts possess more 
explanatory power on current earnings changes than dividend increases. 
Last but not least, this chapter, by applying the binary logit model, examines whether 
managers' decisions on dividend increases and dividend cuts are dependent on current 
and future earnings performance. The hypothesis predicts that current and future 
earnings increases (declines) should promote managers' propensity to increase (cut) 
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dividends. The findings on the current earnings changes are consistent with the 
prediction of the hypothesis and indicate that the managers' dividend decisions are 
influenced by the current earnings changes. Nevertheless, the future earnings changes 
do not show much influence upon the dividend decisions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses literature 
reviews about dividend signalling. Data collection and the descriptive statistics are 
presented in Section 4.3, followed by the section of hypotheses and methodologies. 
Section 4.5 demonstrates the results and evidence. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter. 
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4.2. Prior evidence on dividend signalling 
This section mainly focuses on reviewing previous studies on dividend representing 
current earnings or signalling for future earnings. The dividend signalling hypothesis 
is based on the idea that uninformed investors may not be convinced by the 
information released from managers of firms if this information is costless (such as 
press releases). Instead, firms, as compared to others, pay dividends to signal their 
outperformance. Since cash distribution is costly for dividend-paying firms, the firms 
have to earn enough profits for the dividend payouts. However, on the other hand, for 
managers who have no confidence in their firms' future performance, they would not 
mimic the dividend policy in that their firms are unable to afford dividend payouts. 
To signal their superiority, two possible situations would make managers willing to 
pay higher dividends. One possibility is that the firms' current earnings or profits are 
high enough to afford the cash dividend payout. If the firms' earnings are not high 
enough, managers may try to maintain the level of dividends, and dividend cuts are 
the last choice of the dividend policy (Lintner, 1956). The second possibility is that 
managers have good prospects of their future earnings and profitability, which are 
generated by the future returns of current investments (Bhattacharya, 1979). Since 
information asymmetry exists between managers and investors, dividends are paid in 
order to reduce information asymmetry. However, it is possible that the cost of 
signalling would force the firms to forgo investing in productive projects, resulting in 
lower future earnings (Miller and Rock, 1985). 
Various approaches are undertaken in previous studies investigating the signalling 
hypothesis. One of the approaches is empirical tests on historical data. The examples 
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could be found from DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992), Benartzi, Michaely, 
and Thaler (1997), Nissim and Zi v (200 1) and some others. There are some other 
studies surveying the managers or directors for learning directly the actual opinion of 
firms in setting dividend policy. Examples could be detected from Baker and Powell 
(1999), Dhanani (2005), and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005). A main 
advantage of the former approach is that, by testing the historical data, one could 
estimate the relation between the dividends and earnings without being affected by the 
subjective opinion of the managers. Furthermore, the former approach could be 
carried out for the samples existing over the period of interest while the latter could 
only be implemented on the existing firms. Nevertheless, the advantage of the latter 
method is that the test could measure the manager's viewpoints if they respond to the 
questionnaires frankly. Besides, the survey-based studies are more capable of 
answering qualitative questions. 
The findings of survey-based studies on dividend signalling 
From managers' point of views, dividends convey information to outsiders but 
managers do not pay dividends to signal for the superiority of their firms to their 
competitors (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). Moreover, only few 
managers (nine percent) agree that they would forgo investment to increase dividends 
for costly signal and only a third of managers agree that dividend decisions are made 
after investment decisions are set. This evidence is contrary to Miller and Rock's 
(1985) argument which proposes that managers would forgo productive investment 
projects to increase dividends for signalling purpose. However, the managers believe 
that the stability of future earnings and a sustainable change in earnings are important 
factors affecting dividend decisions. Specifically, this indirectly supports that 
dividends are related to current and future earnings. 
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Other survey-based studies also obtain similar findings. Baker and Powell (1999) 
similarly confirm that dividends are considered as a signal for future prospects. 
Dhanani (2005), by using survey approach, provides the evidence for the UK market. 
Her evidence supports the argument that a dividend increase (cut) indicates 
improvement (a decline) in future firm earnings. Her evidence additionally indicates 
that the large firms, the firms with high profitability or the firms with high growth 
opportunities demand less on signalling function of dividends. Unlike the above 
studies focusing on managers' views, Dong, Robinson, and Veld (2005) uniquely 
survey Dutch investors to learn their views about payout policy (mainly about cash 
dividends, but also including stock dividends and share repurchases). The respondents 
generally regard dividend changes as the indicators for future firm performance. 
While both managers' and investors' views confirm that dividends contain 
information about the future performance, the findings presented by the empirical 
studies appear to be mixed. 
The findings of the relation between dividends signalling and future earnings 
By applying logit model to test whether past, current or future earnings would 
influence managers on making dividend decisions, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 
(1992) study the firms which experience at least one annual earnings loss or declines 
during 1980 to 1985. The estimates of the model show that dividend cuts are 
influenced by the earnings of the previous, the current and the subsequent years. 
Besides, the firms with higher level of earnings or earnings expectations are less 
likely to cut dividends. Furthermore, they compare the level of annual earnings of the 
years surrounding the year of initial losses for firms cutting and not cutting dividends. 
Consistent with the signalling theory, their results reveal that the firms, experiencing 
earnings loss but not cutting dividends, earn positive earnings in the following two 
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years. By contrast, the firms which cut dividends experience improvement in earnings, 
but they still suffer earnings losses over two years following the initial loss. 
According to DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992), it is proposed that what the 
dividends signal is the level of future earnings but not year-by-year earnings changes. 
Their findings of dividend signalling for future earnings appear evident even when 
they simultaneously include dividend changes and current earnings as the explanatory 
variables. 
Another study about the firms expenencmg earmngs decline is carried out by 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996) by examining 145 NYSE firms which 
experience earnings decline after nine or more consecutive years of earnings growth. 
They compare the average future earnings of the sample firms which increase 
dividends to those which do not increase dividends. However, no significant 
difference is detected among these firms. The finding of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (1996) presents that about 50 percent of the managers of the 
dividend-increasing firms show optimism about the future performance to investors 
while only 2.1 percent of the managers express their non-optimism. They, thus, 
suggest that managers' over-optimism makes managers overestimate future earnings, 
resulting in incredibility of the information signalled by dividend increases. 
When DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992) document that the firms with 
dividend cuts experience improvement in future earnings, their findings are consistent 
with the earlier study by Healy and Palepu (1988). Focusing on the sample of 
dividend initiations and omissions, they demonstrate that the earnings of the firms 
which initiate dividends appear to be permanent after the initiations. Nevertheless, the 
firms which omit dividends experience improvement in earnings in the subsequent 
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years. They call the U-shape relation between dividends and earnings changes a 
puzzle, and attribute the earnings reversal to the possible survival bias inherent in 
their sample. Ho and Wu (2001) carry out a similar study as Healy and Palepu (1988) 
but, additionally, they take the survival bias into account. Their evidence appears a 
little different from that of Healy and Palepu (1988). Ho and Wu (200 1) find future 
earnings reversal following both dividend initiations and omissions while Healy and 
Palepu (1988) only find earnings reversal following dividend omissions but earnings 
persistence following dividend initiations. Similarly, Balachandran, Cadle, and 
Theobald (1996), studying the UK sample, find negative relation between future 
earnings changes and dividend cuts. They explain that the results are possibly caused 
by mean reversion of earnings process. Other studies, such as Benartzi, Michaely, and 
Thaler (1997) and Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), also provide the 
similar findings about the U-shape relation. Testing the relation between dividend 
changes and return on asset (ROA), the result indicates that, as implied by Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), the changes in ROA reverse following both 
dividend increases and dividend cuts. Moreover, the level of ROA rises following 
dividend cuts and drops following dividend increases. However, the level of 
post-announcement ROA for dividend cuts is substantially lower than that for 
dividend increases. This finding is similar to the findings of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Skinner (1992), suggesting that dividends may signal for the level of earnings but 
not for the yearly changes. 
Different from the previous studies which focus on specific financial condition or 
dividend decisions, Nissim and Ziv (200 1) examine for more general samples. They 
make some improvements in estimating earnings changes and regression models. 
Firstly, they use book value of equity instead of market value to scale earnings 
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changes. They argue that market value may contain investors' expectation about 
firms' future. Thus, using earnings changes scaled by market value would result in 
bias on examining the relation between earnings and dividends. Secondly, instead of 
using pooled regression models, they employ the regression procedure for the panel 
data suggested by Fama and MacBeth (1973). This approach not only preserves the 
explanatory power of cross-sectional model, but also provides inferences which take 
the residual cross-correlation into account. Thirdly, Nissim and Ziv (200 1) consider 
the mean reversion in the earnings changes. Failure in considering the mean reversion 
may result in paradoxical evidence. Thus, they incorporate the concurrent earnings 
changes as an explanatory variable in their models. Fourthly, since future information 
may be mixed up with the information signalled by dividends, they suggest using 
concurrent or past information as explanatory variables. 
Overall, Nissim and Ziv's (2001) evidence supports the dividend signalling theory, 
implying that dividend increases have explanatory power on the future earnings for 
the subsequent two years and dividend cuts for one year. When they examine the level 
of earnings instead of earnings changes, only dividend increases appear to correlate 
with future earnings for the subsequent years. However, no explicit evidence is found 
for dividend cuts. Nissim and Ziv (200 1) attribute the lack of link between dividend 
cuts and the level of future earnings to concurrent earnings' capturing the information 
conveyed by dividends. When they exclude the concurrent earnings, the relation 
between dividend cuts and future earnings becomes significantly positive. 
Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005) further consider the autocorrelation 
and the mean reversion in earnings process on testing the relation between dividend 
changes and the earnings changes of different periods. They argue that it is 
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inappropriate for Nissim and Ziv (200 1) to assume that the mean reversion in earnings 
process is linear since previous findings suggest that the mean reversion is highly 
non-linear30 (Elgers and Lo, 1994; Fama and French, 2000). Grullon, Michaely, 
Benartzi, and Thaler (2005) test both the linear model suggested by Nissim and Ziv 
(2001) and the non-linear model modified from Fama and French (2000). They 
maintain that the relation between dividend changes and future earnings changes only 
appear in the linear model. The non-linear models do not generate significant relation 
between dividend changes and future earnings variables which include future earnings 
changes, the level of future earnings and future profitability (future ROA changes). 
The findings of the relation between dividends signalling and current earnings 
While the findings of dividend's signalling for future earnings are mixed, some other 
studies only detect conspicuous relation between dividends and current earnings. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) study the troubled firms listed on NYSE for the 
signalling hypothesis. The troubled firms are defined as the firms which suffer at least 
three annual losses during 1980 to 1985. DeAngelo and DeAngelo's (1990) main 
focus is placed on the behaviour of dividend cuts and omissions. Their findings 
suggest that these firms gradually reduce their dividend level after suffering the initial 
loss. By the third year of distress, over half of the troubled firms omit dividends. The 
implication of their findings reveals that the current earnings have notable impact on 
dividend decisions for the firms with earnings losses. This evidence is confirmed by 
the later study ofDeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992). 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996) further examine the firms which suffer 
earnings decline after nine or more consecutive years of earnings growth. In their 
30 Throughout this chapter, the term "linear" or "non-linear" indicates the relationships between the 
variables of earnings changes, but not the regression model itself. 
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sample, 66.8 percent of the firms (99 firms) increases dividends, 30.3 percent 
maintains dividend level and only 1.4 percent cuts dividends. By implication, it 
implies that when firms suffer from the initial earnings declines after a long period of 
earnings growth, they are very reluctant to cut dividends. This indirectly undern1ines 
the reliability of the signals from dividend increases. 
Unlike the US firms which are reluctant to cut dividends, Germany firms have more 
flexible dividend policy. As indicated by the findings of Georgen, Renneboog, and Da 
Silva (2005), Germany firms, except widely held firms, are more willing to reduce 
dividends to reflect the concurrent earnings. Moreover, Germany firms also revise 
their dividend policy as soon as they experience earnings improvement. For example, 
there are about 75 percent of the sample firms increasing dividends by two years after 
dividend cuts (Table 8; p. 393). This finding is consistent with the Japanese findings 
ofDewenter and Warther (1998). Japanese firms, particularly keiretsu-member firms 31 , 
are less reluctant to omit or cut dividends, and the dividends are paid to reflect the 
concurrent earnings changes. 
Using the sample of dividend cuts, increases and continuations, the dividend 
signalling theory is thoroughly tested by Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997). Their 
findings, however, are not completely consistent with the prediction of the dividend 
signalling theory. Based on their evidence, both dividend increases and dividend cuts 
are detected to have obvious explanatory power on concurrent earnings changes. 
Particularly, after the model includes accounting variables to control for the prediction 
of earnings performance, the relation between dividends and current earnings remains 
evident. Nevertheless, they do not get much evidence supporting the prediction that 
31 A keiretsu is an industrial group with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings. 
(Wikipedia, 2006) 
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dividends signal for future earnings performance. 
To conclude, according to the theory of the dividend signalling, it is predicted that 
dividend is informative for current and future earnings. The positive relation between 
dividends and current earnings is well documented by previous studies. However, the 
findings on dividend signalling for future earnings have presented to be mixed so far. 
The survey-based studies confirm that managers and investors tend to believe that the 
information contents of dividend changes are about managers' future prospects. 
Supportive evidence is also presented by Nissim and Ziv (200 1) from their empirical 
studies. Nonetheless, a number of fmdings provided by the empirical studies appear to 
be against this prediction. Healy and Palepu (1988) and many others suggest that 
dividend changes have a U-shaped relation with the process of earnings changes. 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler 
(2005) fail to find a significant relation between dividend changes and future earnings. 
Overall, the aforementioned divergent findings advance the significance of this 
chapter in that this chapter controls various effects what previous studies suggest may 
bias the results. Moreover, the sample of this chapter consists of all observations with 
dividend increases, cuts and continuations. As a consequence, the results of this 
chapter are broadly valid for general cases, but not solely for a specific financial 
condition or a specific type of dividend changes. The data for the sample are 
discussed in the following section. 
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4·3· Data and descriptive statistics 
4.3.1. Data 
This chapter studies all the UK firms listed on London Stock Exchange during the 
period of 1989 to 1999. The data is sourced from Datastream provided by the 
Thomson Corporation. Datastream initially provides the data containing 1,119 firms, 
including listed and delisted firms. Dividends per share, which is the item coded 190, 
are utilised for measuring dividend changes. The item, net earnings per share (data 
code: 254), is employed for estimating the earnings variables (i.e. annual earnings 
changes, and returns on equity). Additionally, book value per share used is the item 
coded 1308 in Datastream. 
The criteria of filtering data are set as follows: 
1. All the observations included in the sample are required to have at least four 
consecutive annual data of dividend per share (DPS) and earnings per share 
(EPS) from the year prior to the event year to two years after the event year (i.e. 
year 0). The data of book value per share are required to be feasible from year 
-1 to year 1. This is essential for computing the annual dividend changes and 
the unexpected earnings which are assumed to follow a random walk process 
(discussed in the following). 
2. The events of dividend omiSSions, initiations, or continuous non-dividend 
payments, are not included in the sample since the data is inappropriate for 
computing the rate of dividend changes. 
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3. The observations with negative EPS or negative book value per share are 
dropped as they are inappropriate to measure the earnings growth. 
4. The sample crosses out the firm-year observations with the outliers of the 
dividend changes, the current earnings changes, and the future earnings changes 
which distribute under 0.25 percentile or over 99.75 percentile (approximate 
eight observations on each tail for each variable), as these observations would 
generate potential bias for empirical results. 
Overall, 3,148 observations survive the above criteria for the tests which assume that 
the earnings follow a random walk process. 
4.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables of dividends and earnings. 
The distributions of the earnings changes and dividend changes is presented in Panel 
A. Earnings changes are computed by the raw earnings changes scaled by book value 
per share, which is shown as Eq. ( 4.1 ): 
(E -E I) CE = 1,1 l,t-
1,1 BV. , 
1,1-l 
(4.1) 
where CE;, 1 denotes the changes in earnings of firms i in year t. Eu denotes the 
earnings per share and BV;,t-I denotes book value per share of the previous year. As 
noted by Nissim and Ziv (2001), when testing dividend signalling, book value is more 
appropriate to scale the earnings changes. Since market value reflects investors' 
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expectation for future earnings, the ratio of current earnings to price is likely related 
negatively to the earnings changes of the following year. Whereas firms which 
increase (cut) dividends usually have high (low) ratio of current earnings to price, it 
may mislead the test to detect negative relation between dividend changes and 
changes in future earnings. 
Dividend changes are the percentage changes of dividends, which are computed as Eq. 
(4.2): 
. Div;, - Div; ,_1 Wzv. = · · 
'·' D' lVi,t-1 
(4.2) 
where Div;,1 denotes the dividend per share32 of firm i in year t. The L1Div;, 1 denotes 
the percentage change in dividends of firm i in year t. 
For each variable, the statistics are presented by the categories of dividend changes. 
The statistics contain the mean, 1st percentile (P 1 ), 1 01h percentile (P 1 0), 1st quartile 
(Q1), median, 3rd quartile (Q3), 90th percentile (P90), and 99th percentile (P99) of each 
variable. According to the dividend changes, the categories are formed as follows: 
1. dividend cuts which are larger than 25 percent (hereafter: large dividend cuts) 
2. dividend cuts which are 25 percent or less (hereafter: small dividend cuts) 
3. dividend continuations 
32 Dividend per share is adjusted for subsequent rights and scrip issues. 
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4. dividend increases which are 25 percent or less (hereafter: small dividend 
increases), and 
5. dividend increases which are larger than 25 percent (hereafter: large dividend 
increases). 
As demonstrated in Panel A of Table 4.1, the firm-year observations with earnings 
increases are apparently more than those with negative earnings declines. The median 
earnings change for the whole sample is 1.74 percent while the mean earnings change 
is 1.68 percent. While looking further at the dividend categories, the largest mean and 
median earnings declines (increases) appear in the category of large dividend cuts 
(increases). The category of dividend continuations is associated with more negative 
mean and median earnings changes than the category of small dividend cuts. While 
comparing the other percentiles or quartiles, the earnings changes for the category of 
small dividend cuts all appear to be less negative or more positive. Comparing these 
two categories in Panel C may provide explanation for this result. The numbers of the 
dividend continuations ( 456) are, strikingly, much larger than the small dividend cuts 
(56). Within the former category, there are 307 out of 456 firm-years (about 67 
percent) experiencing earnings declines, while there are only 30 out of 56 (about 53 
percent) for the latter category. As inferred form these statistics, it implicitly exhibits 
that managers are reluctant to cut dividends. Another implication worthy of note is 
that when firms are incapable of increasing dividends, a large number of them decide 
to maintain the dividend level. 
On the other hand, Panel A reveals that the observations of dividend increases are 
much more than dividend cuts as the 1Oth percentile of the dividend changes variable 
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appear to be zero. The mean dividend change is 0.231 and the median is 0.12. In 
terms of the dividend categories, the means and the medians appear to be consistent. 
The mean (median) dividend change for the category of small dividend cuts is -0.1534 
(-0.1467), while the mean (median) for large dividend cuts is -0.5258 (-0.5). 
Comparing to the dividend cuts, the mean and the median dividend changes for small 
dividend increases are 0.1264 and 0.1202 respectively, and are 0.8953 and 0.4706 
respectively for large dividend increases. 
Panel B of Table 1 illustrates the frequency of the firm-year observations year by year. 
It is shown that the numbers of dividend increases (totally 2,494) overwhelm the 
number of dividend cuts (totally 198), revealing that the dividend cuts are not a 
favourable decision for managers. Noticeably, the numbers of the observation decline 
with years. The most significant decline is observed in the category of large dividend 
increases although similar patterns of declines are also found in other categories. The 
firms which largely increase dividends reduce from 134 in 1989 to only 32 in 1999. 
The declines properly stem from the tax reforms carried out in 1997 and 199933 . 
Alternatively, it is also possibly due to firms' lower propensity to pay dividends 
(Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2004). 
Panel C is a two-way cross table, which presents the frequencies of the firm-years by 
dividends and earnings changes. Within the category of earnings declines, there are 
only about 13 percent of the firm-years cutting dividends, but over a half of the 
firm-years (56 percent) increasing dividends. Nevertheless, within the category of 
earnings increases, the proportion of dividend cuts appear even lower (2.7 percent) 
33 The tax reform eliminates the tax credit for dividends on 2"d July 1997 for tax-exempt institutional 
investors and on 151 April 1999 for all other tax-exempt investors. This reform makes dividends less 
attractive than they were. 
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and the proportion of dividend increases is as high as 90.5 percent. Interestingly, 
while there are 30.4 percent of the earnings-decline observations maintaining the 
dividend level, there are only 6. 7 percent of the earnings-increase observations 
making the same decision. 
Interpreting Panel C by columns also provides interesting information. The 
observations with earnings declines dominate the category of large dividend cuts 
(72.5 percent). Relatively, the two categories of dividend increases are dominated by 
the observations with earnings increases (73 percent for small dividend increases and 
88.2 percent for large dividend increases). However, the proportions of earnings 
declines and increases are not far different in the category of small dividend cuts. 
Surprisingly, the category of dividend continuations has more observations with 
earnings declines (67.3 percent). If information contents of dividends are about 
earnings, it seems that those conveyed by the large dividend cuts and the dividend 
increases are more reliable. 
In sum, the descriptive statistics provide an overview on the examined sample which 
comprises all dividend increases, cuts and continuations from all the UK firms. By 
examining this sample, this chapter examines the validity of dividend signalling 
theory which states that dividends are used by managers to represent current and 
signal for future earnings. When the evidence supports the dividend signalling theory, 
it is expected to find the positive links between dividend changes and current or future 
unexpected earnings. The details of methodology and hypotheses are discussed in 
Section 4.4. 
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4·4· Methodology and hypotheses development 
This section begins with the discussion of the methodology in testing the dividend 
signalling hypothesis. The tests are carried out by using three statistical approaches. 
Section 4.4.1 discusses the usage of the categorical analysis which compares the mean 
or median unexpected earnings among the dividend categories. Following the 
discussion on the categorical analysis, the constitutions of regression models, which 
examine the predictive power of dividends on earnings, are well presented. The final 
part of this section documents the employment of a binary logit model for testing the 
effect of the changes in earnings on the propensity to cut or increase dividends. 
4-4-1. Comparisons of unexpected earnings by dividend changes 
As argued by the dividend signalling hypothesis, dividends, to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, may not only represent the 
information about concurrent earnings, but also signal for future earnings. In order to 
examine this hypothesis, the tests start from comparing the means and medians of 
unexpected current and future earnings among different categories of dividend 
changes. The categorical analysis compares the difference of the earnings variables 
between two categories by using statistically parametric or non-parametric tests, 
which is an appropriate tool for the examinations in this section. 
The five dividend categories to be examined in this test are respectively large 
dividend cuts (the cuts over 25 percent), small dividend cuts (the cuts equal25 percent 
or less), dividend continuations, small dividend increases (the increases equal 25 
percent or less), and large dividend increases (the increase over 25 percent). The 
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underlying reasons for splitting the large and small dividend changes are twofold. 
Firstly, it helps to understand whether the information signalled by large dividend 
changes is more informative than that signalled by small dividend changes. Secondly, 
managers, as implied by the findings of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), 
tend to make the modest cash commitment which does not always truly reflecting 
their firms' earnings performance and thus undermines the reliability of small 
dividend changes. 
In the test, the unexpected earnings are compared for the event year (year 0) and the 
two subsequent years (year 1 and year 2). The estimations of the unexpected earnings 
are based on two different assumptions on the earnings process. The first model 
assumes that the earnings process follows a random walk. Thus, the expected earnings 
of year 0 are assumed to be the earnings of year -1. The unexpected earnings equal to 
the raw earnings changes as shown in Eq. (4.3): 
E -E I UE = l,t 1,1-
1,1 BV 
1,1-1 
(4.3) 
where UE;, 1 denotes the unexpected earnings of the firms i in year t. The earnings and 
book value are denoted by E;,1 and BV;,1 respectively. 
Additionally, Albrecht, Lookabill, and McKeown (1977) suggest that the random walk 
model with drift also performs well on forecasting expected earnings. In light of this 
notion, the second model takes account of the earnings changes of the previous three 
years (year -3 to year -1) and employs the average past earnings changes as the proxy 
for the expected earnings changes of year 0. The adjusted unexpected earnings are 
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computed as the raw current earnings changes minus the average past earnings 
changes, which are expressed as Eq. (4.4): 
E -E 1 r-1 E -E UEi,l = 1,1 1,1-1 -- L l,y l,y-1 ' 
BV;,1-1 3 y=t-3 BV;,y-1 
(4.4) 
Moreover, as the signalling hypothesis predicts that dividends contain information 
about future ea,mings beyond current earnings, comparing the observations which 
experience similar current earnings changes but make different dividend decisions 
should find observable relation between dividend changes and future unexpected 
earnings. To carry out this test, the test controls the earnings changes in year 0 and 
compares the unexpected earnings in years 1 and 2. The category of dividend 
continuations is designed as the basis category. The observations of the other 
categories are selected from those whose current earnings changes are within the 
range of three percentage points above or under the average current earnings changes 
of the basis category. 
The tested hypothesis for the above categorical analysis is identical. Since dividend 
increases (cuts) are regarded as good (bad) news about unexpected earnings, the 
dividend signalling hypothesis predicts that the categories of dividend increases have 
better earnings performance and the categories of dividend cuts have inferior earnings 
performance than the category of dividend continuations. The statistical difference 
compares the mean and the median unexpected earnings of the four categories of 
dividend cuts or increases to the category of dividend continuations which is designed 
as the basis category. Student's t test and Mann-Whitney U test are respectively 
employed to test the statistical differences of the mean and median unexpected 
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earnings between two independent categories. The null hypothesis for the above two 
tests states that the current and future unexpected earnings of dividend cuts or 
dividend increases equal to those of dividend continuations. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis indicates that dividend increases (cuts) signal for good (bad) news. 
4.4.2. Tests on dividends signalling, current and future earnings 
Following the categorical analysis, regressiOn analysis is applied to test the 
explanatory power of dividend changes on current and future earnings changes. The 
regression models employ dividend changes as the main explanatory variables to see 
whether it possesses predictive power on current and future earnings changes. Besides, 
for the purpose of controlling the noisy factors (such as mean reversion of earnings 
changes) which may mislead the results, this chapter constitutes four regression 
models as follows to corroborate the evidence: 
1. an essential model which employs dividend increases and dividend cuts as the 
explanatory variables, 
2. the second model, suggested by Nissim and Ziv (2001), further includes returns 
on shareholders' equity (ROE) and lagged earnings changes to control for the 
autocorrelation in earnings process and the omitted correlated variable problem 
(discussed later), 
3. the third model employs the linear mean reversion and autocorrelation variables 
suggested by Fama and French (2000) to control for the trend in earnings 
process, and 
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4. based on the third model, the fourth model further employs non-linear variables 
suggested by Fama and French (2000). 
The first model is expressed as Eq (4.5): 
(4.5) 
where DPC0 (DNC0) is the dummy variable which equals one for dividend increases 
(cuts), and zero otherwise. This model on which two hypotheses are tested essentially 
tests the relation between dividend changes and earnings changes. Firstly, the 
signalling hypothesis predicts that dividends changes may represent current earnings 
performance and signal for future earnings changes, and thus both of the coefficients 
on dividend increases and dividend cuts variables are expected to be positive. 
Secondly, since managers are reluctant to cut dividends, the secondary hypothesis 
predicts that the dividend cuts signal for larger earnings changes than dividend 
increases. As a consequence, the coefficient on dividend cuts are expected to be larger 
than that on dividend increases in size. 
The second regression model suggested by Nissim and Ziv (2001) is as Eq. (4.6): 
where ROE1_J denotes the returns on shareholders' equity (ROE) in year t-1. 
Comparing to the first regression model, this model further includes lagged ROE and 
the earnings changes in year 0 to control the omitted correlated variable problem and 
the effect of autocorrelation. Nissim and Ziv (200 1) state that high (low) ROE implies 
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expected decreases (increases) in earnings in that ROE is mean reverting. In addition, 
dividend changes are usually positively related to current ROE. It would lead to a 
plausible negative relation between dividend changes and expected changes in 
earnings. Thus, the inclusion of ROE as an additional explanatory variable could 
avoid the plausible results indicating that dividend changes are informative about 
future earnings. Furthermore, when the residual of the first model follows an AR ( 1 ), 
the inclusion of CEo would translate the residual into white noise. Due that the current 
earnings changes are employed as an explanatory variable, the estimations are only 
carried out for the earnings changes of year 1 and year 2. The tested hypotheses on 
this model are the same with those tested on Eq. ( 4.5). 
The third model is modified from the linear model used by Fama and French (2000) 
and expressed as Eq. (4.7): 
where DFE1-1 represents the divergence of real ROE and expected ROE, and can be 
expressed as ROE1_1 - E(ROE1_1). The variable, E(ROE1_1), is predicted by the 
predictors used by Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005). The predictors 
include the lagged ROE (i.e. ROE1_2), the logarithm of lagged total assets and the 
logarithm of lagged market-to-book ratio. The variable, DFE1_1, are developed by 
Fama and French (2000) to be a proxy for the effect of mean reversion in earnings 
process. The lagged earnings changes ( C£1_1) are imposed to capture the 
autocorrelation in earnings process. Originally, Fama and French (2000) constitute the 
model as Eq. (4.8): 
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(4.8) 
Fama and French (2000) propose that ''forecasts of earnings should exploit the mean 
reversion in profitability" (p. 174). Assuming the DFE1 and CE1 in Eq. (4.8) are 
capable of explaining CE1+1 well, Equation (4.7) which includes the explanatory 
variables of Eq. ( 4.8) could well control the mean reversion and autocorrelation in 
earnings process and adequately estimate the explanatory power of the dividend 
changes on current or future earnings changes. The hypotheses tested on Eq. ( 4. 7) are 
identical with those tested on Eq. ( 4.5) and Eq. ( 4.6). 
Previous findings, moreover, suggest that the mean reversion in earnings process 
appears to be non-linear (Elgers and Lo, 1994; Fama and French, 2000). That is, large 
change in earnings has a more speedy reversion than small change. Thus, further 
considering non-linear earnings process could more adequately control the effect of 
the mean reversion and autocorrelation than Eq. (4.7). As a consequence, the fourth 
model is expressed as Eq. ( 4.9): 
C~ =/30 +/31pDPG x!illiVo +/31NDNG x!illilb +y1DFE;_1 +y2SDFfi1 +~C~_1 +~SC4_1 +&, 
(4.9) 
where SDFEt-1 equals to the square of DFE1_1, and SCEt-1 denotes square CE1_1. The 
tested hypotheses, which are identical with those on the aforementioned three models, 
predict that 1) both of the coefficients on dividend increases and dividend cuts should 
be positive and 2) the coefficient on dividend cuts should be larger than the 
coefficient on dividend increases. 
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These four models are all estimated by the regression procedure for panel data 
advanced by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Estimating the cross-sectional models 
year-by-year, the procedure uses the time-serial means of the cross-sectional 
coefficients as the coefficients of the original models. Consequently, this procedure 
takes account of the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals, and allows 
for the residual cross-correlation. The time-serial standard errors of the cross-sectional 
coefficients, which include the estimation errors induced by the cross-correlations of 
the residuals, are applied to test the significances of the coefficients. 
To conclude, this chapter imposes four models to estimate the signalling power of 
dividend changes for current and future earnings changes. The models, by using 
various variables, further control the mean reversion and autocorrelation in earnings 
process. Notwithstanding the inclusion of different explanatory variables, the 
hypotheses tested on these models are identical. The signalling hypothesis predicts 
that the dividend changes are positively associated with current and future earnings 
changes and thus the coefficients on the dividend changes variables should be positive. 
The secondary hypothesis predicts that the managers are reluctant to cut dividends 
and thus dividend cuts should signal for a larger magnitude of earnings changes than 
dividend increases. Thus, the coefficient on dividend cuts are expected to be larger 
than the coefficient on dividend increases in size. 
4·4·3· Testing influence of earnings changes on dividend decisions 
This section examines whether the changes in current and future earnings possess any 
influence on managers' dividend decisions. Since the real factors which affect 
managers on their dividend decisions are only known by managers themselves, one 
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can only apply logit models to find out the effect of the potential factors on managers' 
dividend decisions. To this end, this chapter employs a binary logit model to study 
whether increase (decline) in current and future earnings would increase the chance of 
dividend increase (cut). The models are designed as follows: 
The binary logit model assumes that the dividend decisions are made in managers' 
interest and managers will maximize the utility of their dividend decisions. The utility 
function is expressed as Eq. (4.10): 
u ijl = vi}, + 8 ijl , (4.10) 
where Uy1 denotes the utility of the dividend-paying firm i which chooses the dividend 
decision} (increases or cuts) in year t. The Vtjt denotes the representative utility which 
is developed by this chapter via using future and (or) current earnings changes to 
predict the utility Uy1 that is only known by the managers. 
The eyt denotes the residual which is unobserved by this chapter (and outsiders) but 
known by the managers. The logit model assumes that the residuals are independently 
and identically distributed (iid) extreme value (i.e. Gumbel distribution) over 
parameters i,j and t. 
Since the managers are assumed to maximize the utility of the dividend decision, they 
must make the decision with higher utility. Thus, the choice probability of the 
dividend decision can be expressed as Eq. ( 4.11): 
(4.11) 
---------
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On the basis that the residuals are iid extreme value, the choice probability derived 
from McFadden (1974) is as Eq (4.12): 
(4.12) 
For the alternatives} and k, the ratio of the probabilities (odd ratio) is: 
P (}) exp(v; 1 ) ( ) (( • • \__ ) ( •• ) 
-'
1
- = r; = exp Vijt- Vikt = exp /31 - f3k p;;1 = exp f3 xu Pu ( k) exp(v;kt ) 
And the logit Lis the natural logarithm ofEq (4.13), expressed as Eq. (4.14): 
[ I>;/(})] •• • Lu = Ln -- = f3 xu Vk :t:- 1, P;l (k) (4.14) 
where p* is a vector of coefficients on a vector of earnings variables xu, which 
includes current and (or) future earnings changes. 
In order to examine the panel data, which consists of cross-sectional and time-serial 
units, the logit models are estimated by using random effect models. It is believed that 
random effect model is more appropriate than fixed effect model. Unlike fixed effect 
model, random effect model does not assume the homogeneity among the firms and 
(or) years34 . The residuals could be decomposed into three components, including 
cross-sectional specific error, time-serial specific error, and individual error. In other 
words, the random model assumes that there are differences among firms, over years, 
34 If homogeneity is assumed to be among firms and years, the model is so-called pooled regression 
model. 
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and certainly among individual observations. 
In sum, the dependent variable is set to zero for dividend cuts and one for dividend 
increases. The signalling hypothesis predicts that the increases in current or future 
earnings would promote the firms' propensity to increase dividends and reduce the 
chance of dividend cuts. By contrast, the declines in current or future earnings are 
predicted to lessen the probability of dividend increases and raise the chance of 
dividend cuts. Hence, the coefficients on the variables of current and future earnings 
changes are expected to be positive to support the hypothesis. 
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4·5· Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results of the association of dividend signalling 
with current and future earnings. Generally, the findings indicate that dividends 
represent current earnings performance but do not signal for future earnings. The 
findings are consistent with the US findings of Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) 
and Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005). In addition, the signalling power 
of dividend cuts is greater than that of dividend increases, which supports the 
prediction of Lintner (1956). 
4.5.1. Earnings performance with different dividend decisions 
Table 4.2 presents the comparison of mean and median unexpected earnings of the 
categories with different dividend decisions. The test examines both the mean and 
median earnings for three years, starting from the year of dividend announcement 
(year 0). The dividend categories consist of two for dividend cuts (the cuts larger than 
25 percent and those which are 25 percent or less), two for dividend increases (the 
increases larger than 25 percent and those which are 25 percent or less), and one for 
dividend continuations. The category of dividend continuations is designed to be the 
basis category. 
Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the results of comparing the raw earnings changes which 
is used as the proxy for the unexpected earnings. The evidence reveals that dividends 
are likely changed with concurrent unexpected earnings. For the firms which cut 
dividends larger than 25 percent (large dividend cuts), they averagely experience 10.8 
percent of the declines in unexpected current earnings. It is apparent form this 
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evidence that the mean and median unexpected earnings for large dividend cuts are 
much more negative than those for dividend continuations and for small dividend cuts 
(the cuts which are 25 percent or less). By contrast, the firms which increase 
dividends seem to experience increases in earnings in year 0. The fmns with large 
dividend increases (the increases which are larger than 25 percent) generally possess 
more positive unexpected earnings than those with dividend continuations and with 
small dividend increases (the increases which are 25 percent or less). The only result 
which is contrary to the prediction of the signalling hypothesis on current earnings 
changes is that the unexpected earnings for small dividend cuts are less negative than 
those for dividend continuations. From the mean and median tests, it is shown that the 
differences of the current unexpected earnings between these two categories are 
significant at least at ten percent level. As what is discussed in Section 4.3.2, the 
category of dividend continuations has more observations than the category of small 
dividend cuts. Moreover, the former category has higher proportion of observations 
with earnings declines (67.32 percent). Thus, it is not surprising that the mean and 
median current unexpected earnings of the category of dividend continuations are 
more negative than those of the category of small dividend cuts. This evidence 
implicitly supports Lintner's (1956) argument that managers are reluctant to cut 
dividends though it does not support the prediction of the signalling hypothesis on 
current earnings. 
Differently, the evidence in Panel A of Table 4.2 for year 1 is not as sound as that for 
year 0. Firms with dividend increases seem to have more positive median unexpected 
earnings than the firms with dividend continuations. The comparison of the median 
year-one unexpected earnings appears to be significant at five percent level for small 
dividend increases and at one percent level for large dividend increases, which is the 
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only evidence supporting the prediction of the signalling hypothesis on future 
earnings. However, the evidence for large dividend cuts is surprising. After the firms 
experience severe negative unexpected earnings, they get positive unexpected 
earnings in the following year. The mean and median unexpected earnings are 
respectively 3.66 percent and 1.17 percent, both of which are significantly higher than 
those for the basis category. Besides, the category of dividend continuations appears 
to have better earnings performance in year 1 than the category of small dividend cuts. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 4.2, the positive unexpected earnings for the firms 
which largely cut dividends continue in year 2 but the magnitude becomes smaller. 
Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that the firms of small dividend cuts also 
experience earnings rebound two years subsequent to the dividend cuts. Moreover, the 
category of small dividend cuts experiences larger positive unexpected earnings than 
the basis category and the categories with dividend increases in year 2. The results 
therefore suggest that unexpected earnings rebound by one or two years following 
dividend cuts. When the dividend signalling hypothesis proposes that dividends are 
made to signal for future earnings, most of the evidence so far is contrary to the 
prediction of the hypothesis. 
The unexpected earnings adjusted by the average past earnings changes are presented 
in Panel B of Table 4.2 estimates. Apparently, the different estimations of the 
unexpected earnings do not provide much new evidence. The main difference between 
the results of Panel A and Panel B appears in the category of large dividend changes. 
In Panel B, the firms with large dividend increases are found to experience the 
rebound in the unexpected earnings in year 1 and the negative unexpected earnings 
continue in year 2. The rebounds in unexpected earnings for large dividend cuts still 
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exist in the two sequent years. The finding of the rebounds in earnings following 
dividend cuts is consistent with the findings of Healy and Palepu (1988), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992), Balachandran, Cadle, and Theobald (1996) and some 
others. Healy and Palepu (1988) further explain that these results may stem from 
survivorship bias while Balachandran, Cadle, and Theobald (1996) propose that it 
may be caused by mean reversion of earnings process. For the sample of this chapter, 
the results are more likely caused by the mean reversion of earnings in that the 
rebound of the unexpected earnings is not only found in the category of large dividend 
cuts but also in the category of large dividend increases. Furthermore, firms with 
small dividend cuts appear to have positive unexpected earnings in year 0. The 
unexpected earnings for the firms with small dividend cuts outperform those for the 
firms with dividend continuations or small dividend increases. This evidence 
contradicts the prediction of the dividend signalling hypothesis and merits further 
tests to see whether it is robust. 
Panel C of Table 4.2 shows the results from examining the observations whose raw 
earnings changes are within the range of three percentage points under or above the 
mean earnings changes of the basis category (i.e. the category of dividend 
continuations). Therefore, the main focus in this panel is on the results of year 1 and 
year 2. In year 1 and year 2, the unexpected earnings do not seem to differ 
significantly among the dividend categories. When the signalling hypothesis proposes 
that dividend are made to signal for future earnings performance, different dividend 
decisions in year 0 should be positively associated with unexpected earnings in year 1 
and year 2. However, the evidence is unable to find significant links between different 
dividend decisions in year 0 and future unexpected earnings. Furthermore, the 
estimates in Panel C also show the unexpected earnings rebound in either year 1 or 
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year 2. 
To conclude, the evidence provided by the categorical analysis does not support the 
argument that managers pay dividends to signal for future earnings. In contrast, the 
evidence shows the rebounds in future unexpected earnings, which is opposite to the 
prediction of the signalling hypothesis although these findings are consistent with 
some previous studies. Regarding to current unexpected earnings, the test provides 
evidence supporting the dividend signalling hypothesis. The findings show that the 
firms increasing dividends generally experience better current earnings performance 
than the firms with dividend continuations. By contrast, the firms with large dividend 
cuts suffer worse current unexpected earnings than the dividend-continuation firms. 
On the other hand, the firms with small dividend cuts appear to outperform the firms 
with dividend continuations in current unexpected earnings. This finding may result 
from the managers' reluctance to cut dividends, even when their firms experience 
earnings declines. Consequently, when managers only maintain rather than increase 
dividends, it may not be good news about current earnings. 
4-5-2. Associations of dividends with current and future earnings 
Although the categorical analysis compares the earnings performance of the firms 
with different levels of dividend changes, it does not explicitly examine the relation 
between dividend changes and earnings changes. Table 4.3 to Table 4.6 present the 
estimates of the multivariate regression models, which are capable of showing the 
definite relation between the earnings changes and the dividend changes. The models 
are all estimated by the regression procedure suggested by Fama and MacBeth (1973), 
which accounts for the cross-correlation of the residuals in panel data. Panels A of 
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these tables report the time-serial means of the cross-sectional coefficients which 
indicates the dividend signalling power throughout the examined period. Panels B 
present the year-by-year cross-sectional coefficients and t-statistics for the dividend 
variables, showing the consistency of the dividend signalling power in each sample 
year. 
According to the dividend signalling hypothesis, it is predicted that dividend changes 
represent current earnings changes and further signal for future earnings changes. 
Hence, the relation between dividend changes and earnings changes are expected to 
be positive. In addition, since managers are reluctant to cut dividends, the secondary 
hypothesis predicts that dividend cuts should pertain to larger magnitude of earnings 
changes than dividend increases. Panel A of Table 4.3 reveals that the dividend 
changes are more informative for current earnings changes than for future earnings 
changes. This finding is confirmed by the higher adjusted R square for the model of 
year 0 than for the models of year 1 and year 2. Moreover, consistent with the 
prediction of the secondary hypothesis, dividend cuts seem to have more explanatory 
power on earnings changes than dividend increases. 
In the model of year 0, Panel A of Table 4.3 shows that both of the coefficients on 
dividend changes appear to be significantly positive. Nonetheless, the coefficient on 
dividend cuts is much larger than that on dividend increases. One percentage cut in 
dividends signals for 0.79 percentage of decline in current earnings while one 
percentage increase in dividends only indicates 0.05 percentage of increase in current 
earnings. The year-by-year results in Panel B of Table 4.3 corroborate the above 
evidence, revealing that the coefficients on dividend variables all appear to be positive 
throughout the sample years whereas those on dividend cuts are more significant than 
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those on dividend increases. 
Unlike the model for year 0, those for year 1 and year 2 provide little evidence 
supporting the prediction of the dividend signalling hypothesis. The coefficient on 
dividend cuts appears to be negative in both year 1 and year 2 model. Particularly, the 
one in the model of year 1 is marginally significant at ten percent level. Both of the 
coefficients on dividend increases are insignificant. The estimates in Panel B show 
that there are six out of 11 coefficients on dividend cuts appearing to be significantly 
negative for the model of year 1, while only one of the coefficients on dividend 
increases in Panel B is significant for the models of year 1 and year 2. The evidence 
implies that the rebound in the behaviour of earnings is more apparent for the 
dividend cuts, which is consistent with the results generated by the categorical 
analysis. However, one cannot tell from this model whether the rebound in earnings 
process results from the mean reversion or autocorrelation in earnings process since 
this model does not take these factors into account. This, therefore, makes the 
following models important in that they include the mean reversion and (or) 
autocorrelation variables to control for this noisy effect. 
Table 4.4 reports the estimates of the model introduced by Nissim and Ziv (2001). The 
model (see Eq. (4.6)) controls the autocorrelation of earnings changes and the omitted 
correlated variable problem35 . Nevertheless, the additional inclusion of the lagged 
returns on shareholders' equity (ROE) and the earnings changes in year 0 as the 
explanatory variables has only little impact on the results except the improvement in 
the adjusted R squares. The underlying indication is that the new variables possess 
35 Nissim and Ziv (2001) suggest that high returns on shareholders' equity (ROE) imply decreases in 
expected earnings. Besides, dividend changes are positive correlated with current ROE, resulting in the 
expected changes in earnings would negatively relate to dividend changes. Thus, including ROE as the 
explanatory variables could control for this plausible relation. 
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some explanatory power on future earnings changes, but none is significant enough. 
For the model of year 1, the coefficient on dividend increases variable rises a little and 
that on dividend cuts turns to be positive. The rebound in the behaviour of earnings 
seems to be controlled in this model. The estimates in Panel B confirm this result. A 
number of coefficients on dividend cuts which appear significantly negative in Panel 
B of Table 4.3 become insignificant or even turn into positive. However, the 
coefficients on dividend increases still remain insignificant for each of the annual 
cross-sectional model. As for the model of year 2, both of the coefficients on dividend 
increases and cuts remain negative. Nevertheless, none of these coefficients are 
significant. From the estimates in Panel B, it is shown that most of the coefficients on 
dividend increases and dividend cuts are insignificant for the cross-sectional model of 
each sample year. These results suggest that dividend changes are not associated with 
the earnings changes in year 2. Overall, the estimation of the second model does not 
find the obvious links between dividend changes and future earnings changes as those 
found by Nissim and Ziv (2001). 
Table 4.5 illustrates the estimates of the third multivariate model (see Eq. (4.7)) which 
includes the linear variables of the mean reversion and the autocorrelation developed 
by Farna and French (2000). Comparing the model for Table 4.3, the adjusted R 
squares in Table 4.5 are improved notably for all the three models. However, Panel A 
presents that, for the model of year 0, the coefficients on dividend increases and cuts 
drop a little and that on dividend increases becomes insignificant. This may result 
from that a partial of the explanatory power of dividend increases and cuts are 
absorbed by the new adding variables. The estimates in Panel B present that although 
eight out of 11 coefficients on dividend increases for year 0 appear to be positive, 
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only one is significant. By comparison, the coefficients on dividend cuts appear 
significantly positive for eight out of 11 yearly models. This is consistent with the 
secondary hypothesis which proposes that, since managers are reluctant to cut 
dividends, dividend cuts provide more information about earnings than dividend 
mcreases. 
After controlling for the linear mean reversion and autocorrelation in earnings process, 
Panel A of Table 4.5 shows that the coefficient on dividend cuts for the model of year 
1 appears significantly positive at ten percent significance level. The coefficient on 
dividend increases for the model of year 1 remains positive but insignificant. In Panel 
B, most of the coefficients on dividend increases and dividend cuts for year 1 are 
insignificant except the one on dividend cuts for year 1994. Similarly, in Panel A, the 
coefficients on the dividend variables for year 2 model are positive but insignificant. 
Most of the coefficients on the dividend variables for the model of year 2 in Panel B 
also appear to be insignificant. The lack of statistical significance on the coefficients 
for year 1 and year 2 indicates that both dividend increases and dividend cuts do not 
possess manifest explanatory power on future earnings changes. The evidence does 
not support the dividend signalling hypothesis which states that dividends are 
informative for future earnings performance. 
Since Fama and French (2000) suggest that extreme changes in earnings reverse faster 
than normal changes, the third model which only considers the linear mean reversion 
and autocorrelation in earnings process may not be sufficient. The fourth model (see 
Eq. (4.9)) further considers the extreme changes in earnings process and additionally 
includes the square of the lagged DFE (the deviation of returns on equity from its 
expected value) and the square of the lagged CE (earnings changes) to control the 
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non-linearity of the mean reversion and autocorrelation in earnings process. 
Table 4.6 shows that the inclusion of these variables only makes the evidence in a 
little different from, but not contrary to, that m Table 4.5. Consistent with the 
prediction on current earnings changes, Panel A shows that the coefficients on 
dividend increases and dividend cuts are both significantly positive in the model of 
year 0, indicating that both dividend increases and dividend cuts are informative for 
current earnings performance even after considering the mean reversion and 
autocorrelation in earnings process. In year 0, the higher significance level (t statistic 
equals 5.38) and the larger coefficient (0.3890) on the dividend cuts, comparing with 
the coefficient on the dividend increases, reveal that the signals from the dividend cuts 
is stronger than that from the dividend increases. The magnitude of earnings declines 
along with one percentage of dividend cuts is much larger than that of the earnings 
increases along with the same percentage of dividend increases. More specifically, 
one percent of dividend cuts approximately represent 0.38 percent of earnings 
declines. Nonetheless, one percent of dividend increases only represent 0.05 percent 
of earnings increases. This finding supports the hypothesis which predicts that 
dividend cuts are more informative for the earnings changes. 
As for the models of year 1 and year 2, the test does not detect significant relation 
between dividend changes and future earnings changes. The estimates in Panel A of 
Tabel 4.6 indicate that none of the coefficients on the dividend variables are 
significant for the models of year 1 or year 2. The only significant variable in these 
models are the lagged earnings changes, indicating that the lagged earnings changes 
are more informative for future earnings changes than the dividend changes. This is 
implicitly consistent with Miller and Rock's argument (1985) for dividend 
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announcement effect, which proposes that dividends only provide m1ssmg 
information about current earnings, and the market uses this information to update 
their expectations about future earnings. This indirect route makes the dividends seem 
to be informative for future earnings. 
To conclude, with the prudent controls over the mean reversiOn and the 
autocorrelation in earnings process, the findings present the evidence about the 
relations between dividend and earnings changes. The evidence, supporting the 
prediction of the dividend signalling hypothesis on current earnings, suggests that 
dividend changes are associated with the information about current earnings changes. 
Furthermore, consistent with the prediction ofthis chapter, dividend cuts are found to 
be more informative for earnings changes than dividend increases. This evidence may 
result from managers' reluctance to cut dividends (Lintner, 1956). The findings in this 
section are consistent with the findings of Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler ( 1997) and 
Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005) for the US market but inconsistent 
with the findings ofNissim and Ziv (2001). 
4·5·3· Influence of earnings changes on firms' dividend decisions 
Different from the above examinations which focus on the relation between dividend 
changes and earnings changes, the estimations of the logit model focus on whether the 
earnings performance have any influence on the firms' dividend decisions. Generally, 
the evidence indicates that the changes in current earnings are the determinative factor 
affecting the dividend decisions. However, the influence of the future earnings 
changes is not observed in this examination. 
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The estimates of the binary logit model are presented in Table 4.7. The dependent 
variable equals zero for dividend cuts and one for dividend increases. The signalling 
hypothesis predicts that earnings increases (cuts) should promote manager's 
propensity to increase (cut) dividends. Consequently, the coefficients on the earnings 
changes are expected to be positive. The Column 1 estimates shows that the 
coefficient of the current earnings changes is significantly positive, suggesting that the 
performance of the current earnings is considered when making dividend decisions. 
By contrast, in Column 2 and Column 3, when the variable of future earnings is alone 
in the model, both of the coefficients on the future earnings appear to be positive but 
insignificant. The Z statistics for these coefficients are only 0.04 and 0.05 respectively, 
which indicates that the variables of future earnings almost do not possess predictive 
power on dividend decisions. In addition, the log-likelihood in Column 2 and Column 
3 are larger negative than in Column 1, indicating the current earnings are the better 
predictor on the dividend decisions. 
In Column 4 and Column 5, the model jointly examines the explanatory power of the 
current and future earnings changes on the dividend decisions. The findings only 
support the prediction of the signalling hypothesis on current earnings changes. The 
estimates show that the coefficient of the current earnings changes remains significant 
and it remains positive and significant as it does in Column 1. The joint inclusion of 
the future earnings variables does not affect the predictive power of the current 
earnings changes on managers' dividend decisions. Moreover, the coefficients on 
future earnings are both negative but insignificant. The evidence again suggests that 
managers only think about the current earnings performance when they make 
dividend decisions. The future earnings performance is not taken into account when 
deciding dividend payments. 
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Overall, the evidence in Table 4. 7 indicates that the current earnings changes are the 
important determinant of the managers' dividend decisions, which agrees with the 
evidence provided by the multivariate regression models. By contrast, the dividend 
decisions do not seem to be influenced by the future earnings changes. These findings 
coincide with the fmdings of Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Grullon, 
Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005), suggesting that dividend changes do not signal 
for the future. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter aims to find out the associations of dividend signalling with current and 
future earnings performance. The signalling hypothesis predicts that dividend changes 
signal for the information about future earnings beyond the information about current 
earnings. To test this hypothesis, the chapter applies 1) the categorical analysis to 
compare the earnings performance with different dividend decisions, 2) the regression 
analysis to examine the associations of dividend changes with current and future 
earnings changes and 3) the logit model to test the influence of earnings changes on 
dividend decisions. 
The signalling hypothesis, however, is only partially supported by this chapter as the 
findings of this chapter indicate that the dividend changes only represent the current 
earnings performance. This evidence is robust regardless of the uses of the methods or 
the models. Even after controlling the mean reversion and autocorrelation in earnings 
process, the relation between dividends and current earnings are still explicit. On the 
other hand, the findings of this chapter reject the argument that dividends signal for 
future earnings. The only evidence found for this context is provided by the regression 
model which only consists of the linear mean-reversion and autocorrelation variables 
(i.e. Eq. (4.7)), but the evidence disappears after the non-linear variables are 
included36• These findings are consistent with the findings of Benartzi, Michaely, and 
Thaler (1997) and Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005). 
Furthermore, as suggested by Lintner (1956) that managers are reluctant to cut 
dividends, the secondary hypothesis predicts that dividend cuts should be more 
36 See Eq. (4.9). 
Chapter 4 Dividend Signalling and Information about Earnings 
informative than dividend increases. The evidence of this chapter supports this 
hypothesis, showing that, given the same magnitude of dividend changes, dividend 
cuts signal for larger earnings changes than dividend increases. This finding likewise 
agrees with the findings of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner ( 1996) and Brook, 
Charlton, and Hendershott (1998). 
With respect to the negative relation between dividend changes and future earnings 
changes in the categorical analysis, the evidence of the regression analysis shows that 
the negative relation are mostly caused by the mean reversion and autocorrelation in 
earnings process. The underlying reason is that after controlling the mean reversion 
and autocorrelation in earnings process, the negative relation disappears or mitigates. 
Unequivocally, this chapter concludes that dividend changes only have prominent and 
positive relation with the changes in current earnings. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the distributions and the frequencies of dividend and earnings variables. Panel A presents the mean and median as well as the 151 percentile (PI), lOth 
percentile (PlO), 151 quartile (Q1), 3rd quartile (Q3), 90th percentile and 99th percentile (P99) for earnings changes and dividend changes. Earnings changes are defined as the 
raw changes in annual earnings divided by the book value per share of the event year. Dividend changes represent the percentage changes of annual dividends. Panel B 
presents the frequencies of five categories of dividend changes for each sample year. Panel C is a two-way cross table, which presents the numbers of firm-year observations 
for the intersectional categories of dividend and earnings changes. Each cell in Panel C contains three numbers. The first number on the top represents the numbers of the 
observations for each intersectional category. The second number in the middle shows the proportion of the different dividend categories for an earnings category while the 
third number on the bottom presents the proportion of the different earnings categories for a dividend category. 
Panel A: The distributions of earnings and dividend variables 
Variables Mean P1 PlO Ql Median Q3 P90 P99 
Earning Changes 0.0168 -0.3248 -0.0678 -0.0106 0.0174 0.0504 0.1014 0.3393 
Dividend Cuts > 25% -0.1088 -1.1985 -0.3066 -0.1705 -0.0698 0.0000 0.0378 0.2703 
Dividend Cuts ;;;;; 25% -0.0074 -0.2554 -0.1376 -0.0455 -0.0099 0.0274 0.0481 0.7552 
Dividend Continuations -0.0363 -0.4487 -0.1245 -0.0685 -0.0245 0.0054 0.0367 0.2744 
Dividend Increases ;;;;; 25% 0.0182 -0.2398 -0.0384 -0.0025 0.0176 0.0420 0.0782 0.2601 
Dividend Increases > 25% 0.0800 -0.1663 -0.0033 0.0287 0.0610 0.1075 0.1800 0.5394 
Dividend Changes 0.2301 -0.6667 0.0000 0.0410 0.1200 0.2172 0.4865 2.6191 
Dividend Cuts > 25% -0.5258 -0.9783 -0.7961 -0.6456 -0.5000 -0.3856 -0.2968 -0.2508 
Dividend Cuts ~ 25% -0.1534 -0.2500 -0.2428 -0.2210 -0.1467 -0.1020 -0.0467 -0.0037 
Dividend Increases ;;;;; 25% 0.1264 0.0154 0.0476 0.0828 0.1201 0.1691 0.2068 0.2500 
Dividend Increases > 25% 0.8953 0.2527 0.2811 0.3333 0.4706 0.7391 1.4832 10.4964 
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Table 4.1 - Continued 
Panel B: The frequencies of dividend changes by years 
Years DPS Cuts > 25% DPS Cuts ;;:;; 25% DPS Continuations DPS lncreases;;:;;25% DPS Increases > 25% Total 
1989 5 2 31 173 134 345 
1990 14 6 38 191 100 349 
1991 22 6 82 173 58 341 
1992 30 7 87 162 28 314 
1993 26 11 66 148 37 288 
1994 16 4 49 180 32 281 
1995 5 3 27 177 65 277 
1996 11 3 28 184 65 291 
1997 7 6 24 181 44 262 
1998 3 6 17 166 32 224 
1999 3 2 7 132 32 176 
Total for Category 142 56 456 1867 627 3148 
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Panel C: The frequencies of the observations by dividend and earnings changes 
DPS Increases DPS Increases 
DPS Cuts> 25% DPS Cuts ;;i; 25% DPS Continuations Total 
;;i;25% >25% 
N 103 30 307 497 71 1008 
EarningS • Declines % within EPS Categories 10.22 2.98 30.46 49.31 7.04 100.00 
% within DPS Categories 72.54 53.57 67.32 26.62 11.32 32.02 
N 5 2 6 6 3 22 
Earnings Continuations % within EPS Categories 22.73 9.09 27.27 27.27 13.64 100.00 
%within DPS Categories 3.52 3.57 1.32 0.32 0.48 0.70 
N 34 24 143 1364 553 2118 
Earnings Increases % within EPS Categories 1.61 1.13 6.75 64.40 26.11 100.00 
% within DPS Categories 23.94 42.86 31.36 73.06 88.20 67.28 
N 142 56 456 1867 627 3148 
Total % within EPS Categories 4.51 1.78 14.49 59.31 19.92 100.00 
% within DPS Categories 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 4.2: The comparisons of unexpected earnings by dividend changes 
This table compares the unexpected earnings per share for the three-year period starting from the year 
of dividend payment. Dividend changes are the difference of the dividend per share for the previous 
year and the dividend per share for the current year as a percentage of the dividend per share for the 
previous year. There are five categories grouped according to the dividend changes. The "N" denotes 
the numbers of firm-year observations in each category. 
Panel A presents the results of the raw earnings changes which are used as the proxy for the unexpected 
earnings. The raw earnings changes are computed by earnings difference between year t (year 0 is the 
event year) and year t-1 deflated by the book value per share of year t-1. The unexpected earnings in 
Panel B are defined as the raw earnings changes for year t minus the 3-year average raw earnings 
changes of year t-3 to year t-1. Panel C controls the raw earnings changes in year 0 and only employs 
the observations whose year 0 raw earnings changes are ±3 percentage points from the average raw 
earnings changes for the portfolio which does not change dividends. The test on statistical difference 
between the portfolios employs Student's t test for the means and Mann-Whitney U test for the 
medians. Statistical significant are compared to the mean (median) estimates of the portfolio which 
does not change dividends on year 0. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are marked with*, 
*"',and ***respectively. 
Panel A: Raw earnings changes as the proxy for the unexpected earnings 
YearO Year 1 Year2 
Div. Changes N 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Cut >25% 142 -0.1088*** -0.0698*** 0.0366··· 0.0116*** 0.0169 0.0185** 
Cut<=25% 56 -0.0074* -0.0099 .. -0.0187 -0.0031 0.0345 0.0219* 
Continuations 456 -0.0363 -0.0245 0.0062 0.0055 0.0210 0.0082 
Increase <=25% 1867 0.0182 ... 0.0176 ... 0.0118 0.0130 .. 0.0088 0.0100 
Increase >25% 627 o.o8oo··· 0.061o··· -0.0028 0.0253 ... -0.0059 0.0087 
Total 3148 
Panel B: Unexpected earnings adjusted by the average past earnings changes 
YearO Year 1 Year2 
Div. Changes N 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Cut>25% 77 -0.0726* -0.0385 0.0930 ... 0.0616 ... 0.0523 0.0594··· 
Cut <=25% 29 0.0544 ... 0.0232 .. -0.0014 0.0185 0.0439 0.0230 
Continuations 262 -0.0241 -0.0158 0.0301 0.0162 0.0511 0.0212 
Increase <=25% 955 0.0057 .. -0.0004··· 0.0161 -0.0003··· 0.0041 0.0011··· 
Increase >25% 180 0.0587··· 0.0290 ... -0.0073 •• -0.0110••• -0.0464 .. -0.0196 ... 
Total 1503 
201 
Table 4.2 - Continued 
Panel C: Raw earnings changes by controlling the earnings changes of year 0 
YearO Year 1 Year2 
Div. Change N 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Cut>25% 31 -0.0291 -0.0260 0.0316 0.0279 0.0078 0.0158 
Cut<=25% 20 -0.0283 -0.0283 -0.0068 -0.0082 0.0318 0.0182 
Continuations 466 -0.0363 -0.0245 0.0062 0.0055 0.0210 0.0082 
Increase <=25% 373 -0.0205··· -0.0156** -0.0034 0.0044 0.0124 0.0080 
Increase >25% 53 -0.0174··· -0.0144 0.0302 0.0071 -0.0443 0.0105 
Total 943 
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Table 4.3: The relations between dividends and earnings performance 
This table reports the estimates of regression models which regress raw earnings changes for years 0, 1 
and 2 on dividend changes for year 0 (the event year). The raw earnings changes for year t (CEJ are 
computed by earnings difference between year t and year t-1 deflated by the book value per share at the 
end of year t-1. 6Div0 is the rate of dividend changes, which is computed as the difference of the 
dividend per share for year -1 and the dividend per share for year 0 as a percentage of the dividend per 
share for year -1. DPC0 (DNC0) is a dummy, which equals I when dividend increases (decrease) in year 
0, and equals 0 otherwise. 
The models employ the estimation procedure for panel data suggested by Fama and Macbeth (I973). 
Panel B presents the results of the initial stage of the procedure. The cross-sectional regression 
coefficients are estimated for each year from I989 to 1999. Panel A, which presents the results of the 
second stage, shows the mean regression coefficients estimated by averaging the annual cross-sectional 
coefficients of each year in Panel B. The t-statistics for the mean coefficients are defmed as the mean 
divided by its standard error (time-series standard deviation of the coefficient divided by 11 112). All 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.0 I are marked with *, * *, 
and*** respectively. 
(4.5) 
Panel A: Time-serial means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients 
Year Po PIP PIN Adj-R2 
0.0215. 0.0496 .. 0.7868 ... 0.1114 ... 
t = 0 
(1.8211) (3.0534) (3.4801) (3.2346) 
-0.0536 ... 0.0147 -0.9910 0.0267' 
t = 1 
(-3.6825) (0.9082) (-1.6823) (2.1375) 
-0.0170 -0.0153 -0.4370 0.0067 
t=2 
(-1.0863) (-1.2927) (-1.3090) (1.5570) 
Panel B: Annual cross-sectional regression coefficients of dividend changes 
t= 0 t = 1 t = 2 
Year 
PIP PIN PIP PIN PIP PIN 
0.0368 2.4181 ... 0.0063 -0.2445 ... -0.0503··· 0.0878 
1989 
(0.9473) (10.2696) (0.7190) (-5.0626) (-3.4046) (1.0745) 
0.0032 0.2712 ... -0.0005 -0.0625 0.0018 -0.1047* 
1990 
(1.2736) (7.6288) (-0.0981) (-0.9970) (0.4117) (-1.7713) 
0.0178. O.I906 ... 0.0058 -0.1089. 0.0305 -0.0159 
1991 
(1.7614) (4.5909) (0.3948) (-1.8985) (0.7124) (-0.0956) 
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0.1074 .. 0.1981 ... 
-0.0108 -0.1112 0.0006 0.3261 .. 
1992 
(2.3296) (4.0416) (-0.1464) (-1.4521) (0.0041) (2.1094) 
0.0827 0.2366 ... 0.0445 -0.1111 -0.0732 -0.1351 
1993 
(1.1171) (2.6974) (0.4931) (-1.0881) (-0.3565) (-0.5822) 
0.0202 0.5836*** 0.0510 -5.1956 ... -0.0148 0.3728 
1994 
(0.9108) (7.6194) (0.1531) (-4.7692) (-0.1271) (0.9778) 
0.0165 1.8798 ... 0.0046 -1.0659 ... 0.0090 -3.6273··· 
1995 
(0.6819) (15.2965) (0.1624) (-7.3943) (0.0434) (-3.4491) 
0.1627 0.5435* 0.0914 -4.4275··· 0.0094 -0.6021 
1996 
(1.4657) (1.7926) (0.2728) (-4.8249) (0.0411) (-0.9638) 
0.0945 0.7001 ... 0.0795 0.5240 -0.0932 -0.3655 
1997 
(0.5794) (2.9473) (0.1966) (0.8065) (-0.4451) (-1.0864) 
0.0004 0.3769··· -0.0025 0.6069 0.0001 -0.6460 ... 
1998 
(0.0415) (3.5258) (-0.0448) (1.0695) (0.0048) (-3.2808) 
0.0036 1.2565*** -0.1079 -0.7046' 0.0116 -0.0974 
1999 
(0.0345) (5.4843) (-0.5926) (-1.7725) (0.2088) (-0.7999) 
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Table 4.4: The relations between dividends and earnings performance by 
controlling the autocorrelation and the omitted correlated variable problem 
This table reports the estimates of the regression models, which regress raw earnings changes for years 
I and 2 on dividend changes on year 0 (the event year) as well as Jag earnings and raw earnings 
changes for year 0. The raw earnings changes for year t (CEt) are computed by annual earnings 
difference between year t and year t-I as a percentage of the book value per share of year t-1. 6Div0 is 
the rate of dividend changes, which is computed as the difference of the dividend per share for year -I 
and the dividend per share for year 0 as a percentage of the dividend per share for year -I. DPCo 
(DNC0) is a dummy, which equals I when dividend increases (decrease) in year 0, and equals 0 
otherwise. R0Et. 1 is the ratio of earnings to book value of common equity on year t-I. 
The models employ the estimation procedure for panel data suggested by Fama and Macbeth (1973). 
Panel B presents the results of the initial stage of the procedure. The cross-sectional regression 
coefficients are estimated for each year from I989 to I999. Panel A, which presents the results of the 
second stage, shows the mean regression coefficients estimated by averaging the annual cross-sectional 
coefficients of each year in Panel B. The t-statistics for the mean coefficients are defined as the mean 
divided by its standard error (time-series standard deviation of the coefficient divided by 11 112). All 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are marked with *, **, 
and *** respectively. 
Panel A: Time-serial means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients 
Year flo fJJp /lJN /32 fJJ Adj-R2 
0.1151 0.0233 0.0045 -0.8089 0.2713 0.1353··· 
t =I 
(0.9658) (1.3983) (0.0226) (-1.2196) (0.5758) (3.3239) 
0.1255 -0.0045 -0.1168 -0.8292 -0.0872 O.l42I* 
t = 2 
(1.4281) (-0.3734) (-0.8594) (-1. 7009) (-0.9879) (2.5059) 
Panel B: Annual cross-sectional regression coefficients of dividend changes 
t =I t= 2 
Year 
/lJP /lJN /lJP /lJN 
0.0 Ill 0.0135 -0.0315 •• 0.1332 
1989 
(1.4485) (0.2503) (-2.3154) (1.4169) 
-0.0013 -0.0469 0.0014 -0.0209 
1990 
(-0.3427) (-0.8220) (0.3344) (-0.3355) 
0.0068 -0.0707 0.0455 0.2584 
1991 
(0.4734) (-1.1337) (l.II22) (1.4843) 
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0.0143 -0.0021 0.0445 0.0931 
1992 
(0.1987) (-0.0269) (0.6555) (1.2587) 
0.0636 0.0633 -0.0506 -0.0153 
1993 
(0.7025) (0.5662) (-0.241 0) (-0.0596) 
0.0207 -0.98oo··· 0.0077 -0.0724 
1994 
(0.2764) (-3.4226) (0.1484) (-0.3656) 
0.0090 0.1420 -0.0183 -1.3008 
1995 
(0.3652) (0.8777) (-0.1302) (-1.4123) 
0.1015 -1.0295 0.0257 0.0909 
1996 
(0.3633) (-1.2690) (0.1137) (0.1413) 
0.1139 1.4491 .. -0.0859 0.1742 
1997 
(0.2489) (2.0570) (-0.3830) (0.5193) 
0.0084 0.3143 -0.0009 -0.5931 ... 
1998 
(0.1630) (0.5687) (-0.0503) (-3.0474) 
-0.0913 0.1961 0.0129 -0.0324 
1999 
(-0.5316) (0.4746) (0.2317) (-0.2495) 
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Table 4.5: The relations between dividends and earnings performance by 
controlling the linear mean reversion and autocorrelation effects 
This table reports the estimates of the regression models, which regress raw earnings changes for years 
0, 1 and 2 on dividend changes on year 0 (the event year) as well as mean reversion and autocorrelation 
variables. The raw earnings changes for year t (CEt) are computed by annual earnings difference 
between year t and year t-1 as a percentage of the book value per share of year t-1. 6Div0 is the rate of 
dividend changes, which is computed as the difference of the dividend per share for year -1 and the 
dividend per share for year 0 as a percentage of the dividend per share for year -1. DPC0 (DNC0) is a 
dummy, which equals I when dividend increases (decrease) in year 0, and equals 0 otherwise. DFEt 
denotes the deviation of the returns on equity from its expected value, which is predicted by market 
value, market-to-book ratio, total sales adjusted by total assets, and lagged returns on equity. 
The models employ the estimation procedure for panel data suggested by Fama and Macbeth (1973). 
Panel B presents the results of the initial stage of the procedure. The cross-sectional regression 
coefficients are estimated for each year from I989 to I999. Panel A, which presents the results of the 
second stage, shows the mean regression coefficients estimated by averaging the annual cross-sectional 
coefficients of each year in Panel B. The t-statistics for the mean coefficients are defined as the mean 
divided by its standard error (time-series standard deviation of the coefficient divided by 11 112). All 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are marked with *, * *, 
and*** respectively. 
Panel A: Time-serial means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients 
Year flo fJJp fJJN Y1 .i\1 Adj-R2 
O.II8I •• 0.0254 0.4245··· 0.0119 0.4849. 0.2711··· 
t = 0 
(2.2845) (0.7I52) (5.23I6) (0.0401) (1.9142) (4.I587) 
0.0936 0.0348 0.2269. 0.644I 0.6009 0.1693··· 
t =I 
(0.8318) (1.1651) (1.7615) (0.6820) (1.4082) (3.8912) 
0.0389 O.OI85 O.I778 0.0086 0.7089 •• 0.2I99··· 
t= 2 
(0.6522) (0.8635) (I.2527) (0.0342) (2.4064) (2.8037) 
Panel B: Annual cross-sectional regression coefficients of dividend changes 
t= 0 t =I t= 2 
Year 
fJJp fJJN fJJp fJJN fJJp fJJN 
0.1295··· O.I951 •• 
-O.OI06 0.0581 -0.0457 -0.0776 
1989 
(2.7223) (2.1I43) (-0.4728) (0.297I) (-1.61I2) (-0.7223) 
0.0020 0.345o·· O.OOI7 -O.OI29 -0.0273 0.1524 
1990 
(0.2572) (2.2682) (0.17IO) (-0.1331) (-0.4959) (0.2881) 
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-0.0001 0.2491··· -0.0176 -0.1602 0.0152 0.5415 
1991 
(-0.0074) (3.5920) (-0.3440) (-0.3955) (0.2208) (1.0372) 
-0.2252 0.3487 0.0865 0.2594 0.0075 -0.5290 
1992 
(-0.3831) (1.3617) (0.3989) (1.1106) (0.0354) (-1.3607) 
0.1879 0.8323 ... -0.0449 -0.1822 0.1989 0.2645 
1993 
(1.0262) (3.8018) (-0.1724) (-0.5038) (0.7551) (0.8707) 
0.1244 0.2464 0.0156 0.7176** -0.0281 0.2861 
1994 
(0.4133) (0.6891) (0.4108) (2.5648) (-0.9666) (1.0150) 
0.0202 0.8466 ... -0.0054 -0.0961 0.0331 1.2196* 
1995 
(0.1946) (2.7415) (-0.1370) (-0.2736) (0.4663) (1.9471) 
0.1238 -0.0252 0.0479 -0.0946 -0.0063 0.0285 
1996 
(0.7201) (-0.0443) (1.1 086) (-0.3040) (-0.1407) (0.1290) 
0.0057 0.6097 ... -0.0110 0.1768 -0.0229 0.2938 
1997 
(0.2069) (3.2495) (-0.3814) (0.6214) (-0.1088) (0.4070) 
-0.1064 0.4878 .. 0.0063 1.0224 -0.0148 0.2126 
1998 
(-0.5248) (2.3970) (0.1550) (1.3317) (-0.6405) (0.4532) 
0.0175 0.5334. 0.3142 0.8072 0.0940 -0.4364 
1999 
(0.3052) (1.8546) (0.3427) (0.1108) (0.9391) (-0.6837) 
., 
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Table 4.6: The relations between dividends and earnings performance by 
controlling the non-linear mean reversion and autocorrelation effects 
This table reports the estimates of the regression models, which regress raw earnings changes for years 
0, I and 2 on dividend changes on year 0 (the event year) as well as mean reversion and autocorrelation 
variables. The raw earnings changes for year t (CEJ are computed by annual earnings difference 
between year t and year t-I as a percentage of the book value per share of year t-1. ,0,Div0 is the rate of 
dividend changes, which is computed as the difference of the dividend per share for year -I and the 
dividend per share for year 0 as a percentage of the dividend per share for year -I. DPC0 (DNC0) is a 
dummy, which equals I when dividend increases (decrease) in year 0, and equals 0 otherwise. DFE1 
denotes the deviation of the returns on equity from its expected value, which is predicted by lagged 
total assets, lagged market-to-book ratio, and lagged returns on equity. SDFBt.1 and SCE1_1 respectively 
denote square DFEt-1 and square CE1.1. 
The model employs the estimation procedure for panel data suggested by Fama and Macbeth (I 973). 
Panel B presents the results of the initial stage of the procedure. The cross-sectional regression 
coefficients are estimated for each year from I989 to I999. Panel A, which presents the results of the 
second stage, shows the time-series mean of cross-sectional coefficients in Panel B. The t-statistics for 
the mean coefficients are defined as the mean divided by its standard error (time-series standard 
deviation of the coefficient divided by 11 112). All t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are marked with*,**, and*** respectively. 
CE1 = {30 + f31p DPC0 x tllJiv0 + /31N DNC0 x tllJiv0 (4.9) 
+y1DFEH +y2SDFE,_1 +A,CE1_1 +~SCE1_1 +e1 
Panel A: Time-serial means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients 
Year Po PIP PJN Y1 Y2 A. I A.] Adj-R2 
-0.0622 o.o55o·· o.389o··· -0.2948* 1.6576 1.4042··· -0.5774 0.3687··· 
t= 0 
(-1.36I9) (2.4562) (5.3845) (-1.9598) (1.0374) (3.5359) (-0.6852) (4.9335) 
-0.2980 O.OI29 -O.lll5 -0.0667 1.9038 2.4972 -0.8912 0.273o··· 
t=I 
(-1.0333) (0.2574) (-0.6014) (-O.I445) (0.6344) (1.4267) (-0.4439) (5.9875) 
-0.0648 0.0044 -0.0653 0.0411 0.2113 1.2497*** 0.0514 0.3761 ... 
t= 2 
( -1.1464) (0.2547) (-0.6492) (0.0792) (0.2327) (3.7245) (0.0634) (4.7934) 
Panel B: Annual cross-sectional regression coefficients of dividend changes 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 
Year 
PIP PJN PIP PJN PIP PJN 
O.I543··· 0.1693. 
-0.0030 0.0746 -0.0451 -0.0968 
1989 
(3.3580) (1.9243) (-0.1207) (0.3654) (-1.5734) (-0.8580) 
0.0010 o.34oo·· 0.0016 -0.0100 -0.0495 0.2820 
1990 
(0.1212) (2.2356) (0.1648) (-0.0992) (-0.9550) (0.5694) 
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0.0018 0.2539 ... -0.0156 0.1517 0.0058 -0.0646 
1991 
(0.1528) (3.7222) (-0.3222) (0.3777) (0.1030) (-0.1500) 
0.1653 0.1301 -0.3188. -0.2719 0.0332 -0.0845 
1992 
(0.3174) (0.5730) (-1.7736) (-1.3754) (0.1595) (-0.2041) 
0.1293 0.7621 ... 0.0114 -0.1057 0.0449 -0.0075 
1993 
(0.8630) (3.9486) (0.0440) (-0.2901) (0.1741) (-0.0237) 
0.0926 0.3225 0.0084 0.4294 -0.0352 0.3527. 
1994 
(0.3107) (0.9078) (0.2254) (1.4870) ( -1.6149) (1.6692) 
0.0560 0.7169 .. 0.0061 0.2571 0.0187 0.2117 
1995 
(0.5516) (2.3511) (0.1810) (0.8344) (0.3202) (0.3986) 
0.0456 0.0257 0.0413 -0.1580 -0.0230 0.1770 
1996 
(0.4670) (0.0795) (0.9444) (-0.4962) (-0.5336) (0.8172) 
0.0190 0.5276 ... -0.0100 0.1547 -0.0425 -0.4141 
1997 
(0.7222) (2.8818) (-0.3528) (0.5492) (-0.2174) (-0.5976) 
-0.0781 0.4719 .. 0.0015 0.1199 -0.0067 -0.7714 
1998 
(-0.3909) (2.3502) (0.0386) (0.1474) (-0.3441) (-1.8277) 
0.0184 0.5590 .. 0.4194 -1.8680 0.1483 -0.3025 
1999 
(0.3282) (1.9929) (0.5839) (-0.3270) (2.0415) (-0.6551) 
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Table 4.7: The influence of earnings performance on firms' dividend decisions 
This table presents the estimates of binary logit models. The dependent variable is equal to zero for 
dividend cuts (k) and one for dividend increases (j). The explanatory variables are the earnings changes 
for year 0 (the event year, CE0), year 1 (CE1) and (or) year 2 (CE2). Log-likelihood measures how well 
the models fit the data. The less negative the value the better the fit. Wald chi-square statistics test the 
null hypothesis stating that all coefficients equal to 0. The p-value on the bottom of the table indicates 
the significance level of Wald test. The value in parentheses is the Z statistic for each coefficient. 
Statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are marked with*,**, and*** respectively. 
. [ P, (j)] f3' Log1t Model: Lit = Ln -- = xi/ 
P;, (k) Vk*j 
(4.14) 
~ 1 2 3 4 5 
CEo 
6.6423*** 6.5527*** 6.4981 *** 
(8.91) (8.83) (8.77) 
0.0102 -0.0731 -0.0826 
CEI (0.04) (-0.25) (-0.29) 
0.0084 -0.0299 
CE2 (0.05) ( -0.17) 
2.8492*** 2.7749 2.7829 2.8436*** 2.8568*** 
Intercept (17.69) (19.34) (19.34) (17.75) (17.65) 
Log-Likelihood -595.4527 -645.0192 -639.0735 -588.5857 -583.4896 
WaldX2 79.38*** 0.00 0.00 78.22*** 77.24*** 
p-value 0.0000 0.9665 0.9589 0.0000 0.0000 
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Chapter 5 
Managerial Motives and Shareholders' 
Wealth Effect of Share Repurchases 
5.1. Introduction 
Share repurchases (i.e. share buybacks), an alternative payout mechanism to cash 
dividends, have grown the increasing popularity among payout devices for many 
firms. Firms distribute cash for buying back a certain proportion of their own shares 
from shareholders by share repurchases. Unlike cash dividends, share repurchases are 
not expected to be a recurring or regular event, and thus are viewed as a more flexible 
payout mechanism. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) indicate that, in 
financial executives' point of view, share repurchases are a "very flexible" payout 
policy which they do not need to smooth through time. Another element making share 
repurchases a flexible policy is that firms which announce share repurchases are not 
obligated to accomplish in the future. Since these flexibility natures are inherent in 
share repurchases, firms which announce repurchase programmes may have different 
motives and characteristics from those which announce cash dividends. 
To date, the evidence about the motives for announcing share repurchases and the 
market reactions to the announcements is extensively documented for the US share 
repurchases while still little attention has yet been paid to the UK share repurchases. 
However, given the different taxation and regulations, investors' appetite and 
managers' employment of share repurchases in the UK may be divergent from those 
in the US. Consequently, this chapter is important in that it aims to provide 
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incremental and innovative evidence for the share repurchases in the UK market. 
In addition, for the UK share repurchases, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) already examine 
the shareholders' wealth effect around the UK repurchase announcements for various 
repurchase methods. However, it is criticised by Oswald and Young (2004) that Rau 
and Vermaelen's (2002) data are short on the numbers of share repurchase 
announcements. The study carried out by Oswald and Young (2004) use a more 
complete sample but they only focus on open market share repurchases. Neither of 
these two studies examines the shareholders' wealth effect of the announcements of 
tender offer share repurchases. As the findings in the US market suggest that different 
repurchase methods possess different signalling power37, this chapter is interested in 
understanding whether the same findings exist in the UK market under the different 
taxation and regulations framework. 
Furthermore, this chapter exammes various potential managerial motives, mainly 
focusing on signalling undervaluation, signalling firms' performance and substituting 
dividends, for announcing share repurchases. Recent studies on the UK share 
repurchases mainly examine shareholders' wealth effect38. However, since various 
motivations for announcing share repurchases have been suggested by the US 
findings 39 , examining only the shareholders' wealth effect is insufficient for 
understanding the managerial motives for announcing share repurchases. 
Moreover, for the UK market, this chapter creatively compares the managerial 
37 Comment and Jarrell (1991) show that the announcements of tender offer repurchases induce larger 
market reactions than the announcements of open market repurchases. In addition, prior evidence 
shows that the market responds significantly to the announcements of privately-negotiated repurchases 
(Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005; Bradley and Wakeman, 1983). 
38 See Rau and Vermaelen (2002), Oswald and Young (2004) and Rees (1996). 
39 See Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), Stonham (2002) and Badrinath, Varaiya, and 
Fer ling (200 1 ). 
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motives for announcing share repurchases to those for other payout decisions (e.g. no 
payouts, cash dividends, or both dividends and share repurchases). This comparison is 
important in that the findings help investors to understand the reasons why managers 
choose dividends or (and) share repurchases as the payout device. 
Of particular interest in this chapter are the examinations on the UK share repurchases 
focusing on: 
1. the market reactions to share repurchase announcements to understand whether 
the announcements are informative, 
2. the long-term pnce performance preceding and following share repurchase 
announcements to understand whether the undervaluation is a reason for 
announcing share repurchases and whether the wealth effect of share 
repurchases last during a long period after the announcements, and 
3. the managerial motives for making share repurchase and (or) dividend 
announcements to see whether managers make these announcements with the 
same intentions. 
Firstly, the market responses to share repurchase announcements are examined for the 
full sample and also for different share repurchase methods, including open market 
share repurchases, privately-negotiated repurchases and tender offer repurchases. The 
findings of this chapter demonstrate positive and significant abnormal returns 
associated with all the three repurchasing methods. Consistent with the previous US 
findings (Comment and Jarrell, 1991), the abnormal returns are larger positive around 
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tender offer share repurchase announcements than around the announcements of the 
other repurchasing methods. By comparison, the market reactions to open market 
repurchase announcements are the smallest amongst the three methods. The evidence 
of this chapter, therefore, implies that there is positive information implicit in share 
repurchase announcements regardless of the repurchasing methods. Moreover, the 
announcements of tender offer share repurchases are more informative than the 
others. 
Additionally, this chapter tests the long-term wealth effect to better understand in 1) 
whether the firms are under-priced before share repurchases announcements and 2) 
whether the share price has a long-term uptrend following the announcements. 
Intuitively, since firms and general shareholders are the counterparts of open market 
share repurchases, firms could often employ their superior information to buy back 
own shares with bargain prices. Hence, it could conceivably be hypothesised in this 
chapter that negative long-term abnormal returns precede and positive abnormal 
returns follow the open market repurchase announcements. 
By contrast, tender offer repurchases often offer a premium higher than the market 
price. If the undervaluation is the main purpose of making the tender offer 
repurchases, it is not necessary for the firms to offer the premium. Thus, signalling for 
the firms' performance may be the other implicit intention of tender offer repurchases. 
In addition, the tender offer repurchases are often completed within few months, it is 
not expected that the effect would last long. Consequently, it is possible to 
hypothesise for tender offer repurchases that the announcements are preceded by 
negative abnormal returns and followed by positive abnormal returns. However, the 
positive post-announcement wealth effect is predicted to diminish sooner than that 
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induced by open market repurchase announcements. 
Differently, privately-negotiated share repurchases are the only repurchases which 
firms do not deal with small shareholders. Interestingly, sometimes the share 
repurchases are even proposed by the large shareholders. As large shareholders are 
believed to possess more information than small shareholders, their intention to sell a 
large amount of their shares to the firms is not necessarily good news to the firms' 
shareholders. This chapter, consequently, tests the hypothesis predicting that the 
announcements are preceded by long-term negative abnormal returns but do not place 
definite prediction for the post-announcement abnormal returns which are determined 
by whether the large shareholders make a better trading decision than the firms. 
The findings of this chapter corroborate that the announcing firms generally have 
under-performing share prices for two years before they announce the share 
repurchases. Furthermore, the firms have long-term uptrend on abnormal returns 
subsequent to open market and privately-negotiated repurchase announcements. 
Based on the evidence, it is implied that the undervaluation of the firm value is an 
important factor inducing share repurchasing announcements, which is consistent with 
the prediction of the tested hypothesis. 
The third objective of this chapter is to understand the managerial motives for 
announcing share repurchases and comparing the various motives with those of 
announcing dividends. To this end, this chapter employs a multinomiallogit model to 
compare the motivations and characteristics of the firms with different payout 
decisions. The results of the test show that firms which announce only share 
repurchases are smaller in size, with higher debt ratios, less profitable, and with lower 
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market-to-book ratio than firms which announce dividends. Furthermore, firms which 
announce both dividends and share repurchases are found to be larger, with lower debt 
ratios, more profitable, more permanent in operating incomes, but with lower 
market-to-book ratio than firms which announce dividends. Taken together, the 
overall evidence from examining the multinomial logit model implies that firms are 
likely to make share repurchase announcements when they are conscious that their 
share price is undervalued. While the firms intend to signal for their supenor 
operating performance, they tend to impose dividend announcements, or both 
dividend and share repurchase announcements. In this case, solely announcing share 
repurchase announcements unlikely signal for operating performance. Besides, as the 
firms making the different payout announcements are divergent in firm characteristics, 
the evidence also rejects the hypothesis that share repurchases are made to substitute 
dividends. 
Chapter 5 is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature with respect to 
share repurchases. Data collection and the descriptive statistics for the sample 
employed are presented in the Section 5.3, followed by the section of methodology 
and hypotheses development. Section 5.5 presents the empirical results and Section 
5.6 concludes the findings ofthis chapter. 
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5.2. Background and prior evidence on share 
repurchases 
5.2.1. Regulations and taxation on share repurchases 
Regulations of share repurchases in the UK 
In the UK, repurchase programmes, after being approved at shareholders' meeting, 
could be carried out by the firms any time in the following 18-month period. Once 
repurchases are made, the details of the transactions need to be reported to the United 
Kingdom Listing Authority (UKLA) immediately. This provision, ensuring that the 
firms disclose the repurchase information to the market, simultaneously reduces the 
information asymmetry between the firms and the market. 
Another important thing is that the regulation also specifies the price range of share 
repurchases. The firms are allowed to buyback its own shares in the open market as 
long as 1) the shares sought do not exceed 15 percent of the number of outstanding 
shares and 2) the price paid is not more than five percent above the average price of 
those shares for the ten business days before the repurchase is made. For share 
repurchases exceeding 15 percent of the number of outstanding shares, the firms have 
to implement the programmes by tender offer. This regulatory approach prohibits 
firms' manipulating the share prices by share repurchases. 
Furthermore, the UK firms are only allowed to buyback their own shares by using 
distributable profits or the incomes from new issued shares40 . This ordinance ensures 
that the firms will not repurchase by increasing leverage and indirectly harming the 
4
° For example, the firms are not allowed to use the proceeds from debts to repurchase their own 
shares. 
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right of their bondholders or creditors. Finally, concerning about pre-empting rights of 
shareholders, the repurchase firms, under the Companies Regulations 2003, are 
required to cancel all shares repurchased. However, from 151 December 2003, the 
firms are allowed to hold up to ten percent of their own share in treasury. These 
treasury shares can be used for resale, employees' share scheme or cancellation. 
From the above regulatory provisions, some further notions could be found for this 
chapter. Firstly, the almost simultaneously informing investors about the 
announcements or the execution of share repurchases leaves managers' little chances 
to manipulate the share price by making share repurchases. It can thus be suggested 
that the fluctuation of shareholders' wealth around repurchase announcements in the 
UK market may be due to the changes of investors' evaluations on the shares. 
Additionally, similar to the US regulation on share repurchases, the firms in the UK 
market are not allowed to finance for share repurchases by using the proceeds of debts. 
The funds for share repurchases should be distributable profits or the incomes of 
issuing new shares. It indirectly provides a good opportunity to test the signalling 
hypothesis which predicts the announcements of share repurchases signal for higher 
earnings or profits. However, a notable difference between the UK and the US 
markets is that, in light of Companies Regulations 2003, repurchasing firms in the UK 
market have to cancel all the shares repurchased and it was not until 151 December 
2003 that treasury shares were allowed. It implies that, before 1st December 2003, the 
UK firms are unlikely to buyback their own share for employee' share scheme. 
Therefore, the undervaluation and signalling hypotheses become the main focus of 
this chapter since this chapter investigates the share repurchases during the period of 
1995 and 2004. 
219 
Chapter 5 Managerial Motives and Shareholders' Wealth Effect of Share Repurchases 
Taxation on share repurchases in the UK 
Taxation on share repurchases is another factor which may affect investors' appetite 
for different payout methods41 . In the UK, "advance corporation tax" (ACT), which, 
for firms, can be set against the firms' subsequent corporation tax liability, and, for 
shareholders, can be repayable as tax credit, used to play an important role in firms' 
payout policy before its abolishment on 6th April 1999. The changes of the tax 
regimes in the UK and its influence on investors' decisions on dividends and share 
repurchases are illustrated as the followings. 
Prior to 7th October 1996, firms, exclusive of making open market repurchases, are 
required to pay ACT when they distribute dividends or make share repurchases. 
Relatively, investors can only reclaim tax credit when cash is paid by dividends or 
off-market repurchase programmes, making open market repurchases less attractive to 
investors. From gth October 1996, a tax reform which no longer allows tax-exempt 
investors to reclaim the tax credits for the off-market repurchase makes tax-exempt 
investors become indifferent between off-market repurchases and open market 
repurchases. The tax credits for dividends are also eliminated from tax-exempt 
institutional investors after 2nd July 1997 and from all other tax-exempt investors after 
1st April 1999. The tax credits, after the abolishment of ACT on 6th April 1999, are 
only available for investors to offset against any tax which may due on their dividend 
incomes or capital gains from share repurchases42• 
Similarly, share repurchases in the US are taxed as capital gains but dividends are 
taxed as ordinary incomes. However, while tax credits made dividends more attractive 
41 See Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Oswald & Young (2004). 
42 In tax year 2004 to 2005, investors whose incomes are less than £36,145 or net capital gains are less 
than £8,200 are not required to pay further tax on dividends incomes or capital gains from share 
repurchases. 
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than share repurchases in the UK, the tax advantage possessed by the US share 
repurchases make them a preferred payout method, compared to dividends. Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) indicate that the US firms have gradually substituted share 
repurchases for dividends after Rule 1 Ob-18 provides a safe harbour for share 
repurchases. In the US, the maximum rate on capital gains dropped below the 
maximum rate on ordinary incomes in 1991. The long-term capital gains further 
dropped to 20 percent in 1997, resulting in significant increases in share repurchases 
(McGrattan and Prescott, 2005). Given the different tax effects on share repurchases 
in the UK and in the US, this chapter is therefore interested in understanding whether 
share repurchases, as what have been indicated in the US, are employed as a 
substitution for dividends in the UK. 
5.2 .2. Shareholders' wealth effect of repurchase announcements 
The wealth effect of share repurchase announcements has been extensively 
documented in the literature. Generally, markets respond positively to share 
repurchase announcements, but the magnitude of the responses are varied with the 
methods of share repurchases. This section focuses on discussing previous findings of 
short-term shareholders' wealth effect while prior evidence on long-term wealth effect 
is presented in Section 5.2.2 with undervaluation hypothesis. 
Examining the market reactions to tender offer repurchase announcements, Dann's 
( 1981) evidence indicates that, with the average 22.46 percent of tender offer 
premium, the cumulative abnormal returns on the day and the subsequent day of the 
announcements are 15.78 percent. Consistent with the findings of Dann (1981 ), 
Vermaelen (1981) and Masulis (1980) respectively detects 14.14 and 16.35 percent of 
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the two-day cumulative abnormal returns around the tender offer repurchase 
announcements. In 1991, Comment and Jarrell (1991), more specifically, examine the 
market reactions to Dutch-auction and fixed-price tender offer repurchases. Due to the 
different methods of determining the purchase prices43 , Comment and Jarrell (1991) 
predict that the market should respond more greatly to the fixed-price tender offer 
repurchases which provide larger premiums and more creditable signals. Consistent 
with their prediction, the firms which announce the fixed-price tender offer 
repurchases averagely earn 11 percent of abnormal returns which are significantly 
higher than eight percent earned by the firms announcing the Dutch-auction tender 
offer repurchases. 
By comparing the market reactions to tender offer repurchase and special dividend 
announcements, the findings of Howe, He, and Kao (1992) show that the market 
reactions to tender offer repurchase announcements are twice larger than those to 
special dividend announcements. Nevertheless, when they further examine the market 
reactions by Tobin's Q ratio, no significant differences between the market reactions 
to the high-Q firms and the low-Q firms are detected for both tender offer repurchase 
and special dividend announcements. Remarkably, their evidence on the market 
reactions to tender offer repurchase announcements supports the signalling theory but 
not the agency theory for share repurchases. Similar examinations are carried out by 
Chhachhi and Davidson (1997) with further considering preferential tax rate on share 
repurchases. After the tax reform which eliminates the tax advantage of tender offer 
repurchases, the cumulative abnormal returns around the tender offer repurchase 
announcements reduce about 2.5 percent which are still greater than the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the special dividend announcements. 
43 See Comment and Jarrell (1991), p. 1247. 
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In comparison to the shareholders' wealth effect of the tender offer repurchase 
announcements, the effect of the open market repurchase announcements is relatively 
small. Only two percent of the abnormal returns around the open market repurchase 
announcements is found by Comment and J arrell (1991) who detect eight and 11 
percent of the abnormal returns around the tender offer repurchase announcements. 
Recently, Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) also document higher market reactions to 
tender offer repurchase announcements, compared with the reactions to open market 
repurchase announcements. 
lkenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) focus on exam1mng open market 
repurchases and find that 1) the market reactions to the announcements are positively 
related to the fraction of share sought, and 2) the smaller the firm size of the 
announcing firms is, the greater the market reactions to the announcements are. The 
first evidence is consistent with the finding of Comment and Jarrell (1991) while the 
second evidence indicates that the market reactions to the announcements are 
dependent on information asymmetry. For the full sample, they present 3.54 percent 
of the cumulative abnormal returns during the five-day period centred on the 
announcement days. This evidence is also presented similarly by Otchere and Ross 
(2002) on examining the open market share repurchase announcements in Australia. 
Nonetheless, the five-day cumulative abnormal returns found by Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) for the UK market are only 1.38 percent which are much smaller than the 
above findings. 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) carry out a study which compares the market 
reactions to the open market repurchase announcements with different announcement 
frequencies. They find that the first announcements made in the preceding five years 
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(infrequent repurchases) induce the largest market reactions which are about 3.36 
percent of the three-day abnormal returns. By contrast, the second announcements 
only induce 1.98 percent and the third or the subsequent announcements only induce 
1.13 percent of the abnormal returns. By implication, these findings suggest that the 
market reactions shrink as the frequencies of the open market repurchase 
announcements increases. 
With respect to the market reactions to privately-negotiated share repurchase 
announcements, no abnormal returns existing around the announcement days are 
found by Rau and Vermaelen (2002). In 2005, more comprehensive examinations are 
carried out by Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) by focusing on the privately-negotiated 
repurchases with different repurchase premiums. Their findings show that, except the 
greenmail repurchases44, the market reacts positively to the announcements regardless 
of the repurchase premiums. However, the announcements with positive repurchase 
premiums induce larger market reactions than those with negative premiums. Peyer 
and Vermaelen (2005) attribute the difference of the market reactions to that the 
premium repurchases which may convey information to the market are more likely to 
be proposed by the firms. By contrast, the discounted repurchases, more likely to be 
initiated by the large shareholders, are not made for the intention of signalling. 
To conclude, markets, in general, react positively to share repurchase announcements, 
indicating that share repurchases signal for positive information to investors. 
Additionally, tender offer repurchase announcements averagely induce greater market 
reactions, compared with the other repurchase methods. Repurchase premiums of 
tender offer repurchases could be responsible for this finding. 
44 Greenmail repurchases are the repurchases which are made for anti-takeover. 
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5.2.3. Managerial motives for share repurchases 
Undervaluation hypothesis and long-term shareholders 'wealth effect 
The undervaluation hypothesis is a kind of signalling hypothesis, which predicts that 
the undervaluation of share prices is the motive for share repurchases. Previous 
studies indicate that managers possess more information about the firm's true current 
situation than outsiders do45 , leading to the possibility that the outsiders evaluate the 
firm value inaccurately. While managers, with more information, disagree with the 
performance of the share prices, they expect to get a positive response from the 
market by announcing share repurchase programmes. Moreover, the undervaluation 
hypothesis also predicts that the announcements are preceded by negative abnormal 
returns and sometimes followed by positive abnormal returns. 
A number of studies investigate this hypothesis by testing the long-term returns 
performance. Liano, Huang, and Manakyan (2003) compare the long-term abnormal 
returns of the repurchasing firms to their industry peers. Contrary to the prediction of 
the undervaluation hypothesis, the repurchasing firms are not found to outperform 
their industry peers in long-term returns performance during the post-announcement 
period. Similarly, in contrast to the prediction, Rau and Vermaelen's (2002) 
examination on the long-term return performance find negative abnormal returns 
preceding open market repurchase and privately-negotiated repurchase 
announcements but the returns are insignificant. Extending Rau and Vermaelen's 
(2002) study by using more comprehensive data, Oswald and Young's (2004) results 
present negative (positive) pre-announcement (post-announcement) abnormal returns, 
supporting the prediction of the undervaluation hypothesis. 
45 See Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1986). 
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Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) estimate long-term abnormal returns 
around open market repurchases in light of firm sizes and book-to-market ratios. The 
firm size is a proxy for asymmetric information while the book-to-market ratio is 
employed to indicate the level of undervaluation 46 . Their finding shows that the firms 
with high book-to-market ratio (value firms) averagely have higher compounded 
returns ( 45 percent) than the reference portfolio while the firms with lowest 
book-to-market ratio (glamour firms) only have an even market performance with 
their matched firms. This evidence, with the indication that the market revises their 
evaluation for the value firms after the share repurchase announcements while the 
revision is unlikely for the glamour firms, concludes that the undervaluation is an 
important reason motivating share repurchases for the value firms. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) further extend their tests on the open 
market share repurchases in Canada. Estimating the abnormal returns by using Fama 
and French's (1993) three-factor model, they find negative abnormal returns 
(averagely -0.348 percent per month) during the twelve-month period preceding the 
announcements and positive abnormal returns up to three years following the 
announcements. Furthermore, consistent with Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995), the value firms are found to have better post-announcement returns 
performance than the glamour firms. Besides, negative abnormal returns are also 
detected for the value firms during the twelve-month period preceding the 
announcements. 
In addition to the estimations on the long-term returns performance, Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) test the undervaluation hypothesis by examining 
46 High book-to-market ratio indicates the undervaluation of the firms. 
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the determinants of share repurchase completion rates. The evidence to emerge from 
their test indicates that the portion of shares repurchased negatively relates to the 
previous share performance and positively relates to book-to-market ratio. This 
evidence is later supported by the UK findings of Oswald and Young (2004), 
suggesting that the undervaluation of the share prices would instigate the firms to 
buyback more shares. Similarly, the findings of Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
likewise suggest negative association between the ratio of shares repurchased to 
shares announced (or shares outstanding) and the previous-quarter returns. However, 
Dittmar (2000) do not find the evidence about real repurchases preceded by negative 
market performances47 but her evidence confirms that the actual repurchases are 
negatively related to market-to-book ratio. 
Examining the motives for share repurchases between the firms with frequent and 
infrequent share repurchases, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) point out that the 
firms with less-frequent repurchases have lower market-to-book ratio, suggesting that 
undervaluation is a reason for these firms to buyback own shares. By contrast, the 
firms which repurchase frequently (or regularly) are much larger in size, with higher 
dividend payout ratios and have less volatile operating income. In this case, the 
undervaluation is unlikely a reason for such firms to make share repurchases. 
Following the previous studies, this chapter tests the undervaluation hypothesis by 
testing long-term abnormal returns and the predictive power of market-to-book ratio 
on payout decisions. The hypothesis predicts that the share repurchase announcements 
are preceded by negative long-term abnormal returns, and may be followed by 
positive abnormal returns as well. Moreover, the repurchasing firms are predicted to 
47 She estimates the return by using the value-weighted, market-adjusted stock return in the calendar 
year prior to the repurchase to measure misevaluation. 
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have lower market-to-book ratio than dividend-paying or non-payout firms. 
Signalling hypothesis 
Unlike the undervaluation hypothesis, signalling hypothesis of share repurchases 
predicts that managers engage in share repurchase activities in order to signal for the 
profits or earnings information of their firms along with showing investors that their 
firms perform well. Under the prediction, the repurchasing firms are expected to have 
higher profits or earnings than the firms without paying out cash. The hypothesis also 
predicts that markets would respond positively to the announcements, resulting in 
positive abnormal returns around the days of announcement. 
A number of studies examine this hypothesis by testing the relation of operating 
incomes to repurchase. Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) examine the earnings 
information contained in tender offer repurchase announcements. In their test, the 
earnings forecast errors posterior to the repurchase announcements mostly appear to 
be positive. Furthermore, they test the relationship between abnormal returns and the 
earnings following the repurchase announcements, finding that the abnormal returns 
have positive relation to the post-announcement earnings for up to four years. Taken 
together, their evidence implies that not only tender offer repurchase announcements 
convey information about subsequent earnings, but also this information is perceived 
by the market while repurchases are announced. 
Hertzel and Jain (1991) similarly investigate the earnings information contained in 
tender offer repurchase announcements48 . They find that analysts revise upwards their 
48 Although Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) and Hertzel and Jain (1991) carry out the similar test, 
the variables they employ to measure operating performance are different. The former use both 
earnings per share (EPS) and earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) while the latter use analyst 
forecasts on earnings performance. 
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forecasts for both short-term and long-term earnings. Moreover, they also detect 
positive relation between market reactions and short-term earnings revision, but no 
significant relation is found between market reactions and long-term earnings revision. 
They thus conclude that tender offer repurchase announcements only contain 
information about transitory changes in future earnings. 
Examining the earmngs signalled in fixed-price and Dutch auction tender offer 
repurchases, Lie and McConnell (1998) empirically test the signalling difference of 
these tender offer repurchases originally proposed by Comment and Jarrell (1991)49 . 
The evidence of Lie and McConnell (1998) suggest that the operating performance of 
the repurchase firms are better than their industry peers, and the outperformance 
continues to exist for up to five years following the announcement. However, the 
operating performances are not different between the two repurchase methods. 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) examine the annual changes in operating performance 
preceding and following the announcements of open market share repurchase 
announcements. However, they fail to find evidence supporting the signalling 
hypothesis. In contrast, a part of their evidence shows that the changes in operating 
performance appear to be significantly negative up to three years following the 
announcements. 
Recently, Lie (2005) re-examines the changes in operating performance around open 
market repurchase announcements. In comparison to the control firms matched by 
industry, prior operating performance, and market-to-book ratio, they find that the 
49 Basically, Comment and Jarrell (1991) focus their study on undervaluation information signalled by 
the repurchase with different methods. They suggest due that fixed-price tender offer repurchase pay 
larger repurchase premium than the other repurchase methods do, the signalling effect from fixed-price 
repurchase are stronger. 
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repurchase firms have significant improvement in operating performance over eight 
quarters (i.e. two years) following the announcements. Furthermore, they test the 
performance for two sub-samples, which are categorised in light of actual repurchases 
during the announcement quarter. They find remarkable improvement in operating 
performance following the announcement for the firms which actually repurchase 
during the announcement quarter, but find no evidence about the improvement for the 
firms which do not make repurchases during the announcement quarter. Particularly, 
they present the evidence that the actual repurchases signal more convinced 
information about the future improvement in operating performance. 
The ratio of operating incomes to total assets is employed in this chapter to measure 
the firms' performance in the year of repurchase announcements. In light of the 
signalling hypothesis, it is predicted that firms which announce share repurchases 
should have higher operating incomes. 
Substitution hypothesis 
If the UK market is perfect and complete, share repurchases and dividends should be 
perfect substitutions for each other. According to Miller and Modigliani ( 1961 ), 
dividend policy is irrelevant to firm value in a perfect and complete market. A firm 
could finance for dividends by issuing new shares or new debts and the only 
difference between before and after dividend payment is the capital structures rather 
than the firm value. In contrast, if there is no dividend payment from firms, 
shareholders could get the cash they need by selling a part of shareholdings to others. 
And, still, firm value (i.e. total shareholdings) is not affected by this kind of 
transactions. Ceteris paribus, the proposition could also be applied to share 
repurchases. Thus, dividends and share repurchases should be a perfect substitution 
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for each other in perfect and complete markets. 
In reality, different regulations and taxations are often applied to dividends and share 
repurchases, making investors prefer the one to the other. Moreover, the sources of 
cash flow financed for dividends and repurchases are also considered to be different. 
Since repurchases, unlike dividends, are not regarded as a recurring event and 
repurchase announcements are not as committed as dividend announcements, the 
hypothesis predicts that the firms with temporary cash flow prefer to pay out cash via 
share repurchases, whose flexibility nature gives the firms opportunity to withdraw 
from repurchase programmes when their cash flow is not sufficient enough in the 
future. 
Some previous evidence is generated form the direct answers of the firms by using 
survey-based research. Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar (1989) fail to get a confirmative 
answer from either repurchasing or non-repurchasing firms to support the substitution 
hypothesis. Instead, their findings are more consistent with the prediction of the 
signalling hypothesis. A latest survey carried out by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely (2005) point out that investments and operating decisions are priorities over 
repurchase decisions, while dividend decisions are priority to investment decisions. 
This finding indirectly rejects the prediction of the substitution hypothesis. However, 
their survey also suggests that repurchases appear to be a substitution for dividends, 
but dividends are unlikely a substitution for repurchases. This evidence supports the 
"one-way substitution" advanced by Grullon and Michaely (2002). 
An alternative method is to examine the firm characteristics between the firms which 
have different policies. Grullon and Michaely (2002) present that firms which only 
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pay dividends have similar firm characteristics to firms which pay dividends and 
buyback shares, while firms which make repurchases only have similar characteristics 
to firms which do not pay out any cash. This evidence implicitly suggests the fact that 
firms smooth dividends through time but do not smooth the repurchases. Furthermore, 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) test the relation between dividend forecast errors and 
repurchase yields. A significantly negative relation is found to exist between the 
dividend forecast errors and the repurchase yields. This evidence demonstrates that 
dividend-paying firms have substituted share repurchases for dividends, and this 
evidence is later supported by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005). 
Since special dividends and share repurchases are in common nature of nonrecurring, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) hypothesise that the boom of share 
repurchases are related to the declines in special dividends. Their findings, however, 
reject this hypothesis. Firstly, their findings show that the declines in special 
dividends start in the late 1950s while the boom of share repurchases happen in the 
mid-1980s. The timing of these two events does not match. Secondly, only 20 percent 
of the firms which previously paid special dividends most frequently make share 
repurchases within ten years after they cease special dividends. By comparison, 53.7 
percent of the firms which previously paid special dividend least often buy back own 
shares after ceasing special dividends. With these findings, share repurchases are not 
interpreted as the substitution for special dividends. 
The strategy of this chapter to test the substitution hypothesis is to compare the 
managerial motives and the characteristics of the firms with different payout policies. 
This chapter hypothesises that the firms should have similar managerial motives and 
characteristics regardless of which payout policies, dividends or share repurchases, 
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they intend to distribute cash. 
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5·3· Data and descriptive statistics 
5.3.1. Data 
The data are collected from two sources. The first is the SDC database (now supplied 
by Thomson Financial), which contains the UK share repurchase announcements from 
1985 afterwards. However, the SDC does not seem to contain all repurchase 
announcements in the UK. To ensure the tests could be carried out without the sample 
selection bias, this chapter further retrieves business news related to the UK share 
repurchases. 
The data collection begins from getting a complete list of the UK firms from the 
Worldscope supplied by Thomson Research. The news is then retrieved for each firm 
in LexisNexis™ Academic, which holds a wild range of dated news from different 
media, including the Financial Times and the Extel Examiner. The search is mainly 
processed in the section of "business news" by: 
1. usmg keywords "buyback", "buy-back", "purchase own shares" or 
"repurchase". 
2. limiting the search to country: "UK". 
3. filtering out the news of repurchasing bonds, warrants, or other non-equities. 
On the other hand, the data obtained from the SDC are searched by the following 
criteria: 
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1. The firm is domiciled in the UK. 
2. The firm is listed in London Stock Exchange at the time of the announcement. 
3. The business description of the firm is not "investment trust" or "investment 
fund". 
4. The announcement date lies between 1st January 1995 and 31st December 
2004. 
The fourth criterion is employed since 1995 is the earliest year for the news 
obtainable from LexisNexis™ Academic. The search via these criteria generates 343 
observations after crossing out the overlapping observations from the two databases. 
The sample is further filtered for share repurchase announcements. For the 
observations from LexisNexis™ Academic, once any of the following situations are 
mentioned in the news, the observation is classified as "repurchase announcements" 
and included in the sample: 
1. The firm considers or intends to buy back this year. 
2. The firm indicates that buyback is a possible choice to pay out cash. 
3. The board will seek approval of share repurchase programmes from 
shareholders. 
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4. The annual general meeting (AGM) has approved the share repurchase 
programme. 
If a share repurchase programme is reported more than once, only the news with the 
earliest released date is included in the sample. The news is not expected to contain 
new information about the same repurchase programme if they are not first released. 
For the data from the SDC, only the observations whose "announcement date" and 
"effective date" are recorded on different dates are included in the sample. As share 
repurchases in the UK have to be approved by shareholders before making actual 
repurchases, the observations which have the same date on the repurchase 
announcement and actual share repurchases must be recorded mistakenly by the SDC. 
Since this chapter focuses on the announcements of share repurchases rather than the 
actual share repurchases, the observations with the same announcement and effective 
dates are dropped. 
Additionally, the firms included in the sample for the multinomial logit model are 
required 1) at least announcing share repurchase once over the period of 1995 to 2004, 
and 2) the data of the firm characteristics and the payout records over the above 
period feasible in Datastream. The descriptive statistics of this sample are presented in 
Panel B ofTable 5.1. 
5.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 5.1 presents the number of the share repurchase announcements in 
each year of the sample period. Similar to the US situation, open market repurchase is 
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the majority of the repurchase programmes while privately-negotiated repurchase 
announcements happens less frequently compared to the two other repurchase 
methods. 
There are 236 open market repurchases announced over the 10-year period from 1995 
to 2004, while there are only 27 private negotiated repurchases and 58 tender offers 
repurchases announced over this period. Among 236 open market repurchase, 52 are 
announced in 1998, which is the most comparing to the other years. About 50% of 
open market repurchases are announced over the period of 1997-1998. The rapid 
swell on the numbers of the open market repurchase is probably stemmed from the 
change of the UK tax regime on 2nd July 1997, which eliminated the tax credit for 
dividends50 and indirectly made the open market repurchase become popular. 
As to privately-negotiated repurchases, ten were announced in 1997 while only a few 
numbers were announced in the other years. Remarkably, the numbers of tender offer 
repurchase announcements are about two times larger than the number of 
privately-negotiated repurchase announcements, indicating that the tender offer 
repurchases are relatively popular than the privately-negotiated repurchases. 
Panel B of Table 5.1 demonstrates the mean and median firm characteristics and 
payout ratios by the categories of payout decisions. Similar to the categories designed 
in Grullon and Michaely (2002), this study divides the sample into four categories, 
which are 1) firms that do not pay out cash, 2) firms that announce cash dividends, 3) 
50 When paying dividends, the UK firms are required to pay 25 percent of the dividend payment as the 
advanced corporate tax (ACT). This means that the firms have to totally pay 1.25 times the original 
dividend. The shareholders who receive the dividend are levied tax on the basis of 1.25 times the 
original dividend. Then they can claim the ACT from the Inland Revenue as the "tax credit". More 
details about ACT and the changes of the tax regimes in the UK can be found in Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005). 
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firms that announce share repurchases, and 4) firms that announce cash dividends and 
share repurchases. 
Estimates of total assets indicate that the firms which pay dividends (regardless of the 
share repurchase policy) are much larger than the firms without paying dividends. The 
firms which announce both dividends and share repurchases conspicuously appear to 
have the largest total assets which are 7,013 million pounds for the mean and 619 
million pounds for the median. Relatively, the repurchasing firms whose mean total 
assets are 376 million pounds and the non-payout firms whose median total assets are 
73 million pounds are the smallest in size among the four categories. The estimates of 
the natural logarithms of total assets tell a similar story. The mean and median natural 
logarithms of total assets are about 13 for the firms which pay dividends (categories 1 
and 3) and about 11 for the firms which do not pay dividends (categories 0 and 2). 
Both F test and median test illustrate that the differences across the categories are 
significant. Moreover, the mean (median) ratio of operating incomes to total assets are 
9.1 (8.6) percent for firms which pay dividends but are negative for firms which do 
not pay dividends. Measuring by mean (about 0.2) or median (about 0.05), the 
standard deviations of operating income over five years prior to the announcement are 
larger for firms which do not pay out dividends (regardless of repurchase decisions). 
The tests on differences across the categories are significant at one percent level. 
Taken together, the aforementioned firm characteristics suggest that firms which 
announce dividends are larger, more profitable, and less volatile in operating 
performance than firms which do not pay dividends regardless of their repurchase 
policy. 
Furthermore, the mean (median) ratio of cash and equivalent to total assets is higher 
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for firms which do not announce dividends (categories 1 and 3). The mean difference 
of the cash ratio is significant at one percent level but the median difference appears 
to be insignificant. As for the debt ratios, the only significant difference is found by 
one way ANOVA on short-term debts across the four categories. The median test does 
not detect any significant differences on both long-term and short-term debt ratios 
across the categories. This result is reasonable since the repurchase in the UK could 
only be financed by distributable profits or the proceeds from new issuing shares but 
not by debts. 
The mean ratio of intangible assets to total assets is the largest for firms which 
announce repurchases (0.069) but is the lowest for firms which announce both 
dividends and repurchases (0.037). Nevertheless, the mean difference across the 
categories is merely marginally significant at ten percent level. Furthermore, firms 
that announce repurchases also have the lowest mean and median market-to-book 
ratio, which are -0.224 and 0.740 respectively while the mean market-to-book ratio 
for the firms that announce both dividends and repurchases is also as low as 0.022. 
These estimates seem to imply the undervaluation on the repurchasing firms. 
Finally, with a number of similar firm characteristics, firms announcing dividends and 
firms announcing both dividends and share repurchases even have similar payout 
ratios. The mean payout ratio of the firms which announce both dividends and share 
repurchases is a little higher than that of the dividend-paying firms but t-statistic 
indicates that the difference is insignificant. Wilcoxon test further suggests that the 
median payout ratios of the two categories are not significantly different. 
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5·4· Methodology and hypotheses development 
This chapter essentially imposes two approaches, namely event study and logit model, 
to respectively test the wealth effect of share repurchase announcements and the 
managerial motives for payout decisions. Under the event study approach, both 
short-term and long-term abnormal returns are estimated. The advantage of the event 
study is that, under the assumption of market efficiency, the test directly estimates the 
share prices around the event day to determine whether the market respond 
immediately to the information (MacKinlay, 1997). If the test accurately defines the 
event dates, the event effect around the event day could be measured by the average 
abnormal returns of a large sample. Moreover, the average abnormal returns could 
also mitigate the firm-specific effect. The second approach examines the firm 
characteristics by using a logit model. It provides an insight into the factors 
influencing firms to make decisions among various payout policies. 
5·4·1. Estimating market reactions to repurchase announcements 
Short-term abnormal returns for the full sample 
The market reactions to the announcements of share repurchases are measured by the 
abnormal returns around the announcement days. The method imposed in this section 
is similar to that introduced in Section 3.4.1. Thus, this section only presents the 
research design specialised for this chapter. 
The abnormal returns are estimated for an 81-day event period centred on the 
announcement day. Unlike the UK dividend announcements, the share repurchase 
announcements are not announced semiannually, which allows a longer event and 
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estimation periods for the examinations. Moreover, some previous studies examines 
the event period with a similar length since they hypothesise that share repurchase 
announcements are preceded by a downtrend of price performance (Dann, 1981; 
Comment and J arrell, 1991 )51 . 
The estimation period is a 150-day period from 190 days to 41 days prior to the day of 
repurchase announcements. To avoid incorporating the days around the adjacent 
repurchase announcements is necessary for consideration when deciding the length of 
the estimation period. Accordingly, the choice of the 150-day estimation period should 
be appropriate in that the repurchase announcement is not a regular event which 
would recur within a short period. Moreover, the long estimation period could 
improve the prediction power of the market model. 
Given the valid semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, the market should respond to 
the repurchase announcements immediately if the announcements are informative. 
When the market does not perceive new information, the share prices are expected to 
follow their normal trends. Consequently, the daily returns of the estimation period 
are imposed to estimate the normal trend (i.e. the market model) which is not affected 
by the information conveyed by the share repurchase announcements. The market 
model is then applied to generate the expected returns for each day of the event period. 
The abnormal returns are the divergence between the real returns and the expected 
returns. Based on the signalling theory of payout policy, this chapter hypothesises that 
positive abnormal returns should be detected around the announcement days, and are 
expected to be zero over the rest of the event period. 
51 The main interest of examining the short-term abnormal returns is to test whether the share 
repurchase announcements are informative. The undervaluation hypothesis is examined by the 
long-term abnormal returns which will be discussed later. 
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Estimating short-term abnormal returns by the methods of share repurchases 
Open market repurchases are the most common repurchase methods in markets. It is 
indicated that firms, whose repurchase programmes have been approved by 
shareholders' meeting, could buy back own shares via open market transactions up to 
18 months. Shareholders are unlikely to perceive that the repurchases are processing 
at the time when they sell the shares 52 . Due to this nature of open market repurchases, 
firms are likely to buyback shares when they think their share prices are bargained. 
Privately-negotiated repurchases are the methods less related to small shareholders. 
The implication is that firms negotiate with large shareholders and buy back a fraction 
or the all shares of the large shareholders. The repurchases can be initiated by either 
the firms or the large shareholders. 
Tender offer repurchases are often carried out with a high percentage of shares sought 
and with repurchase premiums. In the UK, firms are allowed to buyback their own 
shares in the open market as long as 1) the shares sought do not exceed 15 percent of 
the number of outstanding shares and 2) the price paid is not more than five percent 
above the average price of those shares for the ten business days before the 
repurchases. Therefore, for those firms purchasing own shares more than 15 percent 
limit, the repurchases are required to be implemented by tender offer. The process of 
the tender offer repurchases starts from firms' offering a certain percentage of shares 
sought and a fixed price or a range of prices with which they intend to buy back own 
shares. The shareholders then tender for the repurchases proposed within a specific 
period. Different from open market repurchases, tender offer repurchases are often 
completed within one month from the announcements. 
52 However, once repurchase is made, the firm has to report the details of the repurchase to the United 
Kingdom Listing Authority (UKLA) before 7:30am on the next business day. 
242 
Chapter 5 Managerial Motives and Shareholders' Wealth Effect of Share Repurchases 
The different characteristics inherent in the three repurchase methods could lead to 
various market reactions. Shareholders are unlikely to be informed at the time when 
the open market repurchases are carried out. Thus, capital gains are the only benefits 
which shareholders may get from open market repurchases. Differently, tender offer 
repurchases usually provide investors with repurchase premiums, which is normally 
higher than the market value. Investors who are interested in the offers could tender 
for selling their shares to the repurchasing firms. The large percentage of shares 
sought and the repurchase premiums over the market prices make the information 
conveyed by tender offer announcements more likely confirmed and more favourable 
than that conveyed by open market repurchase announcements (Vermaelen, 1981; 
Comment and Jarrell, 1991). As a result, the hypothesis of this chapter predicts that 
the tender offer repurchase announcements are expected to induce greater positive 
market reactions than the open market repurchase announcements. 
With respect to the privately-negotiated repurchases, the only repurchase method 
which does not deal with small shareholders could also induce market responses. The 
underlying reason is that large shareholders are thought to possess more information 
than small shareholders, the share selling of the large shareholders likely signals that 
they have bad news about the firms and would like to get rid of the firm shares they 
hold. Furthermore, if considering from the aspect of agency problem, the large 
shareholders could reduce agency costs. Nonetheless, Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) 
point out that, except those made for fighting takeover, the market responds positively 
to the privately negotiated repurchases regardless of the shares are bought back with a 
discount or with a premium. They suggest that the privately-negotiated share 
repurchases are made with an intention of signalling and are more likely initiated by 
the firms. Differently, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) fail to find explicit market responses 
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to privately negotiated repurchases for the UK evidence. If the privately-negotiated 
share repurchase announcements are made with signalling purpose, this chapter 
hypothesises that the market should react positively to the announcements. 
5.4.2. Estimating long-term returns around the announcements 
Testing short-term abnormal returns provides the evidence for the market reactions, 
while testing long-term abnormal returns helps to better understand whether there is 
unusual performance preceding or following events. Share repurchases, unlike other 
payout policy, may take one or two years to the implementation. This nature makes 
the test on long-term performance important since the market may not only react to 
repurchases on the event month (or day) but also in the subsequent period. Even some 
repurchase programmes are not implemented after the announcements, repurchase 
announcements are still a signalling mechanism for managers. They may make 
repurchase announcements to signal their confidence, firm's undervaluation or future 
prospects. Consequently, pre-announcement long-term performance could possibly 
explain managers' motives for announcing repurchases while post-announcement 
long-term performance helps to detect the signalling effect of the announcements. 
Bootstrapping procedure to estimating long-term abnormal returns 
The findings of Kothari and Warner (1997) suggest that an inappropriate benchmark 
may result in systematic biases and misspecification. Particularly, long-term return 
estimation is more sensitive on the choice of a benchmark than short-term return 
estimation. By simulating the long-term event studies, Kothari and Warner ( 1997) 
detect that the long-term abnormal returns increase monotonously with the length of 
event periods. They also find that the null hypothesis of zero buy-and-hold abnormal 
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returns 1s over-rejected by under-estimated standard deviation, and the situation 
becomes severer with the increase of the event horizon. Hence, Kothari and Warner 
(1997, p.336) suggest that: 
"Bootstrap procedure, such as those employed by Jkenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (I 995), could be used to address biases in both the measure of 
abnormal performance and the standard deviation. " 
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) likewise confirm that "pseudo-portfolio approach"53 
provides well-specific and powerful test statistics for BHARs. Moreover, this 
approach generates an abnormal return measure which accurately represents investors' 
experience. Consequently, this chapter uses the bootstrapping procedure for testing 
the long-term abnormal returns around the repurchase announcements. 
The monthly returns of the sample firms are computed for a 49-month period, which 
starts from 24 months prior to repurchase (month -24) to 24 month posterior to 
repurchase (month 24). The equation is as Eq. (5.1): 
Ri,t = Ln(P;,,)- Ln(P;,,_1 ), (5.1) 
where Pi,t denotes the price of firm i at the end of month t in this section. The 
subsequent events, which are announced within two years, are dropped from this test. 
Secondly, the FTSE All Share Index is employed for the first benchmark based on the 
assumption that the long-term returns of an individual firm equal to the long-term 
average returns of the whole market. Therefore, the expected return equals the 
53 Although using the different tenn, the approach described is the same with that mentioned in 
Kothari and Warner (1997). 
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monthly return of the market, and the divergence between the returns of the firm and 
the market is regarded as abnormal returns. The equation is expressed as Eq. (5.2) 
(5.2) 
where Rm,t denotes the market return on month t. In addition to the monthly market 
returns as the first benchmark, the test also constructs the reference portfolio for the 
second and the third benchmarks of the monthly expected returns. The procedure is 
described as follows. 
In January of each year, all the UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
are sorted by size54and are divided into five quintiles on the basis of the size rank. The 
rank of sizes and the formation of size portfolios are then repeated every January. 
Each of the size portfolios is further sorted by using market-to-book ratio into five 
quintiles. The portfolios sorted by using market-to-book ratio are also reconstituted 
every January. This procedure, therefore, produces twenty-five stze and 
market-to-book ratio portfolios. Each of the repurchase firms is also ranked with the 
non-repurchasing firms to determine its corresponding reference portfolio. 
The second reference portfolios are five size-based portfolios constituted by the size 
rank. The monthly return of the sample firm is compared to the average monthly 
return of the corresponding size-based portfolio. The abnormal returns are expressed 
as Eq (5.3): 
AR;, =R;, -R5 ,, . . . (5.3) 
54 Size is measured by market value which is coded "MV" in Datastream. 
-r.:: 
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where Rs,r denotes the average monthly return of size-based portfolio s on month t. 
The third reference portfolios are twenty-five size/market-to-book ratio portfolios 
which are constituted by the sequential sort procedure. The expected returns are the 
average monthly return generated by each of the twenty-five portfolios. The abnormal 
returns of the sample firms are then compared to the average returns of the 
corresponding reference portfolio. The abnormal return is computed as Eq. (5.4): 
(5.4) 
where Rsmb,r denotes the average monthly return of the reference portfolio smb on 
month t. The abnormal return on each month t is computed as the cross-sectional 
average of the AR;,1 which can expressed as Eq. (5.5): 
1 N 
AR, = -LAR;,1 • N i=t 
(5.5) 
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are then computed over the period of 
interest. The BHAR compounded from months Ml to M2 is as Eq. (5.6): 
M2 
BHAR~12 = L AR1 • (5.6) 
t=MI 
Before testing the significance of the BHARs, the procedure is required to constitute 
the pseudo-portfolios, which empirically generate the distributions of the average 
long-term abnormal returns of the non-repurchasing firms. This procedure is 
particular important on this test. Without adjusting by the pseudo-portfolios, the 
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BHARs are upper biased and the test is mis-specific. The procedure is as follows: 
For each repurchasing firm in the sample, a firm listed on FTSE All Share Index and 
sorted in the same size/market-to-book portfolio in the event month is randomly 
selected with replacement. The process of replacement is repeated for each sample 
firm until the original repurchasing firms have all been replaced by the firms drawn 
from reference portfolios. The newly constituted portfolio is so-called 
"pseudo-portfolio", which consists of one randomly drawn firm for each sample firm, 
matched in time with same rank of size and market-to-book ratio. The monthly 
abnormal returns and the BHARs of the pseudo-portfolio are estimated by using the 
same approach for the original sample. The above procedure is then repeated for 
1,000 times, generating 1,000 pseudo-portfolios and 1,000 average abnormal return 
observations. The average abnormal returns of the original sample are then adjusted 
and tested by the parameters generated from these 1,000 average abnormal return 
observations. Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) indicate that 
BHARs are likely to have a positive bias over a long-term period. While both original 
BHARs and the average BHARs of the pseudo-portfolios are likely biased over a 
long-term period estimation, deducting the average pseudo-BHARs from the original 
BHARs could eliminate the bias. The equation is as Eq. (5.7) 
BHARadjusted,M = BHARoriginai,M - BHARpseudo,M' (5.7) 
where M denotes the period over which the abnormal return is compounded. The null 
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are named as Eq. (5.8): 
Ha: BHARadjusted,M = 0 versus HI: BHARadjusted,M =1:- 0. (5.8) 
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The t-statistics are calculated as the average abnormal return (or the BHAR) divided 
by the standard error of the 1,000 average abnormal return observations (or BHARs). 
Given that the variables are independent and identically distributed, the t-statistics are 
robust and well-specific. 
Estimating long-term abnormal returns by using the three-factor model 
In addition to use the returns on the reference portfolios and bootstrapping technique 
to estimate abnormal returns, this chapter applies event study with calendar-time 
approach and the three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993) to make 
the comparison with the aforementioned approaches. The calendar-time approach 
could eliminate the problem of cross-correlation among the returns of sample firms 
and, furthermore, is less sensitive to a poorly specific asset pricing model. (Fama, 
1998; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999). Since time-serial portfolios are constituted for 
each calendar month to aggregate the same month's stock returns, the variations of the 
portfolio returns automatically account for the cross-correlations in stock returns at 
each point in calendar time. 
The method of constituting the time-serial portfolios is presented as follows. The 
time-serial portfolio on a given calendar month consists of the monthly returns of the 
firms whose event period of interest covers the given calendar month. For example, 
when testing the abnormal returns of the event month, the time-serial portfolio for 
September 1999 would consist of the monthly returns of the firms which announce 
repurchases in September 1999. Likewise, when testing the abnormal returns for the 
period of one to twelve months subsequent to repurchase announcements, the 
portfolio for September 1999 would consist of the September returns of the firms 
whose repurchases are announced within previous one to twelve months. The 
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portfolios are reformed for each calendar month. 
The three-factor model uses the monthly returns of the time-serial portfolios minus 
the monthly returns of risk-free assets as the dependent variable. The model is as Eq. 
(5.9): 
(5.9) 
where Rpt is the value or equally-weighted average returns of the time-serial portfolio 
of the calendar month t, and Rft is the return on one-month Treasury bills. FTSE Aaa 
Share Index is imposed as the proxy for computing the market returns (Rmt). SMB1 
(small minus big) and HMLt (high minus low) are respectively the size factor and the 
book-to-market factor introduced by Fama and French (1993) to control for the size 
and book-to-market effects on stock returns. The size factor is the returns difference 
between the portfolios of small stocks and the portfolios of large stocks. The 
book-to-market factor is the returns difference between the portfolios of high 
book-to-market stocks and the portfolios of low book-to-market stocks 55 • The 
time-series regression generates the parameters estimates of apt. f31, f32 and f33• Among 
these parameters, of main interest is the intercept (apt) which represents the average 
monthly abnormal returns of the examined period. 
The undervaluation hypothesis predicts that negative BHARs and ARs should precede 
the share repurchase announcements and positive BHARs and ARs may possibly 
follow the announcements. The positive po:')t-anp.p:tmcei11ent abnofii1al_returns suggest 
that the market revises their expectations for firms' future performance after the 
55 Sincere appreciation is placed for the data provision of SMB and HML from Professor Krishna 
Paudyal, Durham Business School, Durham University, UK. All remaining errors are mine. 
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announcements, which is also predicted by the signalling hypothesis. On the month of 
the repurchase announcements, the predictions of the hypothesis are identical with 
those for the short-term event-day abnormal returns. 
Estimating long-term abnormal returns by the methods of share repurchases 
Given the different nature inherent in the three repurchase methods, firms may 
employ them at different timings. The open market repurchases are the most flexible 
methods, and thus with the lowest signalling costs among the three. Since the firms 
buy back their shares with the market value, it implies that the firms which announce 
open market repurchases do not have intention to offer a price premium to the 
shareholders. Otherwise, they would make repurchases by using tender offer 
repurchases. Moreover, the firms' intention to buy back the shares with market price 
implies that the firms believe that the market under-values their shares and buying 
back own shares is a bargain at the time of the announcements. Following the 
announcements, two potential effects would shift the long-term market value. The 
first effect is that the market would recognise the undervaluation information and 
revise the evaluation. This effect would make a positive shift on the 
post-announcement market value. Alternatively, the market does not revise the 
evaluation, and the firms subsequently buy back their own shares. This effect would 
also make a positive shift on the post-announcement market value. Overall, the 
undervaluation hypothesis predicts that the BHARs and ARs should be negative prior 
to the open market repurchase announcements and be positive following the 
announcements. 
The privately-negotiated repurchases are sometimes proposed by large shareholders. 
Since the large shareholders are thought to possess superior information than other 
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shareholders, the shares must be sold in his or her best interest. Therefore, the 
happening of the privately negotiated repurchases could stem from lack of the share 
performance preceding the announcements and also signal the large shareholders' 
pessimistic perspective on the firms. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the large 
shareholders could make better anticipations on the firms' future prospects than the 
firms' managements. Consequently, the chapter hypothesises that the BHARs (and 
ARs) preceding the privately-negotiated repurchase announcements should be 
negative, but does not make a definite prediction for the post-announcement returns. 
Tender offer repurchases provides repurchase premiums over the market value. A 
survey carried by Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar (1989) directly asks the managements' 
views on the repurchase premiums. They find that the premiums are positively 
associated with the confidence of the repurchasing firms and the percentage of shares 
sought. Undervaluation is another reason recognised by 35 percent of tender offer 
respondents. Previous empirical findings also suggest that the tender offer repurchases 
are followed by earnings improvement (Dann, Masulis, and Mayers, 1991; Lie and 
McConnell, 1998). If both signalling the future performance and undervaluation are 
the main purposes for announcing tender offer repurchases, the BHARs and ARs are 
predicted to be negative preceding to the announcements and be positive following 
the announcements. Nonetheless, since the tender offer repurchases are often 
completed within few months, this chapter hypothesises that the wealth effect of the 
tender offer repurchases announcements should not last as long as the effect of the 
open market repurchase announcements. 
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5·4·3· Comparing managerial motives for various payout policies 
Share repurchases are a kind of payout mechanism instead of a regular payout policy. 
Dividends which are paid semi-annually in the UK are more regular than share 
repurchases. Thus, a question arisen is that why some firms choose repurchases rather 
than dividends in some occasions. Or, why do some firms decide to distribute cash by 
both alternatives rather than solely by dividends? The tests on the abnormal returns 
provide the fmdings from the perspective of the market, while the logit model 
provides the understanding from the perspective of the cash-distributing firms. To 
figure out the determinants which might influence various payout decisions, the logit 
regression is employed and is considered as a good fit for the test of interest. 
Research design 
For all repurchasing firms in the sample, this study imposes the panel data of these 
firms and tests on their payout history over the period of 1995 to 2004. Each sample 
firm is required to possess at least one firm-year observation of repurchases, and 
could possess up to ten firm-years if the firm remains listed over the whole sample 
period. Four various payout decisions including 1) no cash payout, 2) dividends, 3) 
repurchases, and 4) dividends and repurchases are designed as the four feasible 
choices available for the firms. Each firm is assumed to have its own payout policy, 
and the policy is normally consistent over time. As a consequence, if the firms change 
their payout policies, the multinomial logit model could detect the reasons by testing 
the firm characteristics. The related variables of the models are discussed as follows. 
Payout decisions 
The dependent variable (Yu) of the logit model is a category variable indicating the 
discrete choices of payout policy. Four discrete choices are available for each firm on 
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each payout decision. The choices include, category 0: no payout; category 1: 
dividend announcements (hereafter dividends); category 2: repurchase announcements 
(hereafter repurchases) and category 3: both dividend and repurchase announcements 
(hereafter dividends and repurchases). This design is capable of testing the 
substitution hypothesis in a direct way. If dividends and share repurchases are treated 
indifferently by the firms, the hypothesis predicts that the categories 1, 2 and 3 should 
have similar firm characteristics. That is, while comparing these categories, the 
coefficients on the explanatory variables should be insignificant to support the 
substitution hypothesis. If any coefficients are found to be significant, it implies that 
certain of the firm characteristics instigate firms to make different choices between 
dividends and share repurchases, and the substitution hypothesis is thereby rejected. 
The design of the payout categories are similar to that in Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
and De Jong, Van Dijk, and Veld (2003). The explanatory variables of the multinomial 
logit model are discussed as follows. 
Total Assets 
In light of the previous literatures (e.g. Vermaelen, 1981; Dittrnar, 2000; Guay and 
Harford, 2000; Mougoue and Rao, 2003), large firms are expected to have less 
information asymmetry, and thus suffer less miss-valuation. Consequently, large firms 
have less incentive to signal. Nonetheless, Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest the 
firms which pay dividends are larger than the firms which do not pay dividend 
regardless of their repurchase policies. The evidence from Jagannathan, Stephens, and 
Weisbach (2000) show that dividend-paying firms have larger firm sizes than 
repurchasing firms which are in turn larger than firms that do not distribute cash. 
Furthermore, according to Fenn and Liang (1997) , Kahle (2002) and Ooi (2001), 
large firms are regarded as posing less risk of agency problem and thus more likely to 
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have low financing costs, making them capable of paymg out more cash to 
shareholders 56 . Overall, the signalling hypothesis predicts that, under the 
circumstances of asymmetric information, the firms which do not distribute cash 
should be larger in size than the firms distributing cash. 
Total Cash 
The ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets tests the suggestion from Guay 
and Harford (2000), predicting that repurchases are more financed from temporary 
cash flow while dividends are more financed by permanent cash flow. The model 
created by Brennan and Thakor (1990) suggests that firms make small payouts 
through dividends, intermediate payouts through open market repurchases and large 
payouts through tender offer repurchases. The findings of Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) present that actual repurchase is carried out in condition of sufficient cash level. 
The survey of Baker, Powell, and Veit (2003) suggest that open market repurchases 
are mainly paid by cash (71.1 percent). Dittmar (2000) indicates that firms with more 
cash flow are more likely to buyback own shares. Accordingly, the hypothesis predicts 
that repurchasing firms are expected to have more cash than dividend-paying firms 
which in turn have more cash flow than firms that do not distribute cash. 
Debts 
Debts ratios test the relation between payout policy and firm leverage. The model 
includes 1) long-term debt ratio which is all loans repayable in more than one year 
measured by total assets and 2) short-term debt ratio which is the borrowing repayable 
within one year scaled by total assets. Some empirical findings suggest that 
repurchases are mainly made from temporary cash flows, and short-term debt is a 
56 The firms with low financing cost are more likely to pay out large amount of cash (e.g. repurchases) 
since they could finance with a lower costs than others if necessary in the future. 
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main source of the temporary cash (Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Baker, Powell, and Veit, 
2003). However, due that the UK repurchases are not allowed to finance by issuing 
debts, share repurchases are unlikely the reason for the UK firms to raise debts. Hence, 
the share repurchases in the UK are unlikely to link with debts via this route. 
Another prediction in the light of Jensen (1986) implies that firms which have more 
debts are less likely to distribute cash since the interest for debts are more committed 
than other cash payouts. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005), more 
specifically, suggest that external funds would be raised before cutting dividends but 
after reducing repurchases. If the firms are with high debt ratio, they are not going to 
make share repurchases. The suggestion of Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 
(2005) predicts that firms which announce repurchases are more likely to be with 
lower debt ratio than dividend-paying firms. Overall, the hypothesis of testing the 
debt ratios predicts that the firms which do not distribute cash should have the highest 
debt ratios among the four categories while the dividend-paying firms possess higher 
debt ratios than the repurchasing firms. 
Operating Income 
The ratio of operating income to total assets mainly tests the signalling hypothesis but 
also tests the temporary cash flow hypothesis. The signalling hypothesis predicts that 
dividends and share repurchases are made to signal for the firms' more superior 
performance than the firm's rivals. Consequently, the categories with cash distribution 
are expected to have higher operating income than the category of no cash payout. 
Moreover, Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) suggest that the operating 
income is a kind of permanent cash flow and thus is more likely to distribute by 
dividends than share repurchases. They also propose that uncertainty about cash flow 
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makes firms decide not to distribute cash or prefer to pay by repurchases which is a 
more flexible policy. 
To examine the above prediction, this chapter hypothesises that the firms announcing 
dividends or announcing both dividends and repurchases have higher operating 
income than the firms announcing share repurchases which in turn possess higher 
income than the non-paying firms. Furthermore, using the standard deviation of 
operating income to total assets ratio measured over a five-year period from year -4 to 
year 0 as the proxy for the volatility of operating income, the hypothesis of this 
chapter predicts that the firms announcing dividends should have the most permanent 
operating income while the income of the firms which do not pay out cash should be 
the most volatile. 
Intangible Assets 
Intangible to total assets ratio tests the undervaluation hypothesis which predicts that 
repurchasing firms are more likely to be undervalued. As proposed by Barth and 
Kasznik (1999), firms with more intangible assets are more likely to be undervalued, 
and thus firms have more motives for repurchases. If their proposition is valid for the 
UK, firms which announce repurchases are predicted to have larger intangibles than 
firms which do not announce repurchase regardless of their dividend policy. 
Market-to-book ratio 
Dittmar (2000) employs market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the firms' undervaluation 
and presents negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and the volume of 
share repurchases. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995; 2000) examine the 
long-term returns performance in light of book-to-market ratio (the inverse of 
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market-to-book ratio) and show that undervaluation is likely the reason for high 
book-to-market firms to announce share repurchases. Moreover, market-to-book ratio 
could also be a proxy for investment opportunity. Kahle (2002), Fenn and Liang (1997; 
2001 ), and Ooi (200 1) propose that the firms with higher market-to-book ratio have 
more investment opportunities and are less likely to distribute cash. 
Based on the above implications, this chapter hypothesises that the firms which 
distribute cash (categories 1, 2, and 3) have lower market-to-book ratio than the firms 
which do not payout (Category 0). Moreover, if the undervaluation hypothesis is 
supported, firms that announce share repurchases are predicted to have lower 
market-to-book ratio than firms that do not announce share repurchases. 
The multinomiallogit model 
The model is designed to test whether the various payout decisions are driven by 
different firm characteristics. The firms are assumed to make the decisions in their 
own interest and maximize the utility of the payout decisions. The utility function can 
be expressed as Eq. (5.10): 
uij, = vij, +£ij,, (5.10) 
where UiJt denotes the utility of the announcing firm i that chooses one of the payout 
policy j on time t. The ViJt denotes representative utility developed by this chapter to 
predict the utility UiJt which is only known by the firms. More specifically, the 
representative utility is constituted by the aforementioned firm characteristics 
(denoted as XiJr) relating to the payout policy j, which can be written as Eq. (5.11): 
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(5.11) 
The e iJt of Eq. ( 5.1 0) denotes the residuals, which are unobserved by this chapter but 
known by the announcing firm i. The multinomiallogit assumes that the residuals are 
independently, identically distributed (iid) extreme value (i.e. Gumbel distribution) 
over parameters i,j and t. 
Since the firms are assumed to maximize their own utility, the UiJt must be the 
maximum among J utilities. Consequently, the choice probability of the payout policy 
j can be expressed as Eq. (5.12): 
Pu (U 1 > U k) for all other payout policy k '* j . (5.12) 
On the basis that the residuals are iid extreme value, the choice probability derived 
from McFadden (1974) is as Eq. (5.13): 
forJ= 0, 1, 2, ... ,j. (5.13) 
The equation (5.13) is the multinomial logit model. For any two alternative payout 
policies} and k, the ratio of the probabilities (odd ratio) is as Eq. (5.14): 
P (j) exp(Vift ) ( ) ~( . . \__ ) ( •. ) 
-'
1
- = = exp Vijt- Vikt = exp\ /31 - fJk JXit = exp f3 xit P" ( k) exp(f';k1 ) 
Vk '* j. (5.14) 
And the logit Lis the natural logarithm ofEq (5.14), expressed as Eq. (5.15): 
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[ ~I (j)] *' fi • Lit = Ln -- = f3 xit or k * J . ~~(k) (5.15) 
If the increase in the firm characteristics xu raises the choice probability of payout 
policy j, the coefficient p* appears to be positive. By contrast, a negative j/ implies 
increase in Xit would raise the choice probability of alternative payout policy k. 
Applying the model to this test, k is the base category while j could be each of the 
other three categories. Each of the four categories of the payout policy is required to 
be the base category by turns to compare with the other categories of payout policy. 
For example, while the category of the firms which announces repurchases (k) is 
tested as the base category, the negative coefficient indicates that increase in that 
variable makes the firms more likely to announce repurchases rather than the 
counterpart category (j). In contrast, positive coefficient indicates that firms are less 
likely to announce repurchase while the firm characteristics X it increases. 
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5·5· Empirical results 
This section demonstrates the results of various analyses. The results of this chapter 
generally suggest that repurchases announcements convey good news to investors. 
The major motive for announcing repurchases is undervaluation of current share price, 
which is consistent with the prediction of the undervaluation hypothesis. Additionally, 
tender offer repurchases appear to induce the largest positive market reactions among 
the three repurchase methods. The large positive abnormal returns may result from 
price premiums offered by tender offer repurchases. Nonetheless, the wealth effect of 
tender offer repurchases falls away sooner than the effect of the other repurchase 
methods. Moreover, the evidence by estimating logit model implies that dividends 
rather than repurchases are the main mechanism for signalling earnings performance. 
5-5.1. Market reactions to share repurchase announcements 
Market reactions to share repurchase announcements for the full sample 
According to the signalling theory, this chapter hypothesises that positive market 
reactions should exist around the announcement days if share repurchase 
announcements convey new information to the market. Consistent with the prediction 
and most of the previous findings 57, Panel A of Table 5.2 indicates that the largest 
market response to share repurchase announcements are found on the announcement 
day. The average abnormal returns on the announcement days are 2.13 percent for the 
full sample. Figure 5.1 shows that the pre-announcement shareholders' wealth has an 
upwards trend while the largest boost happens on the announcement day. The 
57 See the UK findings of Rau and Vermaelen (2002); Lasfer (2002); Oswald and Young (2004), the 
US findings of Vermaelen (1981); Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Japan findings of 
Hatakeda and lsagawa (2004), Australia findings of Otchere and Ross (2002), and Hong Kong findings 
of Zhang (2005) etc. 
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pre-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of the various intervals 
shown in Panel A are all significantly positive but not big enough in size. For example, 
the average daily abnormal returns over the period of 40 days to 2 days prior to 
announcements are only 0.06 percent (2.44 percent divided by 39 days), which are 
much smaller than the abnormal returns on the day of announcements. The upwards 
drift continues after the repurchase announced as the post-announcement BHARs 
appear to be significantly positive. Shareholders who buy the shares two days after the 
announcements and sell one (two) month(s) after the announcements would profit 
3.53 percent (2.5 percent). The estimates in Panel B provide the evidence about the 
shareholders' wealth for various event periods centred on the event day. For the 
three-day event period from day -1 to day 1, shareholders earn 2.63 percent of 
abnormal returns. However, if shareholders extend their holding period to 81 days, 
they could enjoy 8.61 percent of abnormal returns induced by share repurchase 
announcements. 
Overall, during the event period, the most prominent market reactions to share 
repurchase announcements are found on day 0 (i.e. 2.12 percent), which is 
unequivocally consistent with the prediction of this chapter. Nonetheless, the 
unanticipated findings are that, beyond the event day, small but positive wealth effect 
is found over the rest of the event period (e.g. 8.61 percent for the 81-day period). 
This finding suggests that shareholders of the firms which announce share 
repurchases could profit more by holding their shares for a longer event period. 
Market reactions to share repurchase announcements with various buyback methods 
Comparing the market reactions to the share repurchase announcements with different 
repurchasing methods, Panel A of Table 5.2 indicates that the announcements of the 
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three methods of repurchases induce different degrees of market reactions on the day 
of announcements. Abnormal returns on day 0 are 5.93 percent for the firms which 
announce tender offer repurchases. By comparison, the abnormal returns for the open 
market repurchase announcements are 1.12 percent and are 2.71 percent for the 
privately-negotiated repurchase announcements. All the event-day abnormal returns 
are significantly positive, and are also significantly different in magnitude (F statistic 
equals 21.92). 
As the results shown in Panel A of Table 5.2, the significantly positive BHARs are 
found over the various intervals prior to the open market repurchase announcements. 
The BHARs compounded from 40 and 20 days to 2 days prior to the announcements 
are 1.32 and 1.58 percent respectively, which are relatively smaller in size compared 
to the event-day abnormal returns. Figure 5.1 reveals that the BHARs turn to be 
negative over the period from 20 days to 10 days prior to the announcements and start 
to grow up afterwards. The BHARs following the announcements still remain 
upwards trends starting from around 2. 7 percent on the day of announcements and 
reaching about 6.6 percent two months after the announcements. The evidence in 
Panel B of Table 5.2 confirms the positive shareholders' wealth effect induced by 
open market share repurchase announcements. Nonetheless, over the various event 
periods estimated, the wealth of shareholders whose firms announce open market 
repurchases increases less, comparing to shareholders whose firms announce 
privately-negotiated or tender offer share repurchases. 
With respect to the privately-negotiated repurchase announcements, Panel A of Table 
5.2 presents that the BHARs for both pre- and post-announcement event periods 
appear to be positive but the BHARs are only found to be significant over three of the 
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periods. Particularly, the BHARs for the post-announcement period from day 2 to day 
40 are 7.10 percent and statistically significant. On day 0, the announcements induce 
2. 71 percent of abnormal returns which are also significant at one percent level. Panel 
B shows that shareholders of the firms announcing privately-negotiated share 
repurchases earn about 13.69 percent of abnormal returns over the 81-day event 
period. For the other periods, the shareholders' wealth also appears to be positive and 
significant. Figure 5.1 indicates that the BHARs for privately-negotiated repurchases 
have a more fluctuant and steeper uptrend than those for open market repurchases. 
Moreover, Panel A of Table 5.2 shows that shareholders of the firms which announce 
tender offer repurchases only receive abnormal returns before and on the day of the 
announcements. The results signify that the BHARs over a period of from 40 days to 
2 days prior to the announcements are 6.26 percent, which are significantly positive. 
By the day of tender offer repurchase announcements, the shares of the announcing 
firms generally provide 12 percent increases in shareholders' wealth. After the 
announcements, the BHARs all appear to be small in size and insignificant. Panel B 
confirms the evidence presented in Panel A. Over the 81-day period, shareholders are 
found to earn 14.12 percent of abnormal returns. Moreover, around the three-day 
period centred on the announcement day, the announcements induce 6. 78 percent of 
BHARs which are much greater than the wealth effect induced by open market and 
privately-negotiated share repurchase announcements. 
The abnormal returns on the announcement day indicate that the market is not 
indifferent towards the three repurchasing methods. Supporting the prediction of this 
chapter, the evidence in Panel A of Table 5.2 confirms that the tender offer repurchase 
announcements are the most favourite announcements among the three, while open 
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market repurchases induces the smallest market response. This evidence is also 
consistent with the findings of Comment and J arrell ( 1991 ), indicating that the large 
percentage of shares sought and the premiums offered by the announcements of 
tender offer repurchases convey more confirmed and more favourable information to 
the market. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of Peyer and Vermaelen (2005), 
the market reactions to privately-negotiated repurchase announcements are found to 
be positive, implying that the information signalled by the announcements is still 
positive although the large shareholders' selling shares may not be good news. Overall, 
the evidence generally supports the signalling theory of payout policy and the 
prediction of this chapter, indicating that share repurchase announcements are viewed 
as good news for the market while tender offer repurchase announcements are the 
most welcome among the three repurchasing methods. 
5.5.2. Long-term shareholders' wealth effect of share repurchases 
Accordingly, the evidence of the long-term wealth effect generally supports the initial 
prediction of this chapter, indicating that undervaluation is an important reason for 
announcing share repurchases. That the announcements are preceded by a long-term 
downtrend of returns performance furnishes strong evidence in support of the 
undervaluation hypothesis. Moreover, the open market repurchase and 
privately-negotiated repurchase announcements are followed by an uptrend returns 
performance over the two-year period after the announcements. The 
post-announcement wealth effect of the tender offer repurchases, however, diminish 
six month after the announcements, which is remarkably consistent with the 
prediction of this chapter. 
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Long-term wealth effect of the full sample 
Table 5.3 demonstrates the estimates of the abnormal returns and BHARs for a 
49-month period centred on the month of announcements. The first three panels 
present the results generated by FTSE-index reference portfolios, size reference 
portfolios and size/market-to-book ratio reference portfolios respectively. Generally, 
the employment of the reference portfolios does not generate different results, so the 
report will be mainly emerged from Panel C unless additional notice. The last two 
panels present the results by estimating the three-factor model. Note that the estimates 
by this model are the average monthly abnormal returns rather than BHARs. As a 
consequence, the estimates would be analogous to the BHARs when they time the 
length of the intervals. 
The BHARs compounded over the vanous intervals appear to be significant 
regardless of pre- or post-announcement. Consistent with the prediction, repurchase 
announcements are generally preceded by a downtrend of price performance and 
followed by an uptrend of price performance. The announcing firms suffer from 
approximate 8. 7 percent declines in abnormal returns over two years before 
announcing share repurchases. Over the one-year period and six-month period prior to 
the announcement, the firms experience declines in abnormal returns about 4.3 
percent and 2.5 percent. In contrast to the pre-announcement returns, the 
post-announcement returns increase about 6.2 percent in two years and about 4.3 
percent in one year. The increases in the abnormal returns are both statistically and 
economically significant. Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 plot the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) compounded from two years prior to the announcements. Based on 
the figures, it is shown that a downwards trend exists until two months prior to the 
announcement, following with a long-term and steeper uptrend which also includes a 
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sudden boost on the month of announcements. 
The results by estimating the three-factor model do not totally agree with those by 
reference portfolios. Panel D of Table 5.3 presents the estimates of equally-weighted 
average abnormal returns. Since the abnormal returns and BHARs in the above panels 
are equally-weighted, the estimates in Panel D could make a corresponding 
comparison. In general, the pre-announcement and the event-month abnormal returns 
in Panel D do not seem to differ apparently from those presented in the previous three 
panels. The firms averagely earn 4.71 percent of abnormal returns on the month of 
announcing repurchases. The pre-announcement abnormal returns for the previous 
two-year period are averagely -0.26 percent per month, which is about -6.24 percent 
for the whole period. Similarly, the abnormal returns for the one-year period prior to 
repurchase announcements are -0.56 percent per month and those for the previous 
six-month period are -0.59 percent per month. The evidence, in agreement with the 
prediction of undervaluation hypothesis, suggests that the sample firms suffer 
long-term declines in stock prices before they announce repurchases. 
The post-announcement abnormal returns estimated by the three-factor model differ 
to some extent from those by reference portfolios. The average abnormal returns for 
the subsequent six-month period are 0.36 percent per month, which is analogous to 
2.20 percent for the whole period. This result is not far different from that by 
reference portfolios. Nevertheless, the average monthly abnormal returns for the 
subsequent one-year and two-year periods are respectively 0.04 percent and -0.04 
percent (respectively about 0.59 and -1.04 percents for the whole period), which are 
much divergent from the estimates of the reference portfolios. Take the corresponding 
estimates in Panel C as example, the BHARs for the subsequent one-year and 
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two-year periods are 4.30 and 6.26 percents respectively. 
In Panel E of Table 5.3, the estimates are similar to those presented in Panel D, except 
the estimates for the two-year periods preceding and following the announcements. 
The different results obtained may stem from various price performances between 
large and small firms during the second year preceding and following the 
announcements. However, for the rest periods, given the similar results of 
equally-weighted and value-weighted returns, the large firms and small firms seem to 
have consistent price behaviours. 
Taken together, the overall results, on one hand, completely support the prediction of 
the undervaluation hypothesis, indicating that the undervaluation of firm price is a 
major motive for announcing share repurchases. On the other hand, positive abnormal 
returns following the announcements also tell a possible story about that the market 
may revise their evaluation of the firm value. Although the evidence by estimating the 
three-factor model is not as explicit as that generated by the reference portfolios, the 
abnormal returns during the subsequent six month is remarkably observable. Finally, 
consistent with the results of short-term abnormal returns, the abnormal returns of the 
event month is positive, suggesting that repurchase announcements are generally 
viewed as good news to the market. 
Long-term wealth effect by the methods of share repurchases 
Table 5.3 likewise presents the estimates of the abnormal returns by three repurchase 
methods. The estimates by the reference portfolios suggest that firms which announce 
tender offer repurchases experience about 5.4 percent increase in abnormal returns on 
the month of announcements while firms which announce the other repurchase 
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methods only experience 3 to 4 percent increase in abnormal returns. The estimates in 
Panel C and D provide similar evidence, but they indicate higher abnormal returns 
around tender offer repurchase (about 7.5 percent). These results are consistent with 
the prediction as well as the results of short-term abnormal returns, indicating that 
tender offer repurchases are more favourable to the market. 
As predicted by the undervaluation hypothesis, Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 illustrate that 
negative abnormal returns start appearing on 18 months prior to the open market 
repurchase announcements and reach the bottom by a month prior to the 
announcement. The Panel C estimates indicate that shareholders of the firms which 
announce open market repurchases would suffer about 6.68 percent declines in 
abnormal returns over the two-year pre-announcement period. By contrast, they 
would profit about 8.48 percent over the post-announcement period if they hold the 
shares for two years. However, even if they hold the share for only one year after the 
announcement, their pre-announcement loss could be almost offset by the 
post-announcement profits. The estimates in Panels D and E furnish similar results for 
the one-year pre-announcement period and the estimates in Panel D further provide 
consistent results for the one-year post-announcement period. Based on the evidence, 
it is suggested that the announcements of open market repurchases are preceded by at 
least one year of downtrend price performance and are followed by at least six months 
of upward price performance. It seems possible that undervaluation is a determinant 
reason for announcing open market repurchases. The market seems to perceive this 
signal and revise their evaluation following the announcements. 
The estimates by the reference portfolios and the estimates by the three-factor model 
provide more consistent evidence for privately negotiated repurchase announcements. 
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The results obtained reveal that, for a long horizon, the announcement is not bad news 
to the firms and the market. Positive abnormal returns appear on the month of 
announcements and two of three examined post-announcement intervals. Over the 
two-year period following the announcement, the Panel C estimate indicates that the 
firms earn 12.82 percent of abnormal returns while the Panel D estimate indicates 
0.98 percent of average monthly abnormal returns (about 23.5 percent for the whole 
period). 
Although negative abnormal returns appear over the first six months following the 
announcements, the abnormal returns are small in size and insignificant. However, 
firms which announce privately-negotiated repurchases suffer much more severe loss 
in share returns than firms which announce open market repurchases over the 
pre-announcement period. The estimates in Panel C of Table 5.3 reveal that they 
suffer 26.65 percent loss for the preceding two-year period, 14.18 percent for the 
preceding one-year period and 8.65 percent for the preceding six-month period. 
Although the estimates in Panels D and E of Table 5.3 are more conservative, they 
also indicate -1.3 percent of average monthly abnormal returns for the preceding 
six-month period. Figures 2, 3, 4 reveal that the BHARs of the firms have a sharp 
drop over the pre-announcement period, and are unable to recover to the original 
returns level over the post-announcement period. The evidence for privately 
negotiated repurchases implies that, no matter who (either the firms or their large 
shareholders) propose the share repurchases, undervaluation of the share price is still a 
determinant of announcing the share repurchases. The positive post-announcement 
abnormal returns during one- or two-year subsequent period indicate that the firms, 
which possess superior information, make a better decision than their large 
shareholders over a long-term period. 
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The wealth effect of the tender offer share repurchases appear to be divergent from the 
other two repurchase methods. The estimates in Panel C of Table 5.3 suggest that 
firms which announce tender offer repurchases experience -7.93 percent of BHARs 
for the two-year pre-announcement period. Nonetheless, the BHARs for the one-year 
and six-month pre-announcement periods are respectively 7.65 and 5.27 percent. By 
comparison, the estimates in Panel D present negative average monthly abnormal 
returns for these two periods, but they are insignificant and close to zero. Figures 5.2, 
5.3, and 5.4 clearly demonstrate the pattern of the return performance. The most 
negative abnormal returns appear during the period of 24 to 18 months prior to the 
announcements. Positive abnormal returns (about 13 percent) start appearing from six 
months prior to the announcement and reach the top on six months post to the 
announcement. After the six months following the announcement, the effect of the 
announcement seems to be disappearing and the abnormal returns drop again. The 
estimates in Panels D and E present larger negative abnormal returns for the 
post-announcement period. The results obtained reveal that tender offer repurchases 
are an effective mechanism to raise the share price after the long-term undervaluation. 
In the event month, the announcements generate five to seven percent of abnormal 
returns for the investors. However, the effect disappears soon after the announcements. 
This finding is consistent with the initial prediction of this chapter stating that the 
positive wealth effect of the tender offer announcements do not last long as the wealth 
effect of the open market repurchase announcements does. 
Overall, the results indicate that undervaluation is a factor which induces the 
announcements of share repurchases. The findings of the negative pre-announcement 
abnormal returns are consistent with Oswald and Young (2004) while the findings of 
the positive post-announcement abnormal returns are consistent with the findings of 
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Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995; 2000) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2005). 
As for the announcements of tender offer repurchases, the results present positive 
abnormal returns in the event month, which should be attributed to the repurchase 
premium and large fraction of shares sought offered by the repurchases. However, the 
effect of the announcement does not last long after the announcements. 
5·5·3· Managerial motives for various payout policies 
The multinomial logit model employs a variety of firm characteristics to predict the 
chance of the firms' payout policy. It is found that low market-to-book ratio is 
common to firms which announce share repurchases while the characteristic of high 
operating incomes is inherent in dividend-paying firms. This evidence implies that 
undervaluation is a determinant for announcing share repurchases while signalling for 
firms' operating performance is for announcing dividends. 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the multinomial logit model. The category of firms 
which do not pay out cash (category 0) is the smallest in size while firms which 
announce both dividends and repurchases have the largest size among the firms. The 
sizes of the firms announcing dividends are the second largest among the four 
categories. The results, opposing to the prediction from the aspect of information 
asymmetry, seem to imply that large firms are more likely to pay out cash. Besides, 
consistent with Fenn and Liang (1997) and Kahle (2002), an implicit indication to 
emerge from the evidence indicates that low financing cost (of the large firm) may be 
one of the factors motivating cash payouts. 
The results of debt ratios only partially support the prediction. As predicted, firms 
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which do not pay out cash have more debts than firms which announce dividends and 
repurchases. This result, therefore, supports the prediction that firms with higher debt 
ratios have less incentive to pay out cash. However, inconsistent with the suggestions 
of Kahle (2002) and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005), firms which only 
announce repurchases have higher debt ratios than firms which announce dividends 
and also firms which announce both dividends and repurchases. It is interesting to 
note that firms announcing both dividends and repurchases have lower debt ratios 
than firms announcing only repurchases. Due that 1) the repurchase in the UK is not 
allowed to finance from debts, and 2) repurchase announcement is not as compulsory 
as dividend announcement, comparing these two categories implicitly indicates that 
firms which only announce repurchases may not have real intention to buyback their 
own shares. 
By implication, the result of operating incomes demonstrates that the signalling 
hypothesis seems to predict dividend policy well. The firms with paying out dividends 
are likely more profitable than firms without paying out dividends regardless of their 
repurchase policy. This evidence indicates that the signalling hypothesis does not 
predict repurchase policy well. 
The volatility of the operating profits is expected to be higher for firms that announce 
repurchases than firms that announce dividends. The results shows that firms which 
announce repurchases are more volatile in operating incomes than firms which 
announce dividends, but the evidence is not significant enough (p-value equals 0.598). 
However, the result points out that firms announcing both dividends and repurchases, 
compared to the other three categories, have relatively permanent operating incomes. 
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The results from comparing intangibles assets are not completely consistent with 
Barth and Kasznik (1999). Firms which announce repurchases have more intangibles 
assets than firms which do not pay out cash. Nevertheless, firms which announce both 
dividends and repurchases have fewer intangibles than firms which announce 
dividends. The latter result is inconsistent with the prediction of Barth and Kasznik 
(1999), presenting that intangibles may not be an appropriate firm characteristic to 
predict repurchase policy. 
Finally, firms without paying out cash, consistent with the prediction, appear to have 
the highest market-to-book ratio among the categories. If market-to-book ratio is a 
proxy for investment opportunity, higher market-to-book ratio means more investment 
opportunities, which would result in less cash payouts. The evidence is consistent 
with the findings of Kahle (2002) in this context. Furthermore, market-to-book ratio 
also indicates undervaluation. Firms announcing repurchases (regardless of their 
dividend policy) have lower market-to-book ratio than firms announcing dividends 
(and firms without paying out cash). This evidence unequivocally supports the 
prediction of the undervaluation hypothesis. 
The only coefficients which are not significant throughout the model are those of total 
cash and equivalents. Firms that announce repurchases (categories 2 and 3) have more 
cash than firm that announce only dividends. However, the levels of significance for 
the coefficients are only 0.142 and 0.122 respectively. 
In conclusion, the overall evidence in Table 5.4 demonstrates that firms with more 
cash, higher operating incomes, lower debts, and lower market-to-book ratio are more 
likely to announce both dividends and repurchases. On the other hand, firms with 
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higher debts, lower operating incomes, and lower market-to-book ratio are more likely 
to announce share repurchases. Firms that announce dividends have some similar 
characteristics but they are larger in size, with more debts, higher operating incomes, 
little less cash, and, more importantly, higher market-to-book ratio. As for firms that 
do not pay out cash, they are with higher debts, lower operating incomes and higher 
market-to-book ratio. Comparing the firm characteristics among these firms, low 
market-to-book ratio is the common characteristic for firms that announce repurchases, 
indicating that firms which suffer from undervaluation would impose repurchase 
announcement to communicate with the market. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
The mam contribution of this chapter is to clarify the wealth effect of and the 
managerial motives for share repurchase announcements in the UK. Particularly, 
investigating and contrasting the managerial motives for announcing share 
repurchases to those for other payout decisions are innovative for the empirical 
studies on the UK share repurchases. This chapter provides clear evidence supporting 
the undervaluation hypothesis from the perspectives of investors and repurchasing 
firms. 
This chapter begins from testing short-term abnormal returns around the share 
repurchase announcements in the UK. Consistent with most previous findings, the 
evidence shows that share repurchase announcements induce significantly positive 
abnormal returns around the announcement day. When the abnormal returns are 
estimated in light of repurchasing methods, the evidence suggests that the market 
reactions to tender offer repurchase announcements are much greater than the 
reactions to open market and privately negotiated repurchase announcements. The 
findings of the greater market reactions to the tender offer repurchases can be 
attributed to the more convinced information guaranteed by the repurchase premiums 
and the large fraction of shares sought (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). Moreover, 
consistent with the findings of Peyer and Vermaelen (2005), the market also responds 
positively to the announcements of privately negotiated repurchases, indicating that 
the announcements are more likely good news to the market. 
Testing long-term abnormal returns provides clear evidence supporting the 
undervaluation hypothesis. The employment of both the "bootstrapping" technique 
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and the three-factor model helps to mitigate the estimation bias of long-term abnormal 
returns (Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999) and thus makes the evidence robust. Share 
repurchase announcements are found to be preceded by negative buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns and followed by positive abnormal returns. Furthermore, the 
undervaluation hypothesis predicts all the repurchase methods well but the patterns of 
return performance for the three repurchase methods are not the same during the 
sample period. Firms which announce open market repurchases and 
privately-negotiated repurchases have suffered from long-term loss in returns before 
the announcement but have a long increase in returns after the repurchases are 
announced. By contrast, the firms announcing tender offer repurchases also 
experience undervaluation prior to the announcements and the share price rises 
sharply around the month of the announcements. However, this positive wealth effect 
diminishes six months after the announcements. If share repurchase announcements 
are employed for signalling firms' undervaluation, tender offer share repurchases, 
considering their higher costs but short-lasting effect, are not an efficient device. 
The multinomial logit model likewise provides the evidence supporting the 
undervaluation hypothesis. Firms which announce only share repurchases are smaller 
in size, with higher debt ratios, less profitable, and with lower market-to-book ratio 
than firms which announce dividends. This finding implies that signalling operating 
performance is unlikely the purpose of repurchases for firms which only announce 
repurchases. On the other hand, firms which announce both dividends and repurchases 
are larger in size, with less debt ratios, more profitable, more permanent in operating 
performance, but with lower market-to-book ratio. Consequently, for such firms, 
signalling both operating performance and undervaluation are likely the motives for 
announcing share repurchases. Moreover, comparing the firms which announce 
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dividends to the firms which announce both dividends and repurchases indicates that 
these firms are similar in operating performance but are different in market-to-book 
ratio. The overall evidence implies that share repurchases are employed for signalling 
undervaluation and dividends are employed for signalling operating performance. 
Furthermore, since dividends and share repurchases are found to be announced for 
different motivations, the evidence implicitly rules out the possibility that repurchases 
are made to substitute dividends. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A shows the frequencies of repurchase announcements distributed in each year. The repurchase 
announcements are grouped by the repurchase methods. Panel B shows the statistics of the firm characteristics which, except payout ratio, are employed as the dependent 
variables of the logit model. The statistical differences of the payout ratios between the categories of"dividend" and "dividend/repurchase" are tested by independent sample 
t test for mean, and Wilcoxon test for median. Total assets themselves are calculated by using natural logarithm. Standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total 
assets is 'measured over a five-year period from year -4 to year 0. All the other variables, except market-to-book ratio, are scaled by total assets. One-way AN OVA and 
median test are applied to test the statistical differences of the mean and median across the categories. The tests are based on a null hypothesis which the means or medians of 
each variable equal across the categories. 
Year Open-Market 
1995 12 
1996 28 
1997 42 
1998 52 
1999 34 
2000 14 
2001 8 
2002 13 
2003 17 
2004 16 
Total 236 
Panel A: The frequency of share repurchase announcements 
Privately-Negotiated Tender Offers 
5 
2 
10 
4 
1 
2 
0 
0 
3 
0 
27 
0 
4 
4 
6 
3 
9 
3 
15 
11 
3 
58 
Total Repurchase 
17 
34 
56 
62 
38 
25 
11 
28 
31 
19 
321 
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Table 5.1 -Continued 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics 
Payout Policy No Payout Dividends Repurchases Dividends/Repurchases 
. . .. 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t Sig. Wilcoxon W Asymp. Sig. 
N 121 1,380 19 238 
Payout Ratio 0.333 0.468 0.507 0.440 -0.206 0.837 184,693 0.245 
Variables F Sig. Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. 
Total Assets (1,000 GBP) 702,869 73,153 5,972,735 484,803 376,354 120,838 7,013,536 619,767 1.845 0.137 61.285 0.000 
Ln(Total Assets) 11.391 11.200 13.133 13.091 11.306 11.702 13.352 13.337 30.772 0.000 61.285 0.000 
Cash & Equivalent/Total Assets 0.212 0.092 0.112 0.071 0.205 0.073 0.120 0.073 20.557 0.000 2.613 0.455 
Short-Term Debt Ratio 0.084 0.028 0.062 0.040 0.099 0.036 0.056 0.033 4.593 0.003 3.980 0.264 
Long-Term Debt Ratio 0.166 0.065 0.152 0.115 0.195 0.139 0.139 0.101 1.476 0.219 3.640 0.303 
Operating Income/Total Assets -0.202 -0.003 0.091 0.086 -0.006 -0.007 0.095 0.089 52.297 0.000 98.204 0.000 
SD(Operating Income/Total Assets) 0.202 0.058 0.035 0.019 0.251 0.056 0.024 0.017 35.277 0.000 68.492 0.000 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.051 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.037 0.000 2.019 0.109 10.215 0.017 
Market-to-Book Ratio 3.008 0.960 2.634 1.630 -0.224 0.740 0.022 1.545 1.695 0.166 29.976 0.000 
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Table 5.2: The market reactions to share repurchase announcements 
This table presents the results of testing the short-term abnormal returns (ARs) and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for different portfolios. Abnormal returns are 
estimated using market model. The BHAR(t~> t2) denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal return, which is calculated by accumulating the AR over the period t1 to t2 while t is the 
day relative to the announcement date. ARt denotes the average abnormal return on day t of each portfolio. Statistical test of significance of AR (different from 0) and BHAR 
(different from 0) are carried out with t test, using the standard deviation of the abnormal returns over the estimation period. The bottom raw is F statistics testing the AR or 
BHAR difference among three repurchase methods. The null test is ARs or BHARs are indifferent among these repurchase methods. Student t statistics or F statistics are 
reported in parentheses, and the significance levels are marked with***, **,and* for 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
Market Model: R; =a+ f3Rm + &; 
Panel A: Abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns for various event days and event periods 
Repurchase Methods N BHAR(-40,-2) BHAR(-20,-2) BHAR(-10,-2) BHAR(-5,-2) AR-1 ARO AR1 BHAR(2,5) BHAR(2,10) BHAR(2,20) BHAR(2,40) 
2.4478% ... 1.8949%··· 1.0834%··· 0.6034%··· 0.3495%··· 2.1273%··· 0.1547% 0.4325%" 1.2141%··· 2.5063%··· 3.5335%··· 
ALL 321 
(3.5068) (3.8895) (3.2310) (2.6991) (3.1272) (19.0328) (1.3842) (1.9347) (3.6208) (5.1443) (5.0622) 
1.3288%" 1.5801%··· 1.1640% ... 0.5806%"" 0.3686%··· 1.1241%··· 0.1263% 0.6606%··· 1.4960%··· 2.7082%"** 3.7286%··· 
Open Market RP 236 
(1.8397) (3.1343) (3.3549) (2.5101) (3.1871) (9.7193) (1.0921) (2.8557) (4.3116) (5.3719) (5.1624) 
4.0286% 2.5950% 2.1031%. 0.6252% -0.1181% 2.7108%··· -0.0285% 0.0862% 1.0564% 4.0505% •• 7.1043%··· 
Privately Negotiated RP 27 
(1.6094) (1.4853) (1.7490) (0.7800) (-0.2946) (6.7631) (-0.0712) (0.1075) (0.8785) (2.3183) (2.8382) 
6.2653% .. 2.8502% 0.2807% 0.6857% 0.4896% 5.9378%··· 0.3556% -0.3342% 0.1406% 0.9663% 1.0772% 
Tender Offer RP 58 
(2.1475) (1.3997) (0.2003) (0.7339) (1.0480) (12.7103) (0.7612) (-0.3577) (0.1003) (0.4745) (0.3692) 
F (2,318) (2.6107)" (0.5814) (0.5976) (0.0271) (0.3211) (21.9221)··· (0.1876) (0.9447) (0.7376) (0.6517) (0.9700) 
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Table 5.2- Continued 
Panel B: Shareholders' wealth during the various periods centre on the announcement day 
Repurchase Methods N BHAR(-1,1) BHAR(-5,5) BHAR(-10,10) BHAR(-20,20) BHAR(-40,40) 
2.6316% ... 3.6674% ... 4.9291 % ... 7.0328% ... 8.6129%··· 
ALL 321 
(13.5932) (9.8931) (9.6233) (9.8267) (8.5620) 
1.6190% ... 2.8602%*** 4.2790%*** 5.9072% ... 6.6764%*** 
Open Market RP 236 
(8.0821) (7.4564) (8.0736) (7.9768) (6.4141) 
2.5642%··· 3.2756%'* 5.7237%*** 9.2096%··· 13.6970%··· 
Privately Negotiated RP 27 
(3.6935) (2.4640) (3.1161) (3.5884) (3.7970) 
6.7830%··· 7.1345%··· 7.2043%··· 10.5995%··· 14.1255%··· 
Tender Offer RP 58 
(8.3828) (4.6046) (3.3652) (3.5434) (3.3596) 
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Figure 5.1: Shareholders' wealth around share repurchase announcements 
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Figure 5.2: Long-term wealth effect adjusted by market returns of FTSE-Index 
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Figure 5.3: Long-term wealth effect adjusted by the returns of size reference 
portfolios 
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Figure 5.4: Long-term wealth effect adjusted by the returns of 
size/market-to-book reference portfolios 
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Table 5.3: Long-term wealth effect of share repurchase announcements 
This table presents the long-term abnormal returns estimated from 24 months prior to repurchase announcements to 24 months posterior to repurchase announcements. The 
table cori,sists of five panels. Panels A, B and C present the BHARs by using event-time approach event study and bootstrapping technique. The expected monthly returns are 
generated by using the average returns of various reference portfolios which are respectively FTSE All Share Index (FTSE), the portfolios sorted by size rank (size) and the 
portfolios sorted by the ranks of size and market-to-book ratio. Since the long-term abnormal returns are biased for long-horizon estimation, the abnormal returns (ARs) and 
the buy-and -hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are adjusted by the average abnormal returns of 1000 pseudo-portfolios (see "bootstrapping procedure" in Section 3.1.3). 
Statistical test of significance of AR (different from 0) and BHAR (different from 0) are measured by the standard deviation of the average ARs or average BHARs of the 
1000 pseudo-portfolios over the corresponding period. Panels D and E present the abnormal returns estimated by calendar-time approach event study. The estimation of 
abnormal returns imposes Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model. The equally-weighted average ARs are shown in panel D while the value-weighted average ARs in 
panel E.'stu<fent t statistics are reported in Parentheses, and the significance levels are marked with a, b, and c for 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
Panel A: BHARs adjusted by the market returns of FTSE All Share Index 
Market Adjusted Returns: AR;,1 = R;,1 - Rm,t (5.2) 
Repurd1ase Methods N BHAR(-24,-1) BHAR(-12,-1) BHAR(-6,-1) ARO BHAR(1,6) BHAR(l,12) BHAR(1,24) 
-10.0789% ... -5.4039% •• -2.9311%. 3.8447%··· 2.6955%* 4.4440% •• 6.4428%* 
ALL 260 (-2.8740) (-2.2877) (-1.8797) (6.0483) (1.6483) (1.9609) (1.8807) 
-7.8952%"* -6.6816% •• -3.9679% •• 3.4969%··· 3.5985%"" 6.9643%··· 8.9085%"* 
Open Market RP 191 (--2.2103) (-2.5415) (-2.1877) (4.9212) (1.9837) (2.6361) (2.2422) 
-26.0426% •• -14.4073%. 
-8.7752% 3.9128%" -1.2037% 6.4158% 12.7908% 
Private Negotiated RP 25 (-2.3301) (-1.9110) (-1.6914) (1.8680) (-0.2620) (0.8535) (1.1564) 
-10.5104% 5.8525% 5.1500% 5.4263%··· 1.4273% -6.1552% -6.4429% 
Tender Offer RP 44 (-0.9711) (0,8411) (1.1221) (3.1994) (0.3523) (-0.9948) (-0.6718) 
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Table 5.3- Continued 
Panel B: BHARs adjusted by the returns of size reference portfolios 
Size Reference Portfolios Adjusted Returns: AR;,1 = R;,1 - Rs,t (5.3) 
Repurchase Methods N BHAR(-24,-l) BHAR(-12,-1) BHAR(-6,-1) ARO BHAR(1,6) BHAR(l,12) BHAR(1,24) 
ALL 260 
-9-.4784%··· -4.7037% •• 
-2.4694% 3.7896%··· 2.7260%. 4.0937%. 4.5641% 
("2.6987) (-1.9882) (-1.5825) (5.9616) (1.6665) (1.8061) (1.3554) 
Open,Market RP 
-7.2333% •• -6.0068% •• -3.4036% ... 3.4200% ... 3.5167%. 6.5546% •• 7.3628%. 
191 (-2.0275) (-2.2872) ( -1.8813) (4.8130) (1.9457) (2.4849) (1.8860) 
-27.1446% .. -14.3185%. 
-8.8131% 3.9852%. -1.0349% 6.7560% 10.0343% 
Private Negotiated RP 25 (-2.4368) (-1.9041) (-1.6996) (1.9026) (-0.2253) (0.8988) (0.9214) 
-9.1473% 6.7925% 5.3630% 5.4059%··· 1.9388% -6.5708% -9.1344% 
Tender Offer RP 44 (-0.8459) (0.9765) (1.1688) (3.1874) (0.4786) (-1.0619) (-0.9707) 
Panel C: BHARs adjusted by the returns of size and market-to-book ratio reference portfolios 
Size and Market-to-Book ratio Adjusted Returns: AR;,1 = R;,1 - Rsmb,t (5.4) 
Repurc~ase Methods N BHAR(-24,-1) BHAR(-12,-1) BHAR(-6,-1) ARO BHAR(1,6) BHAR(l,12) BHAR(l,24) 
ALL 260 
-8.7269% .. -4.3730%. 
-2.3392% 3.7468% ... 2.8731%. 4.3088%0 6.2638%. 
(-2.4814) (-1.8473) (-1.4998) (5.8942) (1.7566) (1.9010) (1.8577) 
OpenJMarket RP 
-6.6865%. -5.8376% •• -3.2476%. 3.3489%··· 3.5681% •• 6.5634% •• 8.4857% •• 
191 (-1.8793) (-2.2209) (-1.7935) (4.7130) (1.9741) (2.4874) (2.1738 
Private Negotiated RP 
-26.6508% .. -14.1873%. 
-8.6518% 3.9395%. -0.7083% 7.1568% 12.8252% 
25 (-2.3865) (-1.8866) (-1.6680) (1.8807) (-0.1542) (0.9522) (1.1795) 
Tend~r Offer RP -7.9336% 7.6513% 5.2786% 5.4391%··· 2.1159% -5.9720% -5.7590% 44 (-0.7346) (1.1012) (1.1505) (3.2070) (0.5223) (-0.9652) (-0.6076) 
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Table 5.3- Continued 
Panel D: Equally-weighted average abnormal returns estimated by Fama-French's three-factor model 
Three-Factor Model: Rpr- Rfl = apr + /31 (Rmr- Rfl) + /32SMB1 + /33HML1 + & pr (5.9) 
Repurcha5e Methods N AR(-24,-1) AR(-12,-1) AR(-6,-1) ARO AR(1,6) AR(I,12) AR(1,24) 
-0.2602% -0.5649% -0.5947% 4.7111% ... 0.3672% 0.0493% -0.0437% 
ALL 260 
(-0.7486) ( -1.4505) (-1.4371) (4.3074) (0.9173) (0.1703) (-0.2007) 
-0.0483% -0.4035% -0.5326% 4.0869%··· 0.5314% 0.2743% 0.0169% 
Open Market RP 191 (-1.0961) (-0.1378) (-0.9319) (3.6603) (1.1335) (0.7850) (0.0688) 
-0.4625% -1.0531% -1.3534% 4.2167% -0.3634% 0.9039% 0.9822% 
Private Negotiated RP 25 (-0.6253) (-1.3045) (-1.1943) (1.5012) (-0.4328) (1.3069) (1.6357) 
-0.7789% -0.0628% -0.1445% 7.5798%··· -1.4536% .. -1.5513% •• -0.7456%. 
Tender Offer RP 44 (-1.5525) (-0.1048) (-0.1738) (33722) (-2.1509) (-2.5614) (-1.7345) 
Panel E: Value-weighted average abnormal returns estimated by Fama-French's three-factor model 
Repurc~ase Methods N AR(-24,-1) AR(-12,-1) AR(-6,-1) ARO AR(1,6) AR(1,12) AR(l,24) 
0.4576% -0.4245% -0.0826% 4.6538%··· 0.2679% -0.0108% -0.1567% 
ALL 260 
(1.0002) (-0.8274) (-0.1375) (4.0729) (0.5259) (-0.0226) (-0.2559) 
0.5320% -0.5495% -0.2794% 3.9339% ... 0.2106% -0.0937% -0.1738% 
OpenMarket RP 191 (1.1030) (-1.0807) (-0.4216) (3.3484) (0.3979) (-0.1885) (-0.2773) 
0.2464% -0.6452% -1.3321% 4.1936% -0.4521% 1.8170% •• 0.8549% 
Private Negotiated RP 25 (0.4155) (-0.8710) (-1.3931) (1.4747) (-0.4855) (2.1082) (1.1485) 
-0.2160% -0.0015% 0.3955% 7.3097% ... -1.1151% -0.9098% -0.7874% 
Tender Offer RP 44 ( -0.3712) (-0.0022) (0.4636) (3.2348) (-1.5389) (-1.3823) (-1.2209) 
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Table 5.4: Managerial motives for the various payout policies 
This table presents the results from the estimation ofthe potential firm's characteristics affecting the firm's payout policy by using a multinomiallogit model as Eq. (5.15). 
The table comprises four columns, which respectively presents the coefficients estimated by setting one of the four categories (payout choices) as the base category in the 
logit model. The categories represent four different payout policies, which include category 0 for the fmn-years with no payout, category 1 for the firm-years with dividend 
payouts, category 2 for the firm-years with repurchase announcements, and category 3 for the fmn-years with both dividend payout and repurchase announcements. The 
variable, total assets, itself is calculated by using natural logarithm. In addition, the variable, standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets, is measured 
over a five-year period from year -4 to year 0. All the other independent variables, except market-to-book ratio, are scaled by total assets. The predicted sign of coefficients 
are presented with "+", "- ', or "NI A". The 'N/ A" represents that the coefficients are not predicted by the hypotheses of this chapter. 
Category 0: No Payouts 
Ln(Total Assets) 
Cash & Equivalent/Total Assets 
Short-Term Debt Ratio 
Long-Term Debt Ratio 
Operating Income/Total Assets 
SD(Operating Income/Total Assets) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
Intercept 
Category 1: Dividends 
Ln(Total Assets) 
Cash & Equivalent/Total Assets 
Short-Term Debt Ratio 
Long-Term Debt Ratio 
Operating Income/Total Assets 
SD(Operating Income/Total Assets) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 
Multinomial Logit Model: Lit = Ln[~~ (j)] = p*'xit for k -:f. j 
P;l (k) 
Base Categories 
Category 0 Category 1 Category 2 
(5.15) 
Category 3 
+!- Coeffici WaldZ p-value +/- Coeffici WaldZ p-value +I~ Coeffici WaldZ p-value +/- Coeffici WaldZ p-value 
+ 
+ 
+ 
N/A 
0.410 3.290 0.001 
-1.295 -1.140 0.253 
-4.449 -3.310 0.001 
-2.945 -2.420 0.016 
20.051 5.900 0.000 
0.335 0.650 0.515 
0.217 0.160 0.872 
+ 
+ 
+ 
NIA 
+ 
-0.410 -3.290 0.001 -
1.295 1.140 0.253 -
4.449 3.310 0.001 + 
2.945 2.420 0.016 + 
-20.05 -5.900 0.000 -
-0.335 -0.650 0.515 + 
-0.217 -0.160 0.872 -
0.005 1.490 0.136 + 
2.551 1.770 0.077 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
-
0.109 0.650 0.515 
-0.469 -0.420 0.677 
-0.724 -0.650 0.517 
-0.911 -0.640 0.522 
-2.493 -1.460 0.144 
-0.670 -1.780 0.075 
-1.908 -1.690 0.091 
0.021 3.790 0.000 
1.031 0.560 0.574 
0.519 2.790 0.005 
-1.764 -1.470 0.142 
-5.172 -3.510 0.000 
-3.855 -2.620 0.009 
17.559 4.580 0.000 
-0.335 -0.530 0.598 
-1.692 -1.000 0.319 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.485 -3.750 0.000 
0.623 0.510 0.607 
5.999 3.880 0.000 
3.826 2.790 0.005 
-20.91 -6.000 0.000 
-
6.373 2.210 0.027 
1.250 0.800 0.424 
0.014 2.840 0.005 
4.987 3.290 0.001 
-0.075 -2.780 0.005 
-0.672 -1.540 0.122 
1.550 1.620 0.106 
0.882 1.820 0.069 
-0.865 -0.970 0.333 
6.708 2.340 0.019 
1.467 2.100 0.035 
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Table 5.4- Continued 
Market-to-Book Ratio - -0.005 -1.490 0.136 + 0.015 3.460 0.001 + 0.009 2.150 0.031 
Intercept -2.551 -1.770 0.077 -1.520 -0.730 0.463 2.435 6.230 0.000 
Category 2: Repurchases 
Ln(Total Assets) + -0.109 -0.650 0.515 - -0.519 -2.790 0.005 -0.594 -3.110 0.002 
Cash & Equivalent/Total Assets + 0.469 0.420 0.677 + 1.764 1.470 0.142 - 1.092 0.840 0.402 
Short-Term Debt Ratio - 0.724 0.650 0.517 - 5.172 3.510 0.000 6.722 4.120 0.000 
Long-Term Debt Ratio - 0.911 0;640 0.522 3.855 2.620 0.009 - 4.737 3.040 0.002 
Operating Income/Total Assets + 2.493 1.460 0.144 - -17.55 -4.580 0.000 - -18.42 -4.730 0.000 
SD(Operating Income/Total Assets) - 0.670 1.780 0.075 + 0.335 0.530 0.598 + 7.043 2.460 0.014 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets + 1.908 1.690 0.091 + 1.692 1.000 0.319 N/A 3.158 1.650 0.099 
Market-to-Book Ratio - -0.021 -3.790 0.000 -0.015 -3.460 0.001 NIA -0.006 -2.490 0.013 
Intercept -1.031 -0.560 0.574 1.520 0.730 0.463 3.955 1.830 0.067 
Category 3: Dividends and Repurchases 
Ln(T otal Assets) + 0.485 3.750 0.000 0.075 2.780 0.005 + 0.594 3.110 0.002 
Cash & Equivalent/Total Assets + -0.623 -0.510 0.607 + 0.672 1.540 0.122 + -1.092 -0.840 0.402 
Short-Term Debt Ratio - -5.999 -3.880 0.000 -1.550 -1.620 0.106 + -6.722 -4.120 0.000 
Long-Term Debt Ratio - -3.826 -2.790 0.005 -0.882 -1.820 0.069 + -4.737 -3.040 0.002 
Operating Income/Total Assets + 20.917 6.000 0.000 + 0.865 0.970 0.333 + 18.424 4.730 0.000 
SD(Operating Income/Total Assets) - -6.373 -2.210 0.027 + -6.708 -2.340 0.019 - -7.043 -2.460 0.014 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets + -1.250 -0.800 0.424 + -1.467 -2.100 0.035 NIA -3.158 -1.650 0.099 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.014 -2.840 0.005 - -0.009 -2.150 0.031 NIA 0.006 2.490 0.013 
Intercept -4.987 -3.290 0.001 -2.435 -6.230 0.000 -3.955 -1.830 0.067 
Observations 1758 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -1028.267 
Pseudo R2 0.157 
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Summary and Conclusions 
6.1. Overview of the Research 
The major thrust of this thesis has been to explain the central importance of the 
signalling power and the information contents of firms' payout announcements. 
Returning to the questions mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, it is now possible 
to answer that both dividend and share repurchase announcements possess signalling 
power and the information signalled has been received by the market. Nonetheless, 
while dividend announcements mainly signal for firms' operating performance, share 
repurchase announcements more likely signal for the undervaluation of firm value. 
A considerable amount of literature with respect to dividend and share repurchases 
has been reviewed in Chapter 2. A number of studies investigating the relative 
theoretical models and empirical findings have reported a good understanding on the 
background of the research. Chapter 3 begins by testing the shareholders' wealth 
effect of the simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements and looks at whether 
dividends remain informative while earnings information is disclosed at the same time. 
For the purpose of detecting whether the information conveyed by dividend 
announcements is about current or future earnings, investigations are carried out in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 focuses on the signalling of share repurchase announcements, 
examining the shareholders' wealth effect and comparing the managerial motives for 
different payout methods. 
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6.2. Shareholders' wealth effect of simultaneous 
dividend and earnings announcem.ents 
Previous research findings into the shareholders' wealth effect around dividend 
announcements have been well documented. Nevertheless, there is increasing concern 
about that the dividend effect is not necessarily "pure" if the information contained in 
earnings has not been well measured. In an attempt to investigate the shareholders' 
wealth effect "purely" induced by the information implicit in dividends, Chapter 3 
takes advantage of the simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements to test the 
effects of dividends and earnings on the same information set. Additionally, to find 
out whether the dividend, earnings, or interaction effect is the main factor affecting 
shareholders' wealth, the relative contributions of the effects on the event-day market 
reactions are explicitly examined by using the regression analysis. In the test on the 
interaction effect, it is assumed that the investors jointly evaluate the information 
conveyed by the simultaneous announcements. Moreover, separate variables are set 
on the earnings effect in the light of earnings increases, earnings declines and future 
earnings. The split of the earnings effects distinguishes the signalling power of 
earnings increases, earnings declines and prospect for future earnings. It could 
conceivably be argued that the more informative these earnings effects are, the less 
prominent the dividend effect is expected to be. 
Additionally, this study has been drawn attention on the relation between the level of 
information asymmetry and market reactions. Based on the notion that the 
information about large firms is more obtainable than that about small firms, market 
capitalisations are used as the proxy for information asymmetry. This study tests the 
differential information hypothesis which predicts that the market reactions to the 
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announcements made by small firms should be larger in magnitude than those made 
by large firms. 
The findings of Chapter 3 can be outlined as follows: 
1. The results suggest the existence of both dividend effect and earnings effect. 
However, dividend effect is more prominent in that the market reactions are 
more dependent on the information implicit in dividend announcements when 
dividends and earnings signal for contradictory information. 
2. The differential information hypothesis is supported by the inverse relation 
between the level of information asymmetry and the market reactions to the 
announcements of dividend increases. The inverse relation appears to be the 
most prominent in the portfolio of simultaneous increases in dividends and 
earnings, indicating that the announcements made by small firms are more 
informative to investors. This evidence confirms that the market reactions to 
the simultaneous announcements are dependent on the level of information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. 
3. The evidence confirms the existence of the dividend effect and the interaction 
effect between dividends and earnings information. No significant earnings 
effect is found before the test partitions the effects into earnings increases and 
earnings declines. Nonetheless, when the test considers the effect of earnings 
increases and declines individually, the effect of earnings declines is 
remarkably manifest. This finding, consistent with the initial prediction, 
maintains that the earnings declines are more informative than earnings 
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mcreases. Moreover, this result implicitly suggests that dividends play a 
confirmative role for earnings increases. 
4. The significant relation between the event-day abnormal returns and the 
earnings changes of the following half-year is apparently presented by the 
evidence of the findings. Moreover, the effect of future earnings does not 
influence the effect of dividend announcements on the event-day abnormal 
returns. Combined with the above findings, it can thus be implied that 
dividends may only convey the confirmative information for current earnings 
increases but do not signal for future earnings changes. Nevertheless, the 
market updates the expectations for future earnings based on the information 
signalled by the simultaneous announcements. 
6.3. Earnings information signalled by dividends 
To investigate whether current earnings are represented or future earnings changes are 
signalled by dividend changes, Chapter 4 furthermore examines directly the 
association of dividends with current and future earnings. Difficulties arise in 
previous studies when an attempt is made to apply methods to control for the mean 
reversion and autocorrelation in earnings process. This, however, may result in 
spurious findings on the relation between dividends and earnings. To this end, this 
thesis attempts various methods on controlling the mean reversion and autocorrelation 
in earnings process and aims to provide incremental evidence for the association of 
dividends with current and future earnings. Three empirical methods, namely, 
categorical analysis, multivariate regression models and binary logit models, are 
applied to test the information content in d\vidends. For these examinations, the 
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signalling hypothesis predicts that 1) the earnings performance of the firms with 
dividend continuations should be better (worse) than that with dividend cuts 
(increases), 2) dividend changes signal for current and future earnings changes, and 3) 
managers should take current and future earnings changes into account when making 
dividend decisions. 
The evidence in Chapter 4 is found to be consistent with the findings of Benartzi, 
Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005). The 
findings are documented as follows: 
1. Except the firms with small dividend cuts, the evidence that dividends 
represent the performance of current earnings is confirmed by the categorical 
analysis. In comparison to the firms with dividend continuations, the firms 
with large dividend cuts have inferior current earnings performance while the 
firms with dividend increases experience better performance on current 
earnings. 
2. Controlling the mean reversion and autocorrelation in earnings process, the 
multivariate models provide more explicit results for the associations of 
dividend changes with current and future earnings changes. No matter which 
models are employed to control for the mean reversion and the autocorrelation, 
the findings are robust and show that the relation between dividends changes 
and current earnings changes is explicit while the relation between dividend 
changes and future earnings changes is trivial. 
3. The findings of the logit model manifestly illustrate that the increases 
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(declines) in current earnings promote the likeliness of dividend increases 
(cuts). Nonetheless, no obvious evidence about future earnings possessing 
influence on managers' dividend decisions is detected in the models. 
6.4. Managerial motives for and market reactions 
to share repurchase announcements 
Chapter 5, implementing the investigations on share repurchase announcements, not 
only focuses on the shareholders' wealth effect but also compares the managerial 
motives for various payout decisions. A number of new evidence on the UK share 
repurchases, which has been drawn little attention in previous studies, is well 
presented in this chapter. Firstly, the shareholders' wealth effect is examined in terms 
of three repurchase methods (open market, privately-negotiated and tender offer). It is 
innovative to examine both the long-term and short-term shareholders' wealth effect 
of the tender offer share repurchase announcements in the UK and, furthermore, 
compare the signalling power of the three repurchase methods. More particularly, the 
long-term abnormal returns directly test the undervaluation hypothesis which states 
that share repurchases are announced to signal for the firms' undervaluation of share 
prices. On the other hand, to examine whether the substitution relation exists between 
share repurchases and dividends as well as to compare the managerial motives for the 
different payout decisions, the multinomial logit model is applied to test the 
association between the firms' characteristics and four payout decisions naming 1) no 
payouts 2) cash dividends 3) share repurchases and 4) both dividends and share 
repurchases. 
The findings of Chapter 5 generally support the undervaluation hypothesis of share 
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repurchases, maintaining that the undervaluation of the firm value is the main reason 
for announcing share repurchases. The findings can be presented as follows: 
1. For all three share repurchase methods, the market reacts positively on the day 
of share repurchase announcements. In light of this result, the evidence 
obtained confirms that share repurchase announcements convey good news 
about the firms to their shareholders. Furthermore, it is suggested that the 
wealth effect of the tender offer repurchase announcements is the largest 
among the three methods, which may stem from the repurchase premiums and 
hence stronger signals provided by tender offer share repurchases. This finding 
is consistent with the fmdings of Masulis (1980) and Comment and Jarrell 
(1991). 
2. From the findings on long-term abnormal returns, it shows that the 
undervaluation hypothesis predicts all the repurchase methods well. Consistent 
with the prediction of the undervaluation hypothesis, the repurchase 
announcements are found to be preceded by long-term downtrend of return 
performance, and the open market and privately-negotiated repurchase 
announcements are further followed by positive long-term returns 
performance. The wealth effect of the tender offer repurchase announcements 
does not last long and diminishes six months after the announcements. 
3. The evidence of the multinomiallogit model indicates that the primary motive 
for share repurchases is to signal the undervaluation of firm value. By 
comparison, the managerial motive for announcing dividends is to signal for 
firms' operating performance. The two payout methods do not seem to be the 
Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusions 
substitute for each other. 
6o5· Limitations and further research 
Managerial prospect and future earnings 
Throughout this thesis, the examinations are carried out by testing the historical data 
of the sample firms. The objective historical data help to furnish the evidence 
reflecting authentically the firms' or the market's previous recorded behaviours. 
However, this thesis was limited by those behaviours which have not been formally 
recorded. For instance, historical data are not able to formally record managerial 
prospect of future earnings in that managers' prospect is a kind of private information 
which is only known by insiders. Consequently, this thesis imposes the real 
subsequent earnings performance as the proxies for managers' prospect of future 
earnings. The underlying assumption is that managers are capable of anticipating their 
firms' future performance. A main drawback of this assumption is that it neglects the 
possibility that the real future performance of the firms may be sometimes far 
divergent from what managers expect. As a consequence, the real subsequent earnings 
performance is not always an appropriate proxy for managerial prospect. 
Conroy, Eades, and Harris (2000) do not encounter similar problem on testing the 
signalling of dividends on future earnings performance. They examine Japanese 
sample whose dividends, earnings and managerial prospect of future earnings are 
announced simultaneously. As a result, the data of managerial prospect of future 
earnings are feasible for Japanese sample and thus can be examined without using 
proxies. Nonetheless, similar data are not feasible for the UK market. 
Alternatively, the method undertaken by De Jong, Van Dijk, and Veld (2003) could be 
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a feasible approach to get the data of managerial prospect. Firstly, they carry out a 
survey on managers' prospect which is normally unknown by outsiders. Then, the 
managers' responses to the survey are employed for empirical examinations. The main 
advantage of this approach is that it examines the first-hand data from managers and 
thus its findings are not influenced by the employment of proxies. However, some 
drawbacks are inherent in this approach. Firstly, this approach may take several years 
to complete a sufficient sample, and the costs of the data collection should be 
enormous. Secondly, survivor bias may be caused when the rate of usable responses 
are low. Thirdly, even with a prudent design on the questionnaire, managers may not 
truly reveal their attitudes (particularly about bad news), making this method feasible 
but inefficient. 
To conclude, this thesis employs firms' future earnings performance as the proxy for 
managerial prospect. This limitation was raised in that managerial prospect of future 
earnings are not formally announced and thus not formally recorded in the UK market. 
This problem can be solved when someday managers are regulated to announce their 
prospect of future earnings with dividends and earnings. 
More speculations on the UK share repurchases 
This study successfully distinguishes the motives for announcing dividends and for 
announcing share repurchases. The findings are based on the assumption that the 
firms could only choose 1) not to distribute cash, 2) to pay dividend solely 3) to make 
share repurchases only, or 4) to pay by both dividends and share repurchases. 
Although this grouping is rational, further research on this issue is suggested to 
consider more payout decisions. For example, Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 
(2000) consider the changes in dividends and share repurchases when splitting the 
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tested sample. This grouping offers a more sophisticating examination on the motives 
for payout decisions but it requires a large sample of share repurchases and dividends. 
Additionally, except open market repurchases, previous studies pay less attention to 
tender offer repurchases and privately-negotiated repurchases in the UK market. The 
US fmdings suggest that each of the repurchase methods conveys different 
information to the market (Comment and Jarrell 1991). In this study, it has 
unequivocally presented the findings of the market's different reactions to the 
announcements of the various methods of share repurchases, and has also concluded 
that the undervaluation is the main information signalled by share repurchases. 
Nonetheless, it would be interesting to examine further on the difference between 
these repurchase methods. For example, why do managers pay the price premium 
through tender offer repurchases when they can distribute the cash less costly by open 
market repurchases? Or, similar to what is examined in Peyer and Vermaelen (2005), 
does the divergence between the market price and the negotiated price of the 
privately-negotiated share repurchases signal for any valuable information about the 
firms? Or, does the liberalisation of treasury shares increase managers' propensity or 
change their purpose of making share repurchases? The UK share repurchases merit 
further investigations to answer the riddles as their growth in the future. 
6.6. Summary of implications 
Overall, this thesis examines both dividend and share repurchase announcements in 
the UK, and the results indicate manifest implications for both managers and 
investors. 
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The first implication for managers suggests that earnings increases announcements 
have to be backed by the announcements of dividend increases. The signals solely 
relying on the announcements of earnings increases are not creditable enough to earn 
investors' trust. The earnings increases announcements induce strong and positive 
market reactions only when they are announced with dividend increases. For those 
earnings increase announcements with dividend cuts or dividend continuations, the 
market relatively reacts weakly. By contrast, the dividend signalling for earnings 
declines is not as important as that for earnings increases. The underlying reason 
should be that earnings decline announcements more likely convey true information to 
the investors, which indirectly reduces the importance of dividend signalling. 
Moreover, managers are suggested to incorporate their prospects of firms' future 
performance in the simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements. The evidence 
indicates that current earnings performances are not investors' only concern when 
they evaluate the new information signalled by the announcements. Relatively, they 
jointly evaluate the information implicit in dividend and earnings changes. 
Furthermore, they revise their expectations for future earnings accordingly . 
. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that, under the scenario of differential information, 
investors of small firms are more anxious for the firms' information than those of 
large firms. The evidence shows that the market reactions to the announcements of 
dividend increases magnify as the firm size becomes smaller. Consequently, the third 
implication for managers suggests that small firms with good news are in more need 
to make the announcements and signal their superiority in operating performance. 
Fourthly, if managers intend to signal for the undervaluation of firm value by 
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announcing share repurchases, tender offer share repurchases are not a recommended 
mechanism based upon the findings of this thesis. By comparison, open market and 
privately-negotiated share repurchases should be better choices. The evidence on 
share repurchases presents that announcing tender offer repurchases elicits larger 
wealth effect, which indirectly represents that the information signalled by tender 
offer share repurchases is stronger than the other repurchase methods (open market 
and privately-negotiated). Nevertheless, the long-term wealth effect of the tender offer 
share repurchase announcements is also found to diminish rapidly six months 
following the announcements. In addition, due to repurchase premiums, repurchasing 
firms normally incur larger cash outflow when buying back own shares by tender 
offers. 
This thesis also provides two implications for investors. Firstly, dividend changes only 
reflect current earnings performance but do not signal for future earnings changes. 
The evidence does not show any explicit association between dividend changes and 
the changes in future earnings. Relatively, the relation between dividend changes and 
the changes in current earnings is manifest. When making dividend decisions, 
managers likely take account of current rather than future earnings performance. 
Secondly, comparing dividends and share repurchases announcements implies that 
these two announcements are employed for signalling different information. The 
recurrence and regularity nature of dividends make them a better mechanism for 
signalling firms' operating performance which is likewise announced regularly. As 
what this thesis mentions above, dividend increase announcements are capable of 
making the announcements of earnings increases reliable. By contrast, share 
repurchase announcements which are not necessarily completed afterward may not be 
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sufficient enough for corroborating the announcements of earnings increases. 
However, managers take advantage of share repurchase announcements to signal for 
the undervaluation of firm value and may even buy back own shares with bargain 
prices. This unique function is what dividends announcements do not possess. From 
the perspective of signalling, dividends and share repurchases are not substitutes for 
each other. 
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